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

Borden Parker Bowne

# Borden Parker Bowne

## HIS LIFE AND HIS PHILOSOPHY

By

FRANCIS JOHN McCONNELL

One of the Bishops of the Methodist
Episcopal Church

PRESBYTERIAN THEOLOGICAL
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THE ABINGDON PRESS
NEW YORK CINCINNATI CHICAGO

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Printed in the United States of America

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# CONTENTS

PAGE
I. Youth ... 9
II. Student ... 23
III. The Critic ... 51
IV. The Realist ... 87
V. The Idealist ... 106
VI. The Transcendental Empiricist ... 111
VII. The Theist ... 120
VIII. The Personalist ... 131
IX. Bowne and Pragmatism ... 149
X. The Achievements in Ethical Theory ... 163
XI. The Defender of Biblical Research ... 179
XII. The Religious Guide ... 207
XIII. The Foe of Officialism ... 228
XIV. The Teacher and His Methods ... 240
XV. The Trip Around the World ... 250
XVI. The Closing Days ... 264
XVII. Postscript ... 270
XVIII. Bibliography ... 282
Articles by Borden P. Bowne ... 282
Index ... 287

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# CHAPTER I

## YOUTH

**BORDEN PARKER BOWNE** was born at Leonardville near what is now called Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, January 14, 1847. The ancestry of the Bowne family can be traced back to William and Ann Bowne, English Puritans, who in 1631 came to Salem, Massachusetts, and thirty years later moved to Monmouth County, New Jersey. James Bowne, the son of William and direct ancestor of Borden Parker Bowne, was a leader in the settlement of New Jersey, noted for his fairness especially in dealing with the Indians, whose language he so mastered that he often acted as interpreter between them and the whites.

Borden Parker always spoke of his father, Joseph Bowne, and of his mother, Margaret Parker Bowne, with deepest respect. There seemed to be nothing in his memory of his early days to becloud his feeling of admiring regard for them. The father was evidently a man of solidity and deep moral sense, not given to much speech, but when he did speak doing so forcefully and to the point. He was an abolitionist when it cost something to speak against slavery. He was called in those days a "squire"—in other words, a justice of the peace—and for many years a considerable portion of his income was in legal fees. The mother was likewise a character of straightforward simplicity with a marked vein of mystic piety, and yet a notable housekeeper, keeping her silver spoons and her mahogany table always scrupulously bright.

The home was a farmhouse of moderate size and altogether unpretentious, well built, of about the same type as could be found by the score in American rural sections a hundred years ago, and completely adapted to its purposes. Farmers in those days had little ready money, and their aim in house building was to get as much for their expenditure as possible. The Bowne family was large, consisting of the parents and six children; the youngsters came into such closeness of contact with one another as to bring out into expression the strong characteristics of each. Some of the experiences of the boyhood days furnished a storehouse of apt illustrations, which was later drawn upon to set forth the profoundest teachings of metaphysics. There was begotten in the young Bowne also a fondness for nature's processes which grew stronger with the passage of the years. The Bowne roses, grown in the garden at Longwood, were a late ripening of the love of plant life which began in the early days in Jersey. After his return from Europe in 1882 Bowne visited the home place, looked from the porch over the sixty-five-acre farm, and declared that it was "real living" just to gaze again on the old scenes. Something of the spell of the early life remained on the mind of Bowne to the end. He used to say that having passed his boyhood near the sea with his windows looking out upon salt water, he did not believe he could ever live happily far from the ocean; and that if fate had compelled him to return to the homestead of his boyhood, after he had reached the age of sixty, he could contentedly live out his remaining days among the early memories.

In any community, no matter how remote, incidents occur which by their arresting, dramatic quality fasten themselves in the minds of growing youngsters unforgettably. No one who ever heard Bowne in his later days describe some events in the neighborhood in which he lived as a boy could fail to be impressed with the strong sense for the dramatic which must have marked him from early years. I recall in particular one such story. There lived in the Leonardville neighborhood a brilliantly endowed physician, who after giving promise of an unusual career, fell into the drink habit, and went from bad to worse, always coming out of his sprees in an agony of remorse. Recovering consciousness from one such debauch, the drunkard found himself staring death in the face. His half-crazed mind realized that the end was at hand, and he besought his tipsy crony, a lawyer, to console the last moments by reciting a prayer. All this took place in a tumble-down barn into which the drinkers had crept to sleep off their stupor. A terrific thunderstorm was raging, and the neighbors, wondering at seeing a light in the abandoned building, went out into the wild night to seek the cause. They found the dying man trying to pull himself together to face death, with the gin-soaked lawyer sitting in a light made by an inch of candle reciting the Lord's Prayer and entering exceptions and suggesting improvements in the Prayer as he muttered along! The dramatic qualities of the scene Bowne never forgot—the fury of the night itself, the contrasts between the significant and the absurd, the sublime and the mean, the tragic and the ridiculous did not fade from his memory. Such an incident encountered in later life might have seemed to him sordid and degrading, but not so as etched in a youthful mind keenly responsive to the dramatic.

I put here a quotation from an article in *The Christian Advocate,* December 20, 1894, to show how Professor Bowne drew upon boyhood memories for illustrations in expounding philosophy:

> The veriest crank has but to label himself a scientist to gain prestige with the untrained. This fact has made science, scientist, and scientific the great question-begging epithets of our time. The logical state of the case is well illustrated by the following legend out of the region of my childhood: There was in that region a family of wealth and social prestige by the name of Hartshorne. On one occasion there had been a drawing of the seine, resulting in an apostolic draught of fishes. These were sent across the bay to the New York market in charge of a hired man, to whom, as often happens with the servants in wealthy families, the name of his employer was above every name. But the day was hot, and the fish spoiled; and when the clerk of the market, as the inspector was then called, came around, he ordered the

> man in charge of the fish to remove them. Now, to the hired man this interference was something incredible, and, thinking to end the matter by a great stroke, he bawled out, "My name's Hartshorne." But the inspector was a person of much uncircumcision of heart and speech, and there was no fear of Hartshorne before his eyes. Accordingly, he made the unfeeling reply: "Hartshorne or the devil's horn, you can't sell that stuff here."
>
> Which thing is an allegory. The man's name was not Hartshorne, and if it had been, the fish were spoiled nevertheless. In like manner we have many persons of slender gifts who are fond of giving themselves out as scientists and their crude imaginings as science; and when the critic complains of the product, their favorite device is to arrogate to themselves the prestige of science by assuming the name. But as in the case of the hired man of the legend, they have no right to the name; and in any case the stuff is bad. We need, then, to be on our guard against this undiscriminating faith, and try both the sciences and the scientists as well as the spirits.

The Bowne conscience too was from the outset extremely sensitive, so sensitive that, combined with a proneness to ask questions and to keep on asking them, it might have driven its possessor to distraction if it had not been held in check by an indefinable good sense. For example, the young Borden Parker at a tender age took so seriously the duty of telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that for a period he wondered if he could honestly reply to the question: "What time is it?" For the instant the question is answered the hands of the clock have moved and the answer is no longer true. The youngster got through with all this over-refinement, however, very early. It is interesting to note that there is an echo of this childish reasoning, faint but nevertheless distinct, in the discussion in Metaphysics of Zeno's flying arrow, as to the sense in which a moving object is in a given place at any particular instant.

The religious atmosphere of the home in New Jersey was most wholesome. The father's piety was of the substantial, weighty type which commanded respect from the children and from the neighbors. President Eliot once remarked, with wisdom, that the best legacy a father can leave a son is the memory of a character which the son can always respect, that this is better than the memory of a character which the son can love but cannot always quite respect. There was no lack of affection on the part of the younger Bowne for the elder, but respect, thoroughgoing and genuine, was predominant.

The mother was equally rigorous in solid righteousness—but she seems to have possessed a vein of mysticism as well. Eighty years ago Methodism laid heavy stress on what was called Christian perfection, or entire santification, or heart purity. The aim of historic Methodism in the preaching of such high experience was self-evident enough. There was partly the altogether practical attempt to hold before converts something more than an initial experience. Wesley and his followers knew well enough that not all converts to Methodism would ever get especially close to Christian perfection, but they knew also that the converts would reach something more than a merely rudimentary discipleship if a high ideal were held before them. So there was preached the possibility of attaining a sinless state of grace in this life, this attainment to be achieved through an experience often conceived of after the fashion of a critical change like an instantaneous conversion, though there is no record that either Wesley in England or Asbury in America ever claimed personally an achievement of this nature. In Bowne's boyhood the Methodist emphasis was strongly upon Christian perfection. There was published in New York a monthly called the *Guide to Holiness* which the mother in the Bowne home pored over by the hour. The numbers were cherished as if each were Holy Writ. Bowne used to say that as a boy he had seen the magazine in the home by the shelfful. Now, the *Guide* was much more worthy than we of to-day who smile at the older Methodist accent are likely to realize. It started its readers to the perusal of the classic mystic literature of all ages—the writings of Fénelon and Madame Guyon, for example.

I would not lay much stress on this profusion of material concerning mysticism in the Bowne home as a factor in the development of Borden Parker except that to a degree it set a problem for him. In spite of the remorselessly logical temper of his mind he used to say that he recognized within himself the tendencies to mysticism which, if not curbed, could easily have run to excess. At least it was always easy for him to understand the excesses of the mystic temperament at the very moment when he was severely and almost savagely denouncing such excesses. His service to Methodism in correcting a tendency to overemotionalism will be the theme of a later chapter. Here I wish to point out that Bowne was familiar with the mystic type from the time when he first knew religion. The late Dr. Daniel Steele, in his day a foremost exponent of the doctrine of Christian perfection, used to quote Bowne's *Ethics* as a philosophical warrant for the doctrine. What Bowne said was that the goal of sincere moral endeavor is to bring all phases of human nature—intellectual, emotional, and volitional—into subjection to the moral ideal. The life throughout must be made moral. Stated thus, the aim at perfection is indeed fundamental in the moral struggle, but there were many phases of the Methodist teaching other than this. *The Christian Advocate* was in the house from its first issue in 1826, and the only surviving member of the family, Miss Letitia Bowne, still takes the paper. The Bowne home insisted upon a morality which touched all phases of conduct. It was a solid foundation on which Borden Parker built from the outset. The emotional aspects of religion—one-sided and often absurd—he also knew, and early learned how to guard against them.

The Bowne home was loyal to Methodism, though some of the contacts with Methodist preachers and church members were not fortunate for a mind as keen and a conscience as alert as Borden Parker's. The ordinary Methodist preacher at the middle of the last century was not altogether the ideal character he is sometimes painted. Not all took Francis Asbury as their pattern for studied imitation. The glory of the Methodist Church in the early and middle years of the nineteenth century was on the frontier. Men still living when Bowne was a boy had seen Asbury as he moved to and fro through New Jersey on his trips from Maine to Kentucky and from northern New York to Georgia. To them, and to those of us of a later day, Asbury seems the type and representative of the Methodism of the time. There were Methodists not quite of the Asbury mold. Asbury himself complains of encountering lazy Methodist preachers, though the laziness, in his eyes, consisted chiefly in lying abed till sunrise. More serious was his complaint that the lazy preacher of this type wanted his "dram" as soon as he got out of bed. The frontier demanded a rather rough preacher, somewhat of the Cartwright variety. The pioneer saddlebag itinerant was not always to be distinguished by a look of ineffable religious ecstasy in his eyes. The picture, which many of us have seen, of the itinerant on horseback fording a stream, his eyes turned upward to the skies, while the whirling current played around his knees, is not altogether historical. The pioneer preacher kept his legs out of the water as long as he could, and did not look up at the skies while crossing fords. Now, Bowne was reared in a home where the solid virtues of the Methodist itinerants were not by any means overlooked, but there were some preachers whose virtues were not solid. The roughness which had its place on the frontier too often degenerated into coarseness in communities which had left the frontier conditions behind. The young Bowne saw too many preachers whose rawness made a bad impression upon him, too many who spoke with a voice, or at least a noise, of authority to which they were not entitled. A group of preachers, returning from a Conference one day, stopped in the Bowne neighborhood, expecting entertainment in the middle of the afternoon. One hostess explained that she had cleared her tables and had nothing left in the pantry. Whereupon two or three preachers chased down some of the good woman's chickens and wrung their necks, thus chivalrously helping her to find food, or in this case, more properly, provender. Another itinerant acquaintance was a notable glutton, with a fondness for entering in his diary lists of dishes he had eaten, along with a record of more spiritual experiences. One night he made an entry to the effect that after preaching service he had gone to supper with a lay brother and had "partaken of the following viands." Then followed an appalling enumeration of foods which had been consumed. The entry in the diary the next morning was to the effect that the diarist felt that "somehow the Lord had hidden his face." This same brother once felt aggrieved because Mrs. Bowne cooked a clam pie of such savory seductiveness that one whiff of its fragrance tempted him into breaking a religious fast. The early Methodist preachers soon got beyond the dram-drinking of which Asbury complained, but they were powerful in the chewing of tobacco and were not overdelicate in the process.

The instance of preacher-rudeness which Bowne remembered most vividly occurred in the home at supper one night. A preacher had invited himself to stay as guest. The main dish was a huge bowl of what was once called—perhaps is still called—succotash; that is, Indian corn and beans cooked together—a most appetizing and satisfactory food, which the mothers of those of us now beyond middle life knew so well how to cook. The preacher, however, was not pleased. When the head of the Bowne household offered him a portion he gave a scornful sniff and remarked, "I don't eat fodder." The youngsters sat aghast at this contempt of a favorite dish and this disrespect to the father. Mr. Bowne, senior, went on quietly serving the others and when he had finished remarked that if the good brother saw anything on the table that he could eat he might help himself. It must be admitted that this rather limited the preacher's gustatory prospects.

The laymen of those days also had some peculiar views which were calculated to make dubious impression upon a thoughtful and impressionable youth. The old-time Methodists lived in a simplicity which was intended to be a protest against worldliness. As a reaction from the laxity in England which prevailed when Wesley began his preaching this protest was wholesome. By the severe plainness of their apparel the Methodists bore witness against the extravagance of the "world," though most of them indeed had not enough of this world's goods to disobey the command of the *Discipline* not to put on gold and costly apparel. In America the almost forced plainness became a badge of Methodistic loyalty. The peril in all this was that artificial standards of Christian living could be set up, and were set up. Borden Parker saw from his boyhood this tendency to artificiality in religious ethics. Some of his later-day protests against professedly Christian standards came out of juvenile reaction against the exactness of the mechanicalized ethics which he saw working their customary moral havoc in the Jersey community. One Sunday afternoon Borden was sitting out in front of the house with his father when along came a neighbor. After a word of greeting the caller remarked: "I reckon Brother Lufburrow is a-gittin' worldly."

"Why?"

"Didn't you notice that he wore a pair of gloves to meetin' this mornin'?"

The gloves which had made this damaging revelation of soul were of black cotton. At another time the neighborhood was set agog by the report that a bishop in Connecticut had ordained a minister without taking the gloves off his ordaining hands. The report was probably a base slander, but it supplied material for debate in plenty, only here the debate soon passed beyond the question of worldliness to that of the validity of the orders thus bestowed. One ministerial worthy gave it as his opinion that an ordination with gloved hands was no more efficacious than if it had been administered through a ten-foot pole.

I mention incidents of this sort to make clear the beginnings of some reactions which came to full statement years later. Borden Parker Bowne did more than anyone else of his time to clarify the thinking of the Methodist Church as to central phases of religious experience. If he had not come from a home where inner piety was soundly taught, and from a community where, in spite of such incidents as I have mentioned, the preachers effectively set forth sturdy moral and religious doctrine, and if he had not himself responded to that teaching, he would never have kept the fires of a devotion to Methodism burning through all the years. His own loyalty gave him a right to speak sharply about the dangers of the Methodist type of experience. "Religion," he used to say, "is a dangerous drug unless it is wisely administered." His own recollections furnished him with illustrations of wise and unwise administration.

All of which reduces at last to this—that Borden Parker Bowne had a normal and happy home life in his boyhood, with unusual opportunity in training in some insights which proved of value to him in his after religious and philosophical study. Perhaps we overdo the emphasis on the naturalness of life on the American farm of seventy-five or a hundred years ago. In some aspects the farmer's life was quite as artificial in those days as city life. Yet there can be little doubt that being reared, if not on a farm in the present-day use of the term, at least under essentially rural conditions, was of significance for one whose career was to be in philosophy. When Bowne announced his doctrine of what he called objective idealism there were enough of the half-baked critics to call out that such philosophy could only be the fine-spun intellectual web of a mind that had never known close contact with actual things. Kicking stones and pounding on the ground has been the favorite answer of crude common sense to idealism since the days of Doctor Johnson. Such common sense overlooks the force of the word "objective" as describing idealism. Bowne was never tired of remarking that in any sound idealism we must recognize an order outside of ourselves which we do not make but find, an order which has existence independent of us, an existence with meanings which may not be for us at all. The actual working with plants and weeds, the close observance of weathers and seasons, does not often make for idealistic philosophy. It is here altogether too manifest that we are dealing with a natural scheme of things which we do not make but find. For that objectivity Bowne had most thorough respect. Whatever the philosophy, he insisted that it must start from the actual world and never lose sight of that world.

There is only a word or two to be spoken as to the schoolroom education of those years. It was very simple and elementary. Until Borden Parker entered Pennington Seminary he had had only training in what we should call the "grades" and that was not of high order, judged by the later-day standards. Yet the schools then did somehow get youngsters pointed toward worth-while books. Bowne made *Don Quixote* so much his own that he fastened the stories of the knight's exploits to scenes of his boyhood neighborhood that he might make them more vivid. The famous conflict with the sheep, in his child's fancy, took place just beyond a bridge near his home! He seemed almost to have committed *Gil Blas* to memory. How often in later life he castigated officials, who advanced causes by undue and unreasonable pressure, with the story of Gil's response to the tender appeal of the bandit, who, with a blunder-buss pointed full in Gil's face, tearfully besought him for God's sake to drop something into his hat!

The schools of the time, too, taught lessons of order which were important. There probably was not an especially worthy pedagogy in the unnatural quiet of the schoolroom, where whispering was a deadly offense, but some of the first glimpses into the iron rigidity of law came to our ancestors of three quarters of a century ago in the stiffness of schoolroom regulations. Judged by our "milder lights and softer airs" the old discipline was all wrong, but it seemed well enough then in teaching obedience to authority. There always was a trace of iron in the blood of Bowne as a pedagogical disciplinarian. According to the custom in his boyhood he put in a winter teaching school after he had himself finished all the elementary work. He was then only a little over sixteen, and slight. There was in the school a notable rowdy who had driven out teacher after teacher, making it difficult for the school board to get anyone even to attempt to teach. The bully's mirth when he learned that Borden Bowne was to be the new teacher was at high pitch, and all the youngsters were on tiptoe with expectancy, waiting for the first encounter. Sure enough, as young Bowne stood just in front of the rowdy's desk one morning, the rowdy rose behind the desk and leaned toward Bowne with an insulting remark. Bowne seized the rebel by the back of the neck as he leaned forward, bent the body down till the posterior made a most excellent presentation for punishment, and then plied a rod so mightily that the bully fainted. It was a rough sort of pedagogy, to be sure, but it brought quiet and made possible keeping open the school.

At just about seventeen Borden Parker left home, accepting the invitation of friends in Brooklyn to live with them while working as the driver of a truck, or delivery wagon, for a grocer in Brooklyn to see "how he would like it." The work was mostly done along the waterfront under what would now be the approach to the Brooklyn Bridge. I remember going with Bowne to look over the scenes of these early labors. I do not think that we found the store. We did find the stable where Bowne cared for the grocer's horse and we found the house in which he roomed. He was content to look over the buildings from the outside. The recollections which seemed to be most vivid in his memory were of his desperate homesickness, of his pride in his quickly acquired skill in loading a truck so that it would "ride" best, and of his interest in the fiery directness with which teamsters would talk to one another, when one violated a rule of the road, or blocked traffic. Time and again I have seen him stop to survey critically a truck whose load was not trimmed aright, or to listen to comments made to one another by irate truckmen in the streets of Boston or New York. I think he considered the eloquence of the later days lacking in fire as compared with that of the earlier.

In spite of the homesickness of those first months away from home, Bowne felt then and always continued to feel the lure of the New York streets, though he soon relinquished the Brooklyn work in order to prepare for college. During the last ten years of his life he used to visit relatives who resided in what was called the Saint Mark's section of Brooklyn, about five short blocks from the New York Avenue Methodist Church. He repeatedly walked from there to the Methodist Book Rooms at 150 Fifth Avenue, Manhattan. I have known him to start down near Brooklyn Bridge and walk along on an East Side avenue up to the neighborhood of the Grand Central Station. I never could get him to see anything hopeless in East Side conditions, in those days of a quarter century ago. He always seemed to feel there was an optimism about East Side life which redeemed it from squalor. I could not help thinking that this optimism came partly out of contrast with European cities with which he was familiar, but more especially out of fondness for New York. In any case, he delighted to roam the streets of New York.

The late Dr. John Handley is authority for the following statement, which is confirmed by Miss Letitia Bowne, sister of Borden Parker: "At a Quarterly Conference in the Navesink Church, held October 19, 1867, presided over by the Rev. Dr. Elwood H. Stokes, the pastor, Dr. William T. Abbott, recommended Borden P. Bowne for local preacher's license. In the Conference sat his father, Joseph Bowne, a local preacher and the oldest member of that body, and a brother, Joseph Bowne, Jr., the acting secretary of the meeting. His examination was greatly out of the ordinary. His readiness to answer all questions on the *Discipline* and doctrines of the church was pronounced. When asked if he had read the *Discipline* he answered, 'I studied it as a boy.' To the question, 'What do you think of it?' he replied: 'On the whole I regard it as a very excellent little book, both for church government and for Christian helpfulness.' His answers as to the doctrines were supported by Scripture, giving book, chapter, and verse. The presiding elder, Dr. Stokes, was never more surprised and interested in any examination he ever conducted than in this one.

"His first sermon was preached in his home church on Sabbath evening, December 29, 1867, from the text, 'Am I my brother's keeper?' " (Gen. 4. 9.)

# CHAPTER II

## STUDENT

IN the year 1865 Borden Parker announced to his mother that he had concluded to go through college. The father supplied the little money necessary to get the boy a start at Pennington Seminary. Borden had set his mind toward New York University chiefly because that had been near enough at hand to monopolize his field of vision in educational matters. When he was ready to enter, his brother, William P. Bowne, owner of a grain and feed store in Jersey City, found work for him in the store which made it possible for him to pay the expenses of the college course.

Young Bowne had no idea how to go about preparing for college. He had studied nothing whatever beyond what were called the "common branches." All he knew was to go ahead and get out the work for the entrance examinations. He did it all in less than a year of study by himself and at Pennington Seminary. In later years he used to say that he might have killed himself if he had not been blessed with immense vitality. His schedule during those months of preparation was fourteen hours a day for study, one hour for meals, one for exercise and eight for sleep. To be sure the entrance requirements were not as stiff as now, but think of acquiring any sort of knowledge of Latin and Greek, algebra and geometry in so short time! Bowne got more than a "sort of knowledge." He passed the entrance tests with distinction. It might seem that one studying at this rate would be left with a positive aversion to the courses taken, but not so Bowne. Probably the reason why he was able to do so much with so little physical strain was his avid interest in all the themes. There does not seem to have been any subject of importance which was not interesting to him. Some of the students of Bowne's earlier classes at Boston University have said that during quiz periods, while the pupils were wrestling with examination problems, the Professor would be whiling away the time solving original problems in geometry. Toward the close of his life Bowne used to say that all this was apocryphal. I am inclined to think that the problems were not geometry as such, but mechanics, on which Bowne said that he "doted." This fondness for mechanics served to good advantage in the discussion of cosmological problems in his *Metaphysics,* notably in the treatment of Newton's laws of motion.

Throughout his life Bowne retained this early-developed power of mastering fields of study by himself. He was as ready a learner in languages as in physics, making himself proficient in Latin, Greek, German, French, Spanish, Italian, and, oddly enough, Norwegian. The only reason discoverable for the interest in Norwegian was that in 1882 Bowne found it possible to take a two weeks' trip into Norway, and he set himself to the slight effort necessary for him to get at least a reading knowledge of the language, with almost as little concern as a tourist would ordinarily show in selecting proper garments to wear in Norway.

Dr. William Valentine Kelley, for many years editor of the *Methodist Review*, was an instructor at Pennington Seminary when the new student appeared to take courses under him in mathematics and physics. Doctor Kelley has written of the Bowne smile—a smile with a pervasive quality of intellectual comprehension, the smile not of conceit, but of rarefied delight in watching the elements of problems fit into their places and the solutions become clear. Here again the boyhood experiences were of use, for in the study of physics especially Bowne showed at the outset a power to bring qualifying considerations of a practical nature into the discussion. What to others was an abstract book-exercise was to him an extension of and application of principles whose working he had already recognized in daily experience. He once asked the teacher in preparatory physics why bird-shot fired from a shotgun straight up into the air did not strike the ground in descending at the same velocity with which it had left the muzzle. The teacher maintained that it did, but Bowne bore witness that many times in hunting he had felt the falling shot strike upon his hat with hardly discernible impact. Nothing was left then but for Bowne to suggest the explanation himself, the separation of the pellets in the air from the compactness with which they had left the muzzle and the consequent greater resistance of the air to each falling shot. I am not sure that the manner with which Bowne asked and answered his own questions endeared him to an instructor's heart. Miss Louise Manning Hodgkins has told us that it was a favorite trick of Pennington students to get Bowne into discussions with teachers—an old stratagem whose intent was obvious.

The reader may wonder why I take the space to mention items as inconsequential as this of the falling shot. I do so partly to give a slight glimpse of the difficulties under which instruction labored in those days. The learning had indeed to be "book learning." In the introduction to the physical sciences there was almost no chance for experiment. A teacher, with attention divided among half-a-dozen subjects, taught science out of a book. All I am trying to say is that in scientific and other realms Bowne early learned to bring what he studied in books to the test of actual experience. The former students of Bowne's classes in philosophy will remember the astonishing range of illustrations drawn from the most practical aspects of every-day experience.

Bowne was matriculated at New York University as entering "privately tutored." No Pennington records are now available. The days at New York University passed quickly enough, even though the institution did not have the profusion of student activities which make so many colleges seem like multi-ringed circuses to-day. Many of the present-day features are justified on the ground that they supply a sphere for the development of student initiative and independence, but it would be wide of the mark to fancy that no independence was possible in the college classrooms of fifty years ago. College students were not by any means so sophisticated then as now, but they were of a solider maturity. A twenty-year-old youngster then may not have known as much of "the world" as a youngster of like age to-day, but he knew quite as much that was worth knowing. Students and professors had to work together in measurably close acquaintance to make the most of the scanty resources. When Bowne graduated from New York University, Harvard University, the oldest college in America, had an endowment of only about a million. Nobody thought of huge endowments as possible. In classroom discussion, where pupils were naturally thrown into close contact with teachers, the student got his chance for the development of independence.

From 1867 to 1871 the view of the universe brought about by the scientific temper generated by Darwin's *Origin of Species* was beginning to make itself felt in American colleges. Darwin's book had been in circulation for seven or eight years when Bowne entered college, and was causing a good deal of terror among those who held the old orthodox views of the method of creation. Practically from the outset Bowne seized the truth that evolution as a theory of methods is harmless and as a theory of causes is worthless. It is from the quickness and certainty with which he grasped this essential that the temper of his criticism of the Darwinian movement is to be understood. There were attitudes taken by critics in those days that were just as severe as Bowne's, but there was often a suggestion of misgiving in the criticisms themselves—a whistling to keep the courage up. No student of Bowne's can ever feel that the vigor of his attack on the metaphysics of evolution came out of an inferiority complex. There was too much of confidence for that. Bowne never went through a period of fear of the atheistic philosophy that marked the opening days of evolutionary statement. Dr. J. W. Draper's work on the warfare between science and religion attracted wide attention when it first appeared and has been widely read ever since. A cheap edition has been published within a year of the date on which these lines are being written. Despite the fact of Doctor Draper's connection with his own college Bowne never took this discussion of science and religion seriously. He found it hard to get interested in it, avowing that he could with difficulty see how the writing of such a book was worth an earnest man's time.

The teacher who seems to have impressed Bowne most at New York was Benjamin N. Martin, to whom he dedicated his first book, *The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*. Dr. Marcus D. Buell, of the class of '72, New York University, is authority for the statement that the University was originally founded in protest against what was thought to be the too narrow devotion to classical studies at Columbia. I may say in passing that Doctor Buell, himself afterward associated with Doctor Bowne in distinguished service of the church, seems to have a clearer recollection of Bowne's days at the University than any other whom I know. He speaks of a "Chapel speech of his when I was a Sophomore and he a Junior, which was peculiarly impressive for its intellectual breadth, moral depth, gravity of tone, and literary style." No one of Bowne's own class is now living. Three members of the class of '70, Dr. William H. Nichols, chairman of the Board of the Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation, New York City, Judge Eugene Stevenson, formerly vice-chancellor of the State of New Jersey, George Zabriskie, well-known New York attorney, all write of the impression of intellectual strength which the young Bowne made upon them. Some of the correspondents who wrote to me speak of a sort of aloofness on Bowne's part in his college days, but he belonged to the Delta Upsilon Fraternity and to Phi Beta Kappa.

Following is a transcript of Bowne's college record supplied by the secretary of the University:

### NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Name, Bowne, Borden Parker
Date of Matriculation, Sept. 17, 1867
Address, 194 Chrystie St. (Sept. 17, 1867)
Withdrew, Graduated June, 1871 (by vote of faculty on May 19, 1871)
Course, Arts
Preparatory work: Privately tutored.

### College Record

| Freshman Year 1867–1868 | 1st term | 2nd term |
|---|---|---|
| Mathematics | 93 | ..... |
| Greek | 96 | ..... |
| Oratory | 100 | ..... |
| Third Term: | | |
| Mathematics | 87 | |
| Annual Grades | 91.1% | |

| Sophomore Year 1868–1869 | 1st term | 2nd term |
|---|---|---|
| Belle Lettres, 13 | 100 | ..... |
| Political Economy, 50 | 100 | ..... |
| Mathematics | 100 | 100 |
| Greek | 99 | ..... |
| Oratory | 100 | ..... |
| German, 23 | ...... | 100 |
| Greek, 34 | ...... | 98 |
| Latin | ...... | 92 |
| Oratory | ...... | 100 |
| Third Term: | | |
| Mathematics | 100 | |
| Latin | 90 | |
| English Literature | 99 | |
| Average, 97.9% | | |

| Junior Year 1869–1870 | 1st term | 2nd term |
|---|---|---|
| Natural Philosophy | 100 | 100 |
| Int. Phil.; Nat. Phil. | 100 | ..... |
| Modern Languages | 100 | ..... |
| Oratory | 100 | Exc. |
| Modern History | ...... | 99 |
| Latin | ...... | 87 |
| Third Term: | | |
| Greek | 98 | |
| Logic | 100 | |
| Oratory | 100 | |
| Astronomy | 100 | |
| Annual Grades | 98.3% | |

| Senior Year 1870–1871 | 1st term | 2nd term |
|---|---|---|
| Moral Philosophy, 50 | 100 | ..... |
| Natural Law, 13 | 96 | ..... |
| Latin | 95 | ..... |
| Chemistry | 100 | 100 |
| Chap. Oratory | 100 | 100 |
| Const. Law | ...... | 95 |
| Spanish, 34 | ...... | 100 |
| Greek, 22 | ...... | 97 |
| Third Term: | | |
| Inter. Law | 93 | |
| Physics | 99 | |
| Chemistry | 98 | |
| Annual Grades | 97.9% | |

*General Average For Whole Course,* 96.3%

Degree Conferred—Bachelor of Arts, 1871.
By vote of the faculty at its meeting on May 19, 1871, Mr. Bowne was assigned the Valedictory.

The secretary adds that during his course Bowne was awarded prizes and honors for excellence in Latin, Greek and Mathematics, a special prize for the greatest improvement in the first two years of the course, and a special prize for greatest excellence in the entire course. He received the degree of Master of Arts from the University in 1876, and of Doctor of Laws in 1909.

Aside from the influences of the University itself, the life of New York played forcefully on Bowne during the college years. Remember, his college career began in 1867, two years after the close of the Civil War, before the tempers of that war had had time to cool down. Bowne afterward seemed to remember most sharply the type of public oratory in that post-war period. Speakers like Bishop Simpson used to come to Cooper Union to hold forth on questions of the day—which, as a matter of fact, were mostly questions of the day just closed. The oratory was usually of the flamboyant, patriotic stamp, and Bowne, like the other college students of his acquaintance, stood hour after hour in the old Cooper Union auditorium, in the bad air of a poorly ventilated room, throwing his cap into the air at some especially thrilling climax. In spite of his philosophical tendencies he had by nature quite a degree of responsiveness to emotional oratory, or he would have had if he had not always asked himself, after he had recovered his cap, as to what, after all, the orator had said. To the end of his life he confessed that time and again he would be caught in the enjoyable rush of "eloquence" only to find himself landed with a jar on the earth when he asked as to whether anything was being said. On the whole, and somewhat as the result of the Cooper Union experiences, he came to put oratory low in the scale of values. In after years he spoke of stump speeches as devoid of all elements of rationality whatsoever. If compelled to listen to such speeches, or to be present at the places where they were being perpetrated, he schooled himself to give heed to the vocal sounds without paying attention to the words. This he avowed to be an entertaining phonetic exercise even when the words possessed least content. In all fairness it must be added that Bowne enjoyed any speaker who excelled in dramatic impressiveness. He even praised

T. DeWitt Talmage for histrionic effectiveness, though Talmage was in all other respects the speaker for whom he had slightest regard.

These Cooper Union experiences, however, revealed a deep concern in public questions, which bore fruit later in the discussion of the principles of ethics. At the time of Bowne's death in 1910 *The Outlook,* by no means inclined to be overfriendly to contributions made to philosophic thought from Methodist centers, nevertheless spoke of the *Principles of Ethics,* published in 1892, as perhaps one of the best books ever written on the subject. The treatment, as I shall try to show more fully later, was remarkable for its recognition of the worth there is in all the important ethical schools, for its tribute to intuitionalism as holding fast to the absolute validity of the will to do right, for the honor paid utilitarianism in insisting that the good will must not exhaust itself in right intentions but must lead to worthy actual result through study of practical consequences, for the place made in concrete human experience for the working out of ethical ideals, normal human life at its highest and best being taken as the aim. Probably a better-proportioned statement of the relations of all these factors to one another has not been made than that by Bowne. It was in the student days at New York that he worked out the mutual interrelationships of these various ethical precepts and systems. He outlined the book which appeared in 1892 in a sketch written in a student's blank-book in 1869 and 1870. He once read to me that outline. The point of view was essentially that of the formal treatment in 1892. It is to be regretted that this blank-book was burned in a grate fire, which its author made of a mass of papers and correspondence one Christmas day shortly before he died, to prevent giving data for any biography that might be written.

The years at New York University must have given opportunity for considerable general reading. When the first edition of *Metaphysics* was published a review in the New York

Tribune said that *Metaphysics* was the work of a man who had thought more widely than he had read. Bowne was pleased with this comment, taking as a compliment what the review may have intended as criticism. It is usually the other way around. Makers of books are inclined to read more widely than they think. The range of Bowne's reading in philosophy can be better dealt with in connection with his later life, but it is appropriate to remark here upon his extensive knowledge of the great literary classics. Those who think of Bowne as cynical will not be surprised to hear that he had been mightily impressed by Swift, especially by *Gulliver's Travels* and the *Tale of a Tub.* In the former of these books he used to see new powers of sarcasm with every reading. I have occasionally seen *Gulliver's Travels* referred to as a child's book. Nobody would ever think of putting it into the hands of a child after hearing Bowne talk of it. To his mind the descriptions of the court customs, and of the houyhnhnms, were almost final and unsurpassable expressions of rage against humanity. So with the *Tale of a Tub.* I read this book because of Bowne's repeated references to it. My reading was later by years than his; but I could never allude to a passage that he could not quote practically word for word. He used to repeat what Swift said of the book when, in the darkened closing days of the cynic's life, he was "dying," as he said of himself, "like a poisoned rat in a hole." "God!" said Swift, "What a mind I had when I wrote that book!"

Vastly as Bowne marveled at Swift's power to utter a mood that tinctures—or perhaps taints—the souls of all of us at moments when the tides of moral vitality are running low, Shakespeare and the more wholesome and genial poets and essayists were closer to his mind and heart than was the cynic.

After graduation from New York University young Bowne entered the New York East Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, class of 1872. He had joined the Seventh Street Church, New York, in 1865. In 1867 he had been made a local preacher. He was ordained local deacon by Bishop Simpson and sent to Whitestone, Long Island, in 1872, then a village of between two and three thousand inhabitants. The little church had eighty members, and had paid seven dollars for missions the year before Bowne went there, fifteen cents coming from the Sunday school. The members seemed to feel that the youthful preacher's sermons were "over their heads"—a judgment concurred in by one of Bowne's own brothers who heard him frequently. Bowne had an opportunity to go abroad before the end of his first year and did not rejoin the Conference till 1878, being ordained elder by Bishop Simpson in 1882.

Miss Letitia Bowne has permitted me to use the following letter:

ON BOARD STEAMER PEMBROKE,
September 5, 1873.

MY DEAR MOTHER:

Our vessel is nearing land, and I write this letter beforehand so that I may mail it immediately on reaching shore. We shall be in dock to-morrow morning.

Directly after crossing the bar at Sandy Hook a gale swept down on us from the north and continued for two days. It blew fearfully. I thought I had seen rough weather in the bay at home, but the roughest sea I ever saw was a calm to what we had. For a part of the time the sun shone and the scene was magnificent. There were mountains of water. You could see them roll up above you and pour over as if to bury you forever. As far as you could see in every direction were these tossing hills—a deep blue—black in. some places, then as the light would shine through the top of a wave, a beautiful bottle green. You could see large patches of this green come and go. Sometimes the wind would catch the top of a wave and disperse it in mist and spray. And this as the sunlight fell on it would be all brilliant with rainbows. It was certainly a magnificent sight.

But how did the ship fare meanwhile? She is a very fair sea-boat, but she was terribly tossed about. The waves broke over her and her rail was often carried under water. The water came down her companion-way into the saloon passages, but only in small quantities. After being struck by one of these waves and thrown on her beam ends she would right herself almost like a living thing and make the spray fly from her bows in great showers. Sometimes tons of water would leap right up into the air and drop back, making everything foam around.

And how fared it with the passengers? Pretty roughly at first. We were pitched in every direction. I attempted to get up and was thrown with great violence headfirst into the cushions. At table we had to have a separate rack for each plate, and our soup plates we had to hold in our hands while we ate. At every lurch those on the window side would be thrown forward on the table, and those on the other side would find their dishes trying to get into their laps. It was laughable to the last degree.

At first our poor stomachs were sorely astonished. They were not used to any such churning as this and they resented it. I was sick for one day and felt mean for the next, and then I got entirely over it, and such an appetite! We ate four times a day, and it was none too often. I did not eat—I devoured. . . .

After the gale went down we had quiet weather. The sick people got well again and we made a merry crowd. I have enjoyed nothing so much for years. The captain took to me, and I took to the captain. We talked till midnight. We walked the deck by the hour. We walked arm in arm and grew very confidential. He told me of his history, and I told him my plans. He voted me the queerest and most sensible Methodist minister he ever saw, and I in turn put him at the head of the captains. It grew to be a joke with the passengers that we would surely suffer greatly at parting.

On Sunday I talked in the cabin. I said that religion does not aim to save us from the troubles and reverses of life, that these come alike to all; but that it aims to support us under them and to teach us the divine purpose in them. I dwelt upon the peace that flows like a river, and which passes all understanding. I said that this, not outward quiet, or prosperity, but this inward calm is the great legacy of the Christian. "Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you." Men wonder that God's true child can keep his heart in such a rest amid the most distracting circumstances—the answer is—"Peace I leave with thee."

Before leaving I made arrangements to publish my essays. I secured very advantageous terms. I get ten per cent on the retail price on all books sold and no expense to myself and no drawbacks. I think then I shall get some small sum of money from it. If a thousand copies are sold I get $150. However, I expect little from that quarter.

I shall go to London immediately upon landing, and after buying some clothes shall proceed at once to Halle before the following Thursday. When I reach there I will write and describe the situation.

Give yourself no fears for me. I shall be among friends. I wish I could see you; but as that can't be I must not think about it. You needn't write until you hear from me again, when I will send the address.

Remember me to Ed and Tish [his sister Letitia].

Yours affectionately,

BORDEN.

Bowne studied chiefly in Paris, Halle, and Göttingen. Of the merely incidental side of the life abroad Bowne never would say much, evidently because he was interested only in the main purpose that took him to Europe. Still he would occasionally speak of European experiences in those exciting days in the seventies.

Here is an excerpt from a letter to his mother, written at Halle, Prussia, soon after arriving to take up his studies.

(I) live as the Dutch do. If you can't do that, you will have to pay for all you get. But if one has been used to restaurants, and has a cosmopolitan stomach, he can come here and live cheaply. I came here to (study) and put up with the inevitable. (I buy) some rolls and put them in (my) coat-tail pocket, and eat them without butter, as I go along the street. Now, if one has not a stout heart, he will feel rather home-sick when he tries such a meal, but if he is crammed full of courage, he can enjoy it. A cold room and a dry roll is not a feast, but one can make it do. Still it requires some imagination to turn it into a meal. . . . Don't, however, get the idea that I live entirely on rolls. I have coffee in the morning and dinner at noon. For the rest I use the rolls. I am quite comfortable, and if my health does not fail, shall need nothing more than I have.

His rather limited means kept his living down to a scale where he saw life without many of its artificialities. In Paris it often happened that he and his roommate would on cold days figure out whether it was cheaper to pay the fee for a lecture or to go to their room and build a fire—a characteristically student performance familiar to students of all generations.

Because the fees were cheaper than the fires Bowne heard much more than otherwise might have been likely. The two years abroad cost him but little more than a thousand dollars, earned mostly by tutoring, but he had to be careful, and the economy had its compensations. The French are proverbially thrifty and Bowne learned from them some ways of saving which he never forgot. Moreover, he learned to speak French like a native. He arrived in Paris one November with hardly any French and by the next May was speaking with ease. This experience made him somewhat harsh in his criticism of language study as customarily taught in American schools. In three months he had learned more about French than he had learned about Latin in six years. On the basis of his own experience he was always protesting against the long stretches of time devoted in American schools to Latin and Greek. Just how he could create for the study of Latin in a schoolroom a situation parallel to his own when he was virtually compelled to learn a European language in Europe itself, he did not state.

The days of Bowne's study in Paris were those immediately following the Franco-Prussian war. Mingling as he did among the "plain people," he caught glimpses of their state of mind as to the crises through which the nation was passing. In spite of the fiasco of Napoleon the Third's closing days there was a considerable volume of pro-Bonapartism in France at the time Bowne was in Paris, based on recognition of the substantial achievements of Napoleon III, and upon the glory of the first Napoleon. Bowne used to delight in telling of the rage into which this Bonapartism would throw an acquaintance of his, an old Frenchman of violent republican proclivities who never became tired of railing against all the Bonaparte family, except Napoleon the First, as a herd of upstarts without intelligence or moral sense. His favorite story was of a young woman of the Bonaparte family who because of straitened circumstances became an artist's model. This model's friends protested against her sitting undraped in the studio. "Why should I not sit undraped?" was her reply. "There is a stove in the room."

The French habit of mind Bowne never quite appreciated. He used to compare French systems of thought to well-sheared lawns—completely finished and beautifully kept, but so planned and so cultivated as to leave the onlooker without adequate discernment of what nature actually is, the artificiality hiding the truth. He appreciated the logical thoroughness of the French mind, its proneness to leap at once to full-length conclusions and to far-reaching implications, but he wondered if here also the French did not get out of touch with reality by following logic to one-sided extremes. He used to read and reread, with delight, Walter Bagehot's letters to England, written at the time of Napoleon the Third's *coup d'état.* It will be remembered that Bagehot used to contrast this logicality of the French with the stolid unresponsiveness of the English. Let an idea once get before the French public and it ran with electric rapidity from Paris throughout all France. Let an idea get before the English and—it made no difference! Bagehot tells of the English countryman, who, during the Crimean War, avowed that the allied forces could never defeat Russia because they could never catch the Czar! Russia was too big and had too many good hiding places. When it was pointed out that the allies did not need to catch the Czar in order to defeat Russia the countryman listened respectfully but made answer, "But they can never catch the Czar." Bowne, in spite of all his dependence on the intellectual, used, like Bagehot, to see in this slowness of the English to seize and act on strict logic the self-assertion of primal forces of a nonintellectual order which make for the stability of civilization. He always maintained that there is good sense in much that seems like social stupidity. Without disparaging the French he used to be suspicious of too quick a response to logical appeal. He feared that something vital might be left out—and he never forgot also the wise consideration that little heads are soon heated.

The work in Germany was with Professor Ulrici and Professor Lotze. In the after years Bowne's indebtedness to Ulrici did not so clearly appear as the indebtedness to Lotze. Ulrici's name is not especially familiar to philosophical and theistic students to-day, but in the seventies the name carried weight for substantial merit. At one time Ulrici desired to have Bowne translate his works—more particularly *Gott und die Natur*—into English. For some reason the plan was never carried out, probably because Bowne so soon began to devote all his time to independent work. After the *Metaphysics* had been published Ulrici wrote to Bowne stating that Bowne's position was substantially his, but Bowne never made an acknowledgment of indebtedness beyond a line or two in the introduction to *Studies in Theism.*

The dependence on Lotze was definitely acknowledged. In the introduction to *Metaphysics* Bowne said there was no doubt that the results of his thinking were substantially Lotzian, but we would better reserve consideration of the extent of this dependence till we come to the consideration of metaphysics. Lotze himself always paid high tribute to the work of Bowne. One afternoon in student days Bowne called on Lotze. As Bowne left he called attention to a heavy thunderstorm coming up a valley. "That is nothing," said Lotze, "to the storm of questionings you have raised in my mind concerning my own philosophic system." Lotze was most anxious to have Bowne take a doctorate with him, but Bowne never stood in much awe of degrees, and felt that he could not afford the time and expense involved.

In after years Bowne did not say much about his personal experiences in Germany. I think this was because he did not take incidents of his life, outside of his philosophic pursuits, to be of importance to any but himself. It was only casually that one would learn, for example, that his sea journeys in those days of the seventies were so rough that for nights at a time he could not stay in his berth, but slept on an improvised mattress on the floor of the cabin wedged in between pieces of furniture to keep himself from being thrown too violently about; that on another journey the passengers became panic-stricken over the continued storm and kept screaming that the boat was sinking. What he seemed to care to talk about was philosophy, or that was what he assumed that people cared to hear him talk about. It is singular that he afterward said so little about the Germany of the days of his student life. When we reflect that during those days Germany was entering on that career of material development made possible by the victory over France this silence is surprising. The prosperity following the billion-dollar franc indemnity exacted of France —if it was prosperity—was having its effect on Germany in that momentous decade. We know that Bowne saw the changes with discerning eye. Still we must remember that material prosperity had significance for him only as an opportunity for the realization of the highest human ideals. To him the important days of Germany were the epochs of the greater philosophies, especially those beginning with Kant, and of the poets of whom Goethe was the leader. He delighted to quote from memory the passages from Faust in which he found perfect expression of some human moods. The lines having to do with advice as to choice of one's profession, and especially those voicing the gratification of the sense-bound intellect at the positiveness of the physician's task, seemed to him to set out with exquisite precision a recurring mood in a well-marked human type.

He early learned to assess educational values apart from the educational apparatus with which the values might or might not be set forth. "No great profusion of the apparatus of scholarship" was the phrase in which he once described the circumstances in which a scholar had worked. The simplicity in which the German professors labored made its impression on the mind of Bowne and marked all his own classroom effort. He was accustomed to say that almost the only significant question that could be asked about an American university, which was making an effect on the public mind by constant harping on material equipment, was: "Seest thou what manner of stones and of buildings are here?"

Bowne brought back from Germany also something of the European method of dealing with students on the part of professors, that method being the presentation of the teaching by the professor accompanied by a take-it-or-leave-it attitude. No one who knew Bowne at all could have the slightest doubt as to his personal interest in his students, or could fail to be impressed with the lengths to which he would go to follow them up with helpful ministries after he had become acquainted with them. He let the student, however, take the initial steps in the getting acquainted. He seemed to feel that, to use his own expression, those who "had tendencies if not talents in the philosophic direction" would seek him out on their own accord. Once sought out he gave of his helpfulness lavishly, but the student usually had to take the lead at first. To the fussy paternalism of much American pedagogical effort which we see to-day, he would have found it impossible to adjust himself. The pedagogy of the period ending about fifteen years ago treated pupils with much more respect than that of to-day does. At least it made the assumption concerning them that they could find their own way to the subjects in which they could do best. Much has been said of Bowne's scorn of dull pupils—and for dullness he indeed had scorn—but there was underneath all a fundamental respect. "Here it is. Make what you can of it! Take it or leave it!" seems like pedagogical cold-bloodedness as compared with much show of personal warm-heartedness to-day. Possibly the apparently colder way has the worthier interest in and regard for the student after all. Coddling may show affection, but it does not develop respect or make possible comradeship or friendship.

Perhaps a word should be said about the influence of the European study on Bowne's religious thought and experience. Very few persons have been endowed with a more logical temper than Bowne, and to many he seemed predominantly rationalistic. It will be remembered that William James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience,* referred to "three little books" which Bowne had published on religion as "wonderfully able" but as "rationalistic." Because of James' emphasis on somewhat mystic experience as the essential in Methodism, James used to twit Bowne with the avowal that he himself was a better Methodist than Bowne. Many besides James held to the same opinion. Yet inwardly Bowne was not rationalistic except in the sense of reasonable. There have appeared in reminiscent remarks of those who knew Bowne in the seventies recollections of what would seem to be extreme claims of personal religious experience, somewhat after the pattern of the exultant old-time Methodist "testimony." I have never seen any of these statements in print. There was once in the New York East Conference of Methodist preachers a remarkable spiritual leader named Benjamin M. Adams. Adams was a veritable saint, after the soundest and noblest Methodist traditions. He had the temperament which lent itself to ecstatics, and yet had also the good sense which judged such uplifts by what happened after he returned to earth. Adams was at one time the "presiding elder" to whom Bowne as a member of a Methodist Conference was expected to "report." In the Methodist Conference it was the duty of Presiding Elder Adams to vouch for the character of Borden Parker Bowne when the name of the latter was called in the annual session of the Conference. Upon one occasion Adams is said to have reported somewhat jubilantly that "the great metaphysician on my district enjoys religion." The natural inference would be that the enjoyment had to be emphatically positive thus to win the praise of Adams. There is enough testimony to warrant the belief that at the very time when Bowne was first putting into shape his metaphysical system he was most truly what James would have called Methodistic.

What I started to say was, however, that the period of study in Europe did not seem to weaken the force of Bowne's own inner convictions. If he was Methodistic—in the James sense—when he went abroad, there was nothing in the experience across the sea that cooled down his religious intensity. Likewise with his intellectual outlook. The years in Europe did not show Bowne many places where, in his thinking, he had been off the track. The European teachers opened up new fields of view indeed, but he found himself ready for those new fields. No teacher considered it necessary to ask him to cast out prejudices or preconceptions. There was no preliminary uprooting or weeding-out necessary, no time lost in taking hold. Moreover, no professor warped the mind of Bowne out of its own orbit. He received nothing passively. He was not of that intellectual independence which fortifies itself against new views, or holds them off for a season, but, rather, of the type which seizes such views at once, to turn them over again and again for critical scrutiny. If accepted after scrutiny, they do not lose the marks of the handling to which they have been subjected.

During the years in Germany Bowne did some notable work in philosophic writing. In a later chapter I shall deal with the early work on Herbert Spencer, but I wish to mention here the beginning of a line of contributions to the *Methodist Review,* known in the seventies as the *Methodist Quarterly Review,* which continued till Bowne's death in 1910. At intervals of seldom more than a year Bowne sent to the *Review* carefully prepared philosophical discussions. Some of the articles ran in length to ten thousand words each. All are worthy of permanent preservation both for matter and style.

I mention an article which appeared in the *Review* for 1874—a discussion of the views to which David Frederick Strauss came in the closing years of his life. The article was entitled the *Old Faith and the New.* Students of biblical criticism will recall that Strauss carried out to a completely negative conclusion the principles of the school of New Testament study which is associated with the name of Tübingen. The old orthodoxy accepted the miracles in the Gospels as historic fact. The old rationalism, led by Paulus, insisted that the miracles were natural events recorded in picturesque language, which at first was understood for what it meant, but came in time to be taken as literal description of miracle. Then recourse was had to myth, and finally Strauss concluded that in the story of Jesus the world was dealing with a myth which as symbol set forth a noble and beautiful ideal, but without any considerable historical basis in an actual personal career. After his book on Jesus, Strauss published a philosophical formulation of which Bowne wrote a review. As soon as Strauss stepped out of the field of biblical research into that of philosophy he was a giant shorn of strength. Bowne had little difficulty in proving that the philosophy was of the crudest order. Strauss ended in total pessimism, seeing in the universe nothing but the turnings of mighty enginery whose wheels and levers broke and pulverized men and their ideals without remorse. Some of the passages are most eloquent in describing the pitilessness of the crushing and tearing of the cosmic machinery. There was, however, nothing beyond the emotional in the argument. It showed the customary weakness in dealing with the self, with a knowable world, and with the problems of the Infinite.

With Strauss, Bowne was terribly severe. He resented even the fine tributes which Strauss paid to the beauties of the older faith and quoted as comment on these passages the dreadful sentence which describes the crime of Judas. "Hail, Master! And he kissed him." How are we to explain such severity? The question will recur again and again as we consider writings of that materialistic, agnostic decade.

I think the answer is that Bowne found it almost impossible to believe that some of the atheistic arguments of the day were advanced in good faith. They seemed so utterly barren that he could not believe that the reasoners were urging them seriously, except with the seriousness of a desire to make a plausible showing to deceive the intellectually helpless. He could not understand how anybody could actually move into despair for any such reasons as those assigned by Strauss. The reasons seemed threadbare. Any man who would have used them, it appeared to Bowne, did so for the sake of using any reason likely to accomplish his purpose.

It is doubtful if in a judgment of this sort Bowne ever took account of any but strictly philosophical considerations. He appraised systems by the reasons assigned for them. Nobody could phrase more clearly than he what he called "the natural history of atheism," by which he meant the steps through which atheism ordinarily moves into the human mind, but, after all, he did not consider such atheistic utterance as anything more than a psychological effect of causes working psychologically. If the formal reasons assigned seemed incredibly shallow, he wondered if they were sincerely meant. This made it difficult for him to see in an utterance an expression of a belief which a man might be holding for quite other reasons than those assigned, and yet doing so without thought of insincerity. The truth probably was that Strauss was so far gone in pessimism that anything atheistic which sounded reasonable at all would appeal to his mind as satisfactory. The treatment of his beliefs by Bowne would be useful to-day, for much modern pessimism runs in the same groove of logical statement. Bowne was especially merciless in showing the futility of the attitudes and measures proposed by Strauss for relief, or for peace of mind, in the face of on-coming annihilation. Here again we are dealing with an oft-repeated phenomenon. It will be recalled that a famous public teacher who passed from us a few years ago—Goldwin Smith, a man honored both in England and America—lapsed into complete agnosticism before he died. This agnostic, not to call him atheist, was distressed at what seemed to him to be signs of increasing social degeneration. He admitted that if his own agnostic views became widespread the decay would rapidly grow worse, leading possibly to outright anarchy. So he approved a wider use of music in the public schools, that song might quiet the restlessness of the human spirit. If a child thus trained to sing were thereafter to feel an anarchistic impulse, he could, presumably, save himself by bursting forth into song. The suggestions of Strauss as to adjustment to a heartless and mindless universe were of this same order of futility.

I do not believe that Bowne, until after he left Europe, discerned the worth of minds of the Strauss type. It would be hard to write an adequate history of New Testament study and leave Strauss out. There is such a fact in the realm of intellectual procedure as productive blundering, or seizure of a principle sound in essence while its proposed applications may be all wrong. The discernment of "tendencies" in the New Testament writers is to the lasting credit of that school to which in general Strauss belonged, even if in Strauss' own hands the principles of the school issued in critical annihilation. It is interesting to note that Bowne in after years came to be quite an admiring reader of the researches of Strauss in church history. He possessed all the works of Strauss and repeatedly, thirty-five years after the review of which I speak, used to comment on their marvelous industry and their massive scholarship. He would delight in reading aloud the passages from Strauss, which revealed an almost incredible patience in digging into early ecclesiastical documents.

His review of the two volumes of the *Old Faith and the New* was very thoroughgoing. Bowne charged Strauss, in the phrase of Butler, with maintaining that Christianity makes all the ills it seeks to relieve. Unless one checks up one by one Bowne's citations of the Strauss positions he is likely to feel that injustice is being done by misrepresentation, but I defy any one to point out unfairness in Bowne's summaries. After the Strauss utterances were put forth in Bowne's condensations their contradictions seemed almost incredible, though the contradictions were characteristic of an interpretation of the world which had not yet found its way through—and never did find its way, for that matter. As an instance Strauss pictures the universe as without heart or soul. It is a cruel machine which grinds and tears. The wheels, and cogs, and stamps, and hammers hiss and pound. Yet in spite of this pessimism Strauss avers that the voicing of pessimism is impious and blasphemous. We are to cherish reverence for all these wheels and hammers and stamps and cogs. Of course the description of the hammers does not occur on the same page as the exhortation to pious reverence. When the description and the exhortation are put side by side they make their author look a trifle foolish. This handling of the world problem by Strauss is instructive because it shows how determinedly skepticism seeks to cast out Christianity and at the same time hold fast the good fruit of Christianity. Strauss' effort in this direction was better than most similar attempts we see to-day, inasmuch as Strauss was an extraordinarily able mind. No atheistic scheme professedly sets out to get rid of the virtues at which Christianity aims, but the expedients by which atheism seeks to retain the Christian excellences are most desperate.

Bowne was in the twenties when he wrote the review on Strauss. In none of his later work are some of his contentions more cogently stated. Strauss made much of the correlation of forces, by which he meant the transformation of one force into another. If the transformation were granted, of course Strauss could have claimed that with the possibility of one force's being made over into another, physical processes like nerve changes could be made over into sensations. Bowne contended with unrelenting rigor that correlation of forces means relations among forces; that each force is what it is on its own account; that forces cannot be transformed, but correlation means that if one force disappears, another may take its place with an energy equal to that of the first. It may well be that forces are so connected that the appearance of one force determines, or conditions, the appearance of another; but that is altogether different from saying that one force is transformed into another. Nerve changes may be the conditions on which feeling appears, but nerve changes are what they are on their own account, and feelings are what they are on their own account. The relations between forces may be most intimate, but each force is itself. It may go and another come, but going and coming are not transformation.

By use of the same principle of transformation Strauss found his way from selfish fear as the originating force in religion to unselfish love as the crown of religion. To use one of Bowne's most characteristic expressions the entire process was "verbal and fictitious." If we have selfish fear to start with we have selfish fear to end with, except as selfishness is not transformed into something else, but replaced by something else. Then, of course, we have the problem of accounting for that something else. In an essay written at about this same date, on evolution, Bowne dealt with such claims as that the wigwam of the savage evolves into the house of the civilized man. The evolution here is not by transformation. There is continuity of plan indeed, but the fact is that wigwams are torn down and replaced by something better, or that savages keep on using wigwams while men who appear above the plane of savagery build houses better than wigwams.

Bowne never claimed to be an anthropologist, but he was certainly as good an anthropologist as Strauss. Surely, his insights were as good as those of Strauss. Strauss avowed that primitive man put a spirit back of or into every animate and perhaps inanimate thing, and regarded the world as peopled by enemies. With these enemies whom he feared man sought to make adjustment for his own purposes. Of course if this had been all, man of prehistoric eras would have been no better than the spirits he was seeking to placate. There would have been selfishness all around, in the spirits and in men. Bowne pointed out that if the selfishness had been all, only selfishness could have been the historic outcome. He denied that man could have been thus totally selfish, or that he sought to make adjustments with forces conceived of as divine wholly on a basis of selfish fear. The early worshipers did think of spirits as dwelling in all things, and worship has always been thought of as involving much more and other than fear. There must have early occurred to primitive men the surmise that many of the spirits were friendly, kindly, and to be sought out on their own account. Bowne had a keen sense not merely for consistency in argument, but for adequacy also. Strauss was sure that the conclusion of primitive man that personal wills were back of the manifold forces of the world was abject superstition—a revelation of the utter childishness of primitive thinking. He seemed to hold that the ability to believe in an impersonal system of forces was one of the sure marks of intellectual progress. Bowne could not see it that way. He felt that the step from men's consciousness of a personal cause in themselves and in their neighbors to personal causes in things was both good logic and good sense on the part of our remote ancestors, considering that there was not much in primitive man's experience to suggest an all-embracing personal unity. Inasmuch as men saw the numerousness of wills in their gods, inasmuch as they saw the fickleness and caprice in human beings, it was not to be wondered at that they saw like tempers and moods in divine beings. Bowne took a much more charitable view of early man than did Strauss, and yet he refused to admit that the higher religious beliefs were just the lower notions "transformed." He recognized an order in the appearance of beliefs, but not transformation.

It is interesting to note that in the seventies Bowne held the customary orthodox view concerning the origin of the human race. He saw in Central Asia the primal home of the race. He quoted Layard, of Nineveh exploration fame, as authority for the theory that the investigation of the archæological remains of early peoples pointed to a decline from a state of culture still earlier, rather than an ascent from lower to higher.

Bowne did not lay claim to any degree of expertness as regards primitive man, and no doubt his ready acceptance of the conventional views of his time on such matters may seem naïve, but it may be just as well to remind ourselves that a good deal of pronouncement on prehistoric man—or man in the full light of history, for that matter—is made at any period under the pressure of this or that theory. The facts have not always been such as of themselves to render a clear verdict either way. We of later times somewhat smilingly ask how the thinkers of the schools of our fathers could ever have believed in the orthodoxy of the conventional theology. We must remember that, until almost to-day, we have been ourselves under the spell of a belief in virtually irresistible progress. Bowne indeed came finally to accept the general evolutionary statement as a fairly good description of the course of cosmic history, but he was never guilty of the offenses against reason and common sense which have marked the more enthusiastic accounts of the career of mankind. He never had much patience with the theorizing which will have it that all evolutionary movement is upward. Of this more later.

Again, he had to the end of his life little room for that stamp of anthropological research which identifies savage man as we see him to-day with primitive man. It is cause for gratitude that we can find occasionally a cool thinker to bring so-called historic data to the test of logic. The evolutionist professes to find in savage man the starting place from which the evolutionary process moved. Now, there can be no doubt that in savage cultures just as in those we called civilized, survivals of primitive stages linger along through the ages. To maintain that present-day savagery, however, shows us what all men once were is to deny the force of evolution on that savagery. Even if we declare that the play of the evolutionary forces is a monotonous repetition year after year and age after age, we have to concede that monotonous forces thus acting may leave the savage quite other at the end of a cultural era than his forefathers were at the beginning. The forces may beat down the physical and intellectual vitality of the savage, or the sifting out of the higher types who move off to a more favorable environment may leave the original group in the condition of those communities which, as Professor E. A. Ross says, are like fish ponds from which all the bass and perch have been fished out and nothing but bull-heads and suckers left.

When critics replied to Bowne that all such anthropological questions should be left to the expert investigators he agreed, but insisted that experts must be careful not to rely too much on their theories themselves as tools of investigation. Any student of such branches knows to what an extent the will to have it so determines this or that marshaling of the data. Bowne complained with justice that Strauss sought to get out of many a tight logical hole by saying that his positions were held by all "cultured men." This cultivated man of Strauss came in for some fierce belaboring, such "cultured-man" utterance appearing to Bowne as a species of intellectual ventriloquism, the cultivated men being Strauss himself and those who shared his point of view—the voices coming from the interior of these professedly superior intellectual geniuses, claiming in their own right to be the last words of wisdom. Strauss had no particular sympathy with the so-called democratic movements of his time. He abhorred the tendency toward republicanism, and the stirrings for self-expression and self-control in labor circles made him feel as if wild beasts were being let loose in society. His positive recommendations were like those mentioned a few pages back—he saw in poetry and song the calming balms which would save us. It can hardly be held against Bowne that he waxed scornful over such remedies.

There was little to sing about in the universe of Strauss. The wheels and stamps and cogs and hammers did not lend themselves readily to song. Of course there could always be the consolation that the singer and the song were themselves outcomes of the universe, in which case they might be called transformed mechanical energy. I mention all these features of Strauss at such length because they are so often appearing in other writers of the time. Bowne often spoke of fallacies that "perennially" recur. "Perennial" was a favorite word with him. We have always been hearing—as, indeed, we are hearing to-day—that in a universe like ours, impersonalistic and mechanical at bottom, the artistic values are alone worth while. Bowne emphasized with unique forcefulness the speculative significance of freedom, holding that speculation implies the power of consideration and reconsideration and suspended judgment. His criticism of the Strausslike system implies likewise a free spirit in art—which is contradicted by the determinism of the universe.

# CHAPTER III

## THE CRITIC

NOW we come to the work of Bowne as critic of Spencer. In the *New Englander* for 1872 appeared a series of articles by Bowne on the philosophy of Herbert Spencer which attracted attention at once. The articles were gathered up, revised, and published in book form by The Methodist Book Concern—Nelson and Phillips—in 1874, while Bowne was a student at Halle. During all his teaching at Boston Bowne used the Spencerian philosophy, especially *First Principles,* as what he called a "cadaver" on which his students might acquire dissection practice. The last writing he did was the book on Kant and Spencer, published in 1910. It would be possible to trace the growth of Bowne's powers in philosophic criticism, to a considerable degree, with only the Spencer material as guide, for that critical effort extended through a period of thirty-eight years.

The tradition has come down that the first work on Herbert Spencer was of the caustic brand of asperity and that Bowne was ashamed of it in his later years. In the 1910 book on Kant and Spencer, Bowne does refer to the earlier volume as written when he had not much fear of the proprieties before his eyes; but he records also his still holding to the belief that because Spencer "had painted a big picture with a big brush many persons have considered him a great painter." The most careful scrutiny of the pages of the 1872 discussion will fail to discover anything at which literary taste could properly take offense. There are much rougher, harsher expressions in the writings of the 80's than of the 70's. In one paragraph in his first book Bowne referred to the Spencerian philosophy as so busily absorbed in mowing down its opponents that it had mowed off its own legs. Surely that is mild enough for these later days of ours, in which even most abstract discussion is expected to be pungently spiced.

To get an idea of the importance of Bowne's books on Spencer, especially the first book, we must recall the intellectual atmosphere of 1872. Men then sensed themselves as on the edge of momentous changes in thinking. Disturbing currents were running the world over. In Europe the revolutions of 1848 had left their mark in the social consciousness; the wars connected with Napoleon III had roused a vast questioning; the rise of Germany was a portent hailed and execrated by adverse camps alike astonished; the United States had but recently conquered in the Civil War, and was continuing its conquests by the so-called policy of reconstruction. With so much unsettling in national and racial and social realms men were ready for a new philosophy.

As we all know, the steps toward that new statement were prepared for by Charles Darwin, particularly in *The Origin of Species.* It is surely not too much to say that there is nothing —or very little—in Darwin's work itself to warrant the agnostic, even atheistic, doctrine which others than Darwin based upon it. We must admit that Darwin himself, however, seemed to lend at least a passive support to the agnostic interpretation of evolution. He moved among men who did thus interpret him. He was not primarily a philosopher but a scientific observer. His power as an observer no one could possibly gainsay. That power showed itself abundantly in the earlier work on the voyage in the *Beagle* around the world. *The Origin of Species* and the later books are almost overwhelming in the range and variety of facts adduced and the skill with which they are marshaled. It is easy to pick out here and there a manifest forcing of an illustration to make it prove more than it should, but there is a quality of convincingness about Darwin's work which gives it continuing potency. It would have been too much to ask that Darwin himself be a philosopher. He says of himself that an interest in music and the responsiveness to music became atrophied in him because of intense preoccupation with science. The same preoccupation must have worked disastrously with whatever ability he may have possessed in metaphysics. It is only fair to say that he did not profess to be a metaphysician. He accepted the working of physical forces in the universe about as they would appear to common sense. His work is always intelligible to common sense. Accepting the variations which are constantly appearing in organic forms, and accepting the workings of those physical agencies, which as a matter of eyesight we almost always see around us, it seemed almost inevitable to the thinker of the common-sense type of sixty years ago that species originated just as Darwin taught.

With all the world-currents making for questioning, with the clue to an interpretation of an immense sum of physical processes supplied by Darwin, the conditions were ripe for Herbert Spencer. If Spencer had not appeared, it is likely that someone else, of his general type, would have said about what he said. For Spencer is a veritable voice of his time, of huge volume, all in one tone, without exactness of articulation or delicacy of shading, or he is the outcome of vast social forces which lumber along awkwardly without any nice fitting of part to part, and often with one part directly opposing another. The "time" called for a mighty unity in our thinking about the world, and Spencer seemed to give it. The "time" craved relief from everything suggestive of subtlety, and Spencer certainly was not subtle. Downright common sense seemed to be in order, with emphasis on what men could see and hear, and Spencer seemed to meet the demand. The power of Spencer seems to have lain in his thus meeting a stupendous demand, especially in the English-speaking world. The philosophy of Kant and the great German idealists, powerful as it no doubt was in Germany, had not obtained wide acceptance in England, and the utterances of common-sense schools of the Sir William Hamilton type had always seemed cramped and uninteresting. Spencer would not allow himself to be tinctured with what he called the "insanities of idealism" if he could help himself. He was not cramped and he was interesting, though completely devoid of anything resembling a sense of humor.

Perhaps it can be urged against Bowne that he did not sufficiently respect the Spencerian system as being a significant utterance of the age, but the more it was the utterance of the age the more closely Bowne thought it should be looked into. I cannot find any warrant for the charge that Bowne was unjustifiably flippant toward Spencer. When the synthetic philosophy first began to make headway Bowne avowed that the orthodox theologians and orthodox philosophers met it with "volleys of shudders." They allowed themselves to be browbeaten into silence. The swaggering of those first evolutionists in the cock-sureness of their pronouncements makes odd reading now. Of course they were amused at the attacks of churchmen who had nothing but imprecations in their arsenal, but they were shocked and grieved when this young stripling of a Bowne began, with all the directness of youth, to show up their philosophy in all its logical crassness. Edward Livingston Youmans, a giant of those days in the evolutionist camp, fairly bellowed with rage in a review of Bowne's "swaggering polemic," as he called it. Here is a line or two from Youmans in the *Popular Science Monthly,* June, 1874: "This book [of Bowne's] is a swaggering polemic, designed to be in the interests of religion, and written by a man equally and eminently self-conscious and unscrupulous." Bowne was a student in Germany when that review appeared. I think the fury of the outcry astonished him. He was rooming at the time with a good, sensible American youth who at once saw the humor of the wrath of the agnostic Philistines when this philosophic David began his taunts, and the mirth of his companion, I suspect, quickly lifted Bowne out of his surprise and prompted him to further taunts. Now, taunting is an entirely legitimate exercise in dealing with Philistinism, and Bowne thought of Spencerism as Philistine throughout. Nothing could rival the Spencerian claim to practical omniscience, and, of course, any poking fun at omniscience seemed to the evolutionist to be profane. Bowne viewed the new philosophy solely from the logical angle. At least in the opening years of his career he did not consider thought systems as effects produced by causes. He was not interested in origins. He did not ask why men spoke as they did. He asked solely as to what a system was worth on its own logical merits.

In all study of Bowne as a critic this fundamental consideration must be kept before us. He was not a historian of the personal or social processes which issue in philosophic statements. He was interested enough in the causes of beliefs, but his chosen purpose was to examine the soundness of reasons. It is true that this method may fail to take account of the practical productivity or futility of philosophic conceptions, but with that aspect Bowne did not concern himself. I do not think he ever gave any prolonged attention to the question as to how or why Spencer ever came to have such vogue. If a publisher's report as to the circulation of the volumes of the New Philosophy had been put before him, he would have shown only the mildest, most casual interest. When he came to formulate his arguments for theism on a basis somewhat similar to the pragmatism which later was expounded by James as the will to believe, he did indeed allow full scope to nonlogical forces as producing belief; but, even so, he judged his own argument by strict logical standards. That is to say, he did not assume that a nonlogical factor was logical and smuggle it into his discussion as logical. He did not call attention to factors as sentimental and then forthwith use them as logical. It is common with some writers frankly to admit the weakness of an intellectual position and then to go on relying on the position as if it were absolutely invulnerable. A reader would search in vain throughout Bowne for a trace of this inconsistency. Bowne's first assumption was that if Spencer claimed to be logical, he had to meet the tests of logic.

It must not be forgotten that Bowne's defense of the spiritual interests against the attacks of the materialism which flourished fifty years ago under the name of evolution was itself aggressive. He had no patience with the more passive defense which stood in horror against the irreverence and even blasphemy of evolution's questionings of spiritual values. Evolution made the onslaught in the name of superior science. Accepting, then, evolution's challenge to fight on the ground of strict reasoning, Bowne looked into the strictness of the evolutionary reasonings. He inquired as to the assumptions of the new school, and especially as to its theory of knowledge. Much of the fury which Bowne aroused in the Spencerian camp was due to the ruthless vigor with which he held the Spencerian down to first principles. Inasmuch as Spencer began his exposition with a formidable volume on First Principles it was altogether reasonable, Bowne thought, to begin a reply not by considering the legitimacy of Spencer's criticism of other systems, but by looking at Spencer's own assumptions. Of course this can easily be caricatured as just a "you're another" strategy, but that would be nothing but caricature. The Spencerian criticism must be tested as to its own soundness by looking at its fundamental assumptions. A primary question, unpopular indeed at the present day, is "How is knowledge possible?" The unpopularity of the question now and formerly comes not, indeed, out of its sheer difficulty, but, rather, out of the likelihood that such a question may make a system like Spencer's face its own inadequacy in rendering all knowledge impossible. If an agnostic or atheistic theory is allowed to take for granted, by wholesale assumption, whatever suits its own purpose, of course it can make quite a showing. The showing may not be so elaborate, however, when the system is compelled to face its own assumptions.

Such thoroughgoing foundation work is especially in order when a professedly scientific scheme lays stress on the exactness of its own procedure and the finality of its own results as over against the faith, not to say credulity, of any philosophizing which is marked with theism. Bowne took delight in showing that the faith required to accept Spencer was, to quote his own characteristic phrase, "beyond anything in Israel." This again was resented by the Spencerians, a group extraordinarily sensitive to any sprightly criticism. One mark of leadership in Spencer was his ability to convince himself that he had reached final truth, and a second mark was his ability to convince others of the same finality. As one who lived through the day when this philosophy was at its height, may I bear witness to seeing repeatedly from the pens of thinkers of high standing the most unconditional surrender to Spencer—avowals of belief that the last word had been spoken. I have heard such a statement from a distinguished college professor within the last fifteen years. Those of the present generation can hardly realize the air of omniscience with which evolutionism bore itself in those flush days. There are few more pathetic figures in the history of philosophy than that of Spencer, who, in his last years, when the caustic criticism of a generation which did not think of Spencerism as sacrosanct began to take effect, sat in bewildered and uncomprehending distress. He could not understand younger students when they began to inquire irreverently as to the justification of this or that flat self-contradiction. No high priest of a temple ever contemplated with more acute agony the trampling of the sacred courts by profane hordes than did Spencer the assault upon his system. On second thought I doubt if this is a true analogy. Perhaps it would be more exact to say that no priest, once a ruler of the devotion of the multitudes, ever saw with keener dismay the multitudes depart from him. Bowne said that Spencer's philosophy was obsolete before Spencer died, but this cannot be taken as historically just. If a system did not meet the demands of logic, Bowne regarded it as obsolete as soon as it was born. He was nearer the biographical and historic truth when he remarked, near the close of Spencer's career, that Spencer had come out of his system-making a long distance from where he had gone in.

There is not space, or justification, for attempting to follow Bowne in his thirty-five years of dissection of Spencer. We look at two or three of the inconsistencies characteristic of Spencer which Bowne, characteristically also, pulled out into the full light.

First, glance at Spencer's doctrine of knowledge as recognition, or cognition as a phase of recognition. Spencer used this doctrine most freely when he was trying to contend against our knowing anything which it was inconvenient for his system to have men know. Before we could know the Infinite, for example, it would be necessary for us to have previously acquired a knowledge of the Infinite to which we could relate the new knowledge, and, in dealing with anything suggestive of theism, Spencer ruled out valid knowledge. It was not gracious of critics to point out that this procedure made all knowledge impossible, for with the first act of knowledge there could not have been any recognition. Spencer met this objection, as far as concerned the knowledge of the objects which it suited his system to have us know, by the affirmation that back of the individual act of knowledge must be the knowledge in possession of the race. An individual does not, indeed, attain to knowledge by relating his objects of thought to conceptions which he himself recognizes as of his own experience, but he acts upon the basis of a transmitted racial experience. The race has learned, and on this basis of the race's accumulated knowledge the individual, no doubt altogether unconsciously to himself, cognizes by recognizing! Can it be wondered that Bowne found fun in this? Where in the history of reputable and respectable thinking can we find anything to match this for sheer puzzle-headedness? If a feat is impossible inherently, there is no sense in saying that it may be achieved if we try often enough. This doctrine of cognition by recognition is a fair specimen of the early evolutionary performances. Large terms, immense periods, accomplished the impossible. Of course thick swarms of difficulties confronted such reasoning when the critics started to ask questions. What is a racial experience? The evolutionist, making the nervous system basal in knowledge, would reply that successive changes, or improvements, or developments in nerve tissue have made the knowing mechanism better and better adapted to doing what we were told at the outset it was inherently unable to do.

A second fallacy which lies at the heart of the reasoning of Spencer and his school is the doctrine of sensations. This was so stated as to do away with the need of the self as a unitary agent. Any such self has been looked upon by Spencerians, and by hosts of evolutionists of all varieties and conditions, as a remnant of a degrading superstition. An editorial in a leading weekly in this country, which lays claim to omniscience in practically all realms, a few weeks ago voiced its horror at the indications of willingness among scientists to reinstate the self as a true agent. Something has all along had to do the work of unifying formerly conceived of as the function of a unitary, relatively abiding self. The thinkers of the 70's and 80's had not, indeed, attained to the degree of nimble credulity which could, after the manner of Bertrand Russell, conceive of "neutrals" which are the fundamental realities, existing it may be now as impressions on the mind and now as effects on a photographic plate. In one way or another this Spencer doctrine has been more or less in men's thinking since David Hume, who gave it its most philosophic phrasing, though there is a question as to how seriously Hume took his own conclusions. He did have enough sense of humor, which is akin to a sense of reality, to feel misgiving about his own success in reducing the world and the self to a series of impressions, even after he had worked his conceptions out with more thoroughness than any other associationalist who has ever lived. The picture of Spencer as ever smiling at his own philosophy is inconceivable. The system could hold its place as the one final truth only on condition that thinkers regard it as sacred. No small share of Bowne's service was in daring to ask whether the evolutionists seriously meant much that they were proclaiming, or whether a deal of it was not to be taken as pleasantry.

Returning for a moment to Hume. The definitive handling of Hume is Thomas Hill Green's *Examination,* and for Green Bowne had genuine admiration. Green was so controlled by Hegel that as to the indispensability of a personal self for thinking he and Bowne did not see alike, but Bowne recognized the completeness of Green's demolition of Hume. Through three hundred big pages Green pursues Hume's associationalism without remorse, showing that Hume could not even get a start toward associationalism without smuggling in a unitary, abiding agent which he professedly repudiated and rejected. Green wrote in a heavy, tedious style, but anyone who wishes to see the utter bankruptcy of associationalism has only to follow through his *Examination.* Bowne set his postgraduate students to work on the *Examination.* A thesis on that was a requirement of every pupil taking an advanced degree in philosophy.

The pertinence of my reference to Hume lies in Bowne's belief that the answer to Hume is the answer to Spencer, and that dealing with Hume was a better discipline than dealing with Spencer, inasmuch as Hume was a finer mind than Spencer. Readers of philosophic criticism may recall that the Spencerians resented Green's remark that he had treated Spencer's philosophy in treating Hume's. Most Spencerians were totally unable to grasp this point, but the point is plain enough to any reader of Green. Bowne believed that some achievements in human thinking are brought to a conclusion, finished for all time. It was a just judgment that regards Green's criticism as holding against Spencer as well as against

Hume. The criticism also holds, we may remark, against all the associationalist doctrines since. Very few philosophic writers to-day seem to read Green, but they might save themselves from many blind alleys if they would. Nobody could have more distinctly recognized the limitations of human reasoning than did Bowne. He had something of Hume's own half-amused misgiving as to much philosophic effort, but he did believe that the contradictoriness of contradictions could be exposed once and for all. I said a moment ago that many associationalists of the present day could read Green to profit, and I shall have occasion to emphasize the same contention in dealing with Bowne's later criticism. I doubt, however, if many of those seeking to-day to put philosophy in the form of light literature, abounding in what the slang of the hour calls "wise cracks," would ever survive the three hundred pages of Green on Hume. There is, moreover, a failure to-day to estimate Hume aright. He indeed carried human thinking into a blind alley, but he thoroughly explored that alley and found that it was blind. The Spencerians went into the same old alley, and never discovering that it was blind, hailed it as the path opening into a new world. Hume at least knew what he had not done.

It was only to be expected that Bowne should make merry with the famous definition of evolution as the progress from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity through successive differentiations and integrations. Of course there came a day when the contradictions that swarm in this formula, and in its various modified phrasings, were widely recognized and ridiculed, but at the first it was not so. Some did not see the contradictions. Others thought the formula valuable as a beginning in the right direction, looking for its correction later. Spencer, however, did not himself take kindly to amendments or improvements, except the slight changes he made himself, and it finally became evident that he regarded the statement as one of his fundamentals. It is only fair to say that the contradictions were productive, in that they prompted explanations and discussions which in the end established the movement from simplicity to complexity as one of the marks of the evolutionary process.

We cannot justly charge Bowne with flippant manipulation of verbalisms in ringing the changes on the formula. His criticism dealt always with logic. Spencer never adequately met the criticisms. If his description of evolution was, in his own judgment, capable of being given compendious statement in formula, then he should have been ready to defend the formula. Bowne always seemed to relish the formula, as one of his favorite playthings. How could homogeneity be indefinite? If we have a genuine homogeneity, it is definite enough—and coherent enough, for that matter—as being all the same. Heterogeneity might stand for a complexity worked into an organism of a definite, coherent unity but that implies something more than mere otherness. It almost seemed as if Spencer meant to hide away in the heaviness of his verbiage itself some mystic quality of high potency which could hardly be mentioned above a whisper. What was the force which started the progress from homogeneity to heterogeneity? The reply was a cryptic doctrine of the instability of the homogeneous, but instability of the homogeneous would imply different levels of power, like different levels of water; and how could we then speak of the homogeneous? Then the successive differentiations and integrations could only be successive separations and puttings-together. He would be rash indeed who would deny that progress arises through separations and puttings-together. Scientific thinking does to-day use terms like differentiation and integration almost technically, but Spencer was making a general exposition of philosophic principles. Bowne showed that his formula was so general that any process could be fitted into it without our being moved an inch forward so far as any valuable knowledge was concerned. When he said that sifting the ashes and trimming one's beard were differentiations which could fit into the Spencerian formula he had done nothing unfair to a doctrine which, according to Spencer himself, found illustration in the segregating power of a breeze which, passing over dry leaves in the forest, separates them into different heaps. As for the instability of the homogeneous, had not Spencer referred to the impossibility of keeping a pair of scales in exact equilibrium as an instance of the work of that instability? So also the impossibility of keeping iron for long from rusting. What Bowne saw here was definite forces not at all homogeneous. One heterogeneity was constantly giving place to another. He declared that evolution might just as well have been defined as the progress from a definite, coherent heterogeneity to another definite coherent heterogeneity, which would have been tantamount to saying that evolution is evolution.

There was at work in Spencer's formula a logical fallacy which constantly breeds havoc, unless thinkers watch closely, the fancy that a simplicity in our thinking necessarily represents a simplicity in the facts. We look abroad and behold manifold complexities in the world around us. Then we think back to an imagined time before these complexities existed, and we conclude that we have come upon a simplicity. We picture the world of nature after the analogy of our social system, which in former centuries had much simpler forms of organization than now. Likewise we fancy that if we could call up the past eons before us we should find less and less complex forms, until we got back to stark simplicity. Of course we then feel free to call this simplicity the homogeneous. Nothing in reason, however, warrants this supposition of a primitive homogeneous. Modern scientific thinking would justify us in believing that we never could go back far enough to ante-date complexity. The underlying assumption in Spencerianism was matter conceived of in atomic form, the atoms not centers of force but the hard lumps with which we arbitrarily come to a stop in our division. To-day an atom is a sort of miniature solar system with complexity enough in the relations of the positively charged proton at the center of the atom system, and the negatively charged electrons revolving around it. Of course we cannot blame Spencer for not knowing about the present-day atomic theories, but did he escape complexity even in the cruder physics of fifty years ago? On the basis of his own assumption of the lump theory of atoms, think of the billions and billions of units the system called for. Granted that atoms could be conceived of as alike as peas in a pod—which, by the way, are never alike—think of the infinity of combinations which they could have entered with one another. There surely would have been complexity in the mathematics required to state the combinations. If some reader here reflects that this concedes that even with simple elements the combinations are infinite, and the possibilities of change therefore infinite, we freely admit the concessions, but call attention to Bowne's further reminder that in such cases we have merely a making explicit what was already implicit, and that the only simplicity is for the imagination, the complexities abounding in splendid profusion.

Moreover, in such a fancied simplicity, what would determine the direction which the changes would take? All that Spencer could logically let us have would be chance.

I present all this—as Bowne would have done to-day—with expressions of apology. The ground has been plowed over many, many times. Within two years a prominent Oxford philosopher has made a summary of the essentials of the philosophy of Spencer from the critic's viewpoint, and the criticisms are substantially as Bowne put them in 1872. The philosophic fashions have changed in half a century, and it is easy to see as self-evident what was not so easy to detect fifty years ago. Moreover, quoting Bowne again, a very ordinary intelligence can understand what it took a Newton or a Laplace to discover. In all our estimate of Bowne's dealing with Spencer we must remember the year 1872, when one could have counted on the fingers of one hand the critics who were pointing out the vulnerable spots in the new system.

The third main point against which Bowne directed his fire was the Spencerian doctrine of the Unknowable. Here again there have been fierce protests at what has been called Bowne's playing upon a word. John Fiske (of whom more later) declared the Unknowable, in Spencer's hands, was merely the same as the Inscrutable in the orthodox theologian's hands, and dismissed criticism of the Bowne stamp with the flourish that it could all be met by the change of the word "unknowable" to something else. Probably a good many, who know Spencer only in summary or outline, would to-day think that Fiske's lordly wave of the hand had disposed of all the Bownes who might happen along. Such students would better go back and read Spencer himself. Fiske had a quite imposing manner of telling what other thinkers meant. Spencer had abundant opportunity to say what he meant by the Unknowable, and he did not even accept his friend Fiske's suggestion as to substituting some other word for Unknowable. What Spencer evidently intended to teach was agnosticism. Since that was his purpose, Bowne's criticisms of the Unknowable have lasting value, for in one form or another agnosticism is constantly with us.

Looking back through the half century it is not difficult to see the causes of the vogue of agnosticism following Spencer's *First Principles.* To mention one of these causes we think of the overpositiveness of the theology of the middle of the nineteenth century. What orthodox theology did not then know about God was not worth knowing. This cocksureness about God was quite as offensive to Bowne as to the Spencerians themselves. He belabored throughout all his career such dogmatists as those who declared that in God there are "one substance, three persons, two processions, etc.," the ardent hair-splitting brother who felt that he had not correctly divided his attention in worship among the persons of the Trinity, and the preacher always too ready to interpret the divine providence, especially in the afflictions of others. All such claims to knowledge Bowne abhorred. He could have sympathized with agnosticism as a protest against the astonishing assertions of knowledge of God put forward by churchmen a half-dozen decades ago. He himself believed in a degree of Christian agnosticism. When, however, Spencer and his followers in their turn became dogmatic about the Unknowable, he took up the cudgels against their dogmatism—a dogmatism which had no more justification than that of the theologian.

Spencerian agnosticism Bowne found to take its start in failure to recognize the inherent limitations of knowledge. That we cannot know all, or even much, about the Reality which we call God is no reason for saying that we do not know anything about that Reality, or for denying that our knowledge is sound as far as it goes. Scientific knowledge does not tell us "how things are made" in the sense of giving us outright creative power. We can learn the orders in which changes in the world around us take place, and, learning the order, or condition, or law of the changes, we have a measurably valid tool for the control of those changes. Now, to say that the world around us is unknowable because we reach irreducible elements, or forces, which we could never create or start going, seemed to Bowne puerile. In other words, we are not to deny the validity of our knowledge, as far as it goes, because we reach limits beyond which it cannot go. It may be that occasionally Bowne's dependence upon logic led him to conclusions which did not take account of actual human experiences. For example, in treating of Spencer's agnosticism he avowed that we could know God whether we think of him either as infinite or finite; for if he is infinite, he can reach us; and if he is finite, we can reach him. This is a bit too summary, though no one could question the logic. If God is to be conceived of as infinite, there is no guarantee in logic that he *will* reach us. If he is to be conceived of as finite, there is no guarantee that we can reach him. Many finite attainments are beyond us. Logic is no guarantee that the finite can master all the finite.

To get back to the main path, however, Bowne insisted that if we are to pose as agnostics, we must make sure that we know what we are about. If all thinking perishes, agnostic thinking goes down with the rest. A few pages back I referred to Bowne's defending theism by attack on the assumptions of atheism. His own constructive argument for theism comes up in a later chapter, but here I wish to say again that the Bowne attacks were not of the tit-for-tat order. What he was always trying to do was to show that if we are to attack theism in the name of reason we must not do so in such fashion as to make reason itself impossible. Most attacks on theism in the name of strict reason end by making reason itself impossible. Bowne's claim was that if we wish to reject theism because we are sick or tired of reasoning, or because we think theistic conceptions inadequate, or because the upholders of theism do not work their belief out into practical expressions, well and good! Let us not, however, condemn theism in the name of reason unless we are willing to examine our conclusions with the aim of discovering if they are themselves compatible with reason. Surely, the Spencerian avowal that our knowledge of God is no knowledge because we do not and cannot know all, would, if applied to other objects of thought, make all knowledge alike impossible. It would be a waste of time for me to seek to enumerate the items of knowledge which Spencer gives us about the Unknowable. Everything that happens is, according to the author of the Synthetic Philosophy, and everything that is said, is the outcome of the activity of the Unknowable, but everything includes a good deal, and on the commonplace assumption that causes are revealed in their effects, everything that is said or done reveals the Unknowable.

Spencer had a way of ruling out criticism of his system by an appeal to a logic all his own. In spite of our agnosticism as to cosmic back-lying Reality there is, he tells us, a mighty principle at work—the Persistence of Force. Bowne revealed quite a knowledge of physics in his dealing with the Persistence of Force. He showed that scientifically all that the principle means is that in the change from one force to another no energy is lost. Spencer took a principle which has its proper validity only in the strictly scientific sphere and made it the touchstone of all truth.

Again, Bowne protested against the use of the relativity of knowledge as a basis for agnosticism. Relativity in those pre-Einstein days did not mean quite what it does to-day. Nor did it mean in the hands of the evolutionists just what it meant to Kant. Not many Spencerians seem to have known much about Kant. Their relativity meant merely that all our knowledge has to come through our faculties, and this did not seem to Bowne to be a firm foundation for Spencer's agnosticism. It is a wonder that the Spencerians did not see that their emphasis on the claim that our knowledge comes through our faculties might lead to what their leader called the "insanities of idealism." Here again the agnostics were not consistent. All our knowledge comes through our faculties. It might seem, then, that all our knowledge is corrupted by our faculties. As a matter of fact, the evolutionists allowed only theistic, spiritualistic knowledge to be thus corrupted. The relativity of knowledge made use of by the agnostics merely meant that all that we know, *we* know; that all we grasp, we grasp according to our manner of grasping. This would indeed be a remarkable basis for general agnosticism. Bowne not only trusted our reason as far as it leads us, and believed our knowledge to be valid as far as it goes, but believed also that our faculties are so constituted as to guide us to knowledge, if properly used. He scrutinized our faculties closely but not on a skeptical assumption.

To mention one more objection of Bowne against the Unknowable we note his insistence through nearly forty years that with the Unknowable giving out all the messages that come from anywhere, there is no standard of truth and error by which we can judge the messages. According to Spencer, every man is to regard himself as authorized and commissioned to utter and act upon the messages which arise in his own mind. Now, "every man" is a fairly numerous messenger, and how are we to get any test by which to judge these incredibly multitudinous messages and messengers? Spencer's philosophy made no provision for choice, for freedom, for error. It might be avowed that some of the messages are inherently worthier than others, more truthful, more beautiful. That might be, but nobody could do anything about it. If a beautiful thought came to any of us, we should indeed be fortunate, but we could not act according to the thought through any choice of our own. A democratically inclined Spencerian might say that the most numerous messages would naturally have most worth as indicating a tendency or habit on the part of the Unknowable. This, however, would not do, as the masses of men have always shown a fondness for belief in a God, or gods, a belief in moral responsibility, and all the other wretched superstitions abhorrent to Spencer. Unless the Synthetic school could make it clear that Spencer himself was the organ through which the Unknowable made its most important revelations, the Spencerian philosophy left the world of thought without a standard of truth or test of error. From the earliest days of his criticism Bowne began to lay stress on the "speculative significance of freedom."

Perhaps it is high time to turn away from Spencer himself, but before doing so I wish to add a word about a somewhat different temper discernible in Bowne's last book, *Kant and Spencer*, as contrasted with the criticism of 1872. As I have already indicated, Bowne in the latter book spoke half apologetically of the earlier work as having been done when there was no fear of the proprieties before his eyes. If this was an apology, it was not called for. The real offense of the youthful book was in its unerring directness in sending its spears straight toward the weak joints in Spencer's armor. The Spencerians never recovered from the chagrin caused, not by lack of regard for proprieties, but by the deadliness of the Bowne frontal attack. In *Kant and Spencer* Bowne spoke more respectfully of Spencer's great abilities than anywhere else, though he still held fast to the earlier criticism for "substance of doctrine." The kindlier tone of the later book may have been due also to Bowne's feeling that as Spencer strove on through his philosophy he was coming out at a long distance from where he expected to arrive.

In estimating Bowne's criticism of Spencer we must not forget that the criticism took its stand admittedly on a strictly logical basis. Inasmuch as Spencer made an elaborate show of exactness in formal reasoning, it was only fair that someone call him to strict account before the bar of formal reason. This is all that Bowne aimed at. If it seems to be a forceful reply that Bowne never adequately sensed Spencer's importance in English philosophy, we must remember that Bowne did not write as a historian of philosophy. To say that he did not know that Spencer had a vast following, and that evolutionary philosophy was at one time practically monopolizing the popular attention given to such matters, would be silly. There may be worth in the claim that Bowne did not estimate highly the service rendered in "bringing evolutionary philosophy to a head," so to speak, and stating it in such fashion that it could be dealt with. No doubt Bowne was thankful that it was so stated as to be open to attack, but probably it is true that he did not enough appreciate the positive, even though passing contributions of Spencer's mammoth formulations. Without question Spencer did get the vague nebulous thoughts and half-thoughts, which Darwin started in the middle of the nineteenth century, into such shape that he can be called a genuine voice of a century, or of a half-century. I am not sure that Bowne was impressed by this as perhaps he ought to have been. Spencer contrived an evolutionary formula which soon showed itself to be in unstable equilibrium and which passed, at least in the interpretation of its commentators and expositors, through all sorts of heterogeneities, into all sorts of differentiations and integrations. That in itself was no small service—to get so much started. To which Bowne would have replied that it was no service to have started so much that was wrong. It is true that Bowne did not estimate Spencerianism highly from any point of view. The common trend of judgment of these later years indicates that Spencer will hardly be thought of as having left a permanent contribution. Probably Bowne did not estimate him highly enough as (at least) a passing phenomenon, but we must not forget that Bowne gave him much close attention through more than a third of a century. This was in itself no mean tribute.

In this chapter one or two other leaders of evolutionary thought ought to be mentioned as having received somewhat of Bowne's critical attention. John Fiske was for long the leading exponent of Spencer in America, and in 1879 Bowne dealt with Fiske in an article in the *Methodist Review*. Fiske's most pretentious work was *Cosmic Philosophy*. Bowne commended it for freshness and vigor of style and for originality of treatment. Certainly, at this day Fiske is better reading than Spencer. There is a happiness of phrasing and argument, rising at times to eloquence and almost to poetry. Moreover, Fiske made a contribution to evolutionary theory as such—apart from its more abstract metaphysics—which is of more concrete value than anything from Spencer. I refer to Fiske's emphasis on the prolongation of human infancy as a factor in evolution. Again, Fiske's interests were more distinctively spiritual than Spencer's. The reader of both Spencer and Fiske has a suspicion at times that Fiske was making Spencer speak more spiritually than the Synthetic Philosophy itself intended. For example, Fiske talked about God as confidently as did the Puritan theologians, and when he made definite place for personal immortality some of the Spencerians spoke as if Fiske had betrayed his master. Darwin highly commended Fiske's philosophy but admitted that he had some difficulty with the chapter on "Cosmic Theism." No wonder. Fiske was trying to put a knowable God into the philosophy and still remain loyal to Spencer's Unknowable. In spite of Fiske's manifold and striking excellences as an expositor Bowne found his work vitiated by the Spencerian fallacies. Fiske went to great lengths in his associationalism. In a passage in one of his latest books, *Through Nature to God,* he speaks of dropping the plummet line into the psychological depths with his avowal that consciousness is made of the associations of sensations as the units of mental life, the units apparently conceived of after an atomic analogy. The sensationalism in all of Fiske's work is of the most outspoken type. He refers to "sensationalism" as a "profound" doctrine with an air of conviction, which seen through the after years is humorous. Bowne saw the humor at the time, and handled sensationalism in Fiske as vigorously as he had dealt with it in Spencer. To show Fiske's rough-and-ready way of meeting vital objections, think of how he handled the criticism that sensationalism leaves us without an adequate subject of the psychological life. Sensations come and go. There is nothing unitary or abiding among them. To which Fiske replied, with an air of finality which makes Bowne's most self-confident utterances look reticent and blushing, that of course the sensations have a subject. The subject is the human body itself.

Fiske repeats the old Spencerian doctrine, though in more attractive dress, that reality is to be conceived of after the pattern of a manifold of atoms. Bowne rejoins that Fiske puts nothing in the manifold which accounts for movement in one direction rather than another, least of all in a direction which means progress. So far as logic goes, Fiske, like Spencer, leaves us with chance. There is no ground for any consistent evolution in the manifold of atoms. To maintain that by chance a movement could result which would show any marks of the progress called for by evolution would require faith beyond anything demanded by the theologians. Moreover, with Fiske, intelligence was conceived of as "continued adjustment of specialized inner relations to specialized outer relations." Bowne naturally enough asked what "inner" and "outer" meant. The only inner and outer of any account in the Spencer theory of knowledge would be "in the body" and "out of the body," inasmuch as the body was the subject—which indicates that Fiske, quite unintentionally, was smuggling common-sense implications into terms which he was professing to define with specific and limited exactness. If asked as to the subject of the mental life he told us that the body was the subject. When using "inner" and "outer" he implied that the terms meant what they mean in common usage, in thought and outside of thought, in the objective world. Moreover, the correspondence would, on the evolutionary basis, be only a happen-so.

In the chapter on "Cosmic Theism," which Darwin found hard to understand, Fiske protests against a finite Deity. It seems that to speak of God as a person is to limit him, whereas Fiske says that God must be infinite. It will be observed that the Spencerians, taken either singly or together, contrived to get a good many things said about the Unknowable, though Fiske himself seemed to feel that the Unknowable was only Inscrutable, or something of the sort. After Spencer had ruled out self-existence as an attribute of being Fiske avowed his belief in an infinite Deity. So it went. The cosmic philosophy of the evolutionary type could, like the evolutionary formula, be fitted to anything.

It must be understood that as a critic Bowne was discussing the logic of the system and its implications. When he called the system atheistic he did not mean that the persons accepting it were personally atheists, as we use the term in common speech. Much of the bitterness which marked the evolutionary discussion could have been avoided if it could have been kept clear that the critics of Spencerianism, as itself reducing to atheism, were not calling the persons following Spencer atheists. It would have indeed been absurd to call John Fiske an atheist. The strict regard for this distinction between the life attitudes of persons and the logical implications of the system they profess is too much to expect in the hour of heated debate. The implications of the Synthetic Philosophy were, logically speaking, atheistic; but, on the other hand, so much of theistic assumption was naïvely carried into the philosophy, and so many of its teachers were devoted to noble ideals, that the use of the word "atheistic" was unfortunate.

I must repeat again and again that Bowne's criticism of the evolutionary philosophy of that early day—for what he said had no reference to theistic evolution which dealt with evolution as method—was wholly from the logical point of view. It must be said that, in dealing with philosophic systems, the strict logical tests were all that he was concerned with. After the publication of Fiske's *Through Nature to God* one of Bowne's pupils asked his opinion of Fiske's book, to get the prompt reply that Bowne had not read the book and that it was not worth reading. This seems extreme, to say the least. *Through Nature to God* can be read in an hour, and is a piece of noble prose, in spite of its associationalistic philosophy. Bowne regarded Fiske's virtual abandonment of philosophy for American history as a confession of failure in the philosophic field. This too was not warranted. Fiske made his living by his pen, and the fact that philosophic writing was not over-remunerative probably was the cause of his turning to other themes; but neither Fiske nor his followers thought of the Cosmic Philosophy as having failed. I have always regretted that Bowne did not care even to look into any of Fiske's historic work, in the days of the appearance of the *Discovery of America,* for example. Fiske was not a "researcher" in the present-day sense, but he had marvelous skill in assembling the findings of others into large suggestive generalizations. Still, it was just this type of power that did not appeal to Bowne.

May I mention one other evolutionist of the early type of whom Bowne fell afoul in those belligerent days? In 1879 there appeared a book which made a lively stir in the English-speaking world—*A Candid Examination of Theism by Physicus.* "Physicus" proved to be George John Romanes, of Cambridge. This book was frankly atheistic. The author avowed, with expressions of grief, amounting almost to wails, that theism had vanished. He professed to write almost as one of a broken heart. This sadness itself carried conviction to some whose faith would not have gone down before any assailant as coldly scientific as Tyndall or Huxley. Romanes would have it that the evolutionary philosophy had compelled him to give up all belief in spiritual "kith and kin in the universe" and to admit that atheism was "overwhelmingly upon us." With this book Bowne lost all patience. If he had been gathering up his early essays for permanent presentation, he would probably have modified what he said about Romanes. In the 70's the Civil War in America was a recent memory. One of the popular terms of contempt, coming out of soldier's jargon, for the man who followed as a hanger-on of an army without doing much fighting himself, was applied to a leader of a great English university. Bowne pronounced Physicus a "bummer." That is to say, he gave him no credit whatever as belonging to the philosophic and scientific armies doing the real thinking. *Candid Examination,* according to Bowne, abounded in fiat logic and fiat science. It proved things by saying they were so. It smuggled into the argument considerations which had no logical right there. Its logic, Bowne said, was that of Bret Harte's Heathen Chinee when he laid down the right bower deftly lifted from the depths of a sleeve.

Bowne's castigation brought out one important peculiarity in the criticism of theism by the atheistic camp. He pointed out that much of the atheism never mastered the distinction between demonstrating a theorem and solving a problem. The atheists practically asked that the theists demonstrate the existence of God, whereas all that can be legitimately expected of theism is that it put forth a reasonable solution of a problem. The world of persons and things is before us. Outright demonstration concerning the nature of the World-Ground is out of the question. The only pertinent consideration is as to the more adequate solution of the world problem—theism or atheism. The rivalry is between differing theories and not between theism as a theory and atheism as some direct self-report from reality. In our examination of Bowne as a theist we shall see this point urged with cogency.

In 1894 Romanes' *Thoughts on Religion* was published and was everywhere hailed as a return to faith. The religious world was agitated at the admission of Romanes that he had come to believe his atheistic reasonings inadequate. Something of Bowne's feeling concerning the worthlessness of the philosophy of Romanes reappeared when *Thoughts on Religion* was published. In the book itself he had not the slightest interest. One would have supposed that he would be concerned to note just what atheistic reasonings had seemed to Romanes to fall short, but Bowne never thought it worth while to read the book. All he ever said was that in giving up theism Romanes must have felt like a soldier who discovers that he has been terrified into surrender by a wooden gun.

Before passing to Bowne's more constructive work we look for a little longer at his general attitude toward associationalism, because of the significance of his criticism for later times. The term "associationalistic psychology" has vanished, though what is substantially the same teaching still persists—carried on, to take a single instance, through the work of William James. In speaking of Bowne's attitude toward James we must always be careful to keep in mind the warm friendship which existed between the two men, in spite of the vigor with which they attacked each other. There was for a time a tradition at Harvard that, for use in one of his courses, James would keep a volume of Bowne at hand and would occasionally turn to it with the prefatory comment, "Now let's see what God

Almighty has to say." Bowne's self-confidence always struck James on the funny bone; and what Bowne said about the picturesque figures of speech with which James would flit over the dangerous spots in philosophy was itself picturesque enough. Along toward the close of their careers Bowne and James experienced a deepening of friendship each for the other, and James felt, after the publication of Bowne's *Personalism,* that fundamentally his own point of view and that of Bowne were alike, even though Bowne persistently stuck to a substantial self which James as persistently denied. James used to say that in his doctrine of the self Bowne crawled into a hole and pulled the hole in after him.

Speaking in exact philosophical terms, however, Bowne felt that James never worked clear from the sensationalist psychology. Oddly enough James felt a heavy obligation all through his life to Spencer, Bain, and Mill. I say "oddly enough," because the stiff carpentry of Spencerianism seems ill equipped to make appeal to a mind as subtle as that of James. Still, James in his doctrine of the Stream of Consciousness was sensationalistic. The ideas float in a stream and the relations between them are the "free water" between the "buckets"—that is, the ideas. The unity here is the "Stream." With all of which Bowne made merry, as was to be expected. The prolifically fertile suggestiveness of James' figures of speech Bowne never appreciated, except as accounting for the hold of the philosophy in popular thought, though in the last year or two of his life he did repeat with fond relish some of James' happy characterizations. Bowne's highest praise for such expressions was "capital."

The sensationalism of James started about where Spencer left off. It was expounded in much more entertaining fashion from the outset. As time went on, James seemed to realize that atomic sensationalism, so to speak, would hardly meet legitimate demands. That sensationalism practically implied that in the sensation we have an indivisible unit, almost as hard-

and-fast as an atom of the old-fashioned lump physics, the sensations conceived of as almost passive. James soon saw the need of an essential activity in the mental life, and provided for this not by any unitary and abiding agent but by smuggling the activities which Bowne thought of as characterizing the self into the successive movements of consciousness. In a famous passage which Bowne found good game for purposes of philosophic sport James declares that it is each passing stage of consciousness which says "I" and "Me." In other words, James puts all the activities which would seem to call for an abiding agent into the passing instants of consciousness. These instants of James did, according to James, all that the self of Bowne did. This is a long distance from the crude sensationalism of the early evolutionary psychology. Bowne, of course, insisted that what James had done was to provide not for one active self, but for millions of them in the one personal stream of consciousness—millions of them, too, with no agency to relate them together. James replied that each of the passing instants hailed its successor with the words "Thou art mine!" etc. Each in passing bequeathed to its heir all its content.

The stream-of-consciousness theory of the James type still obtains among us. The abhorrence of a so-called metaphysical self is as powerful to-day as ever. Nevertheless, the psychologist now makes provision for an activity of the mind even though he does not provide for a self. Activities go on within the mental units. The mental atoms are not passive, but are active with a perfect buzz of energies. As James says, they deal with a big, blooming, buzzing confusion.

It may seem a far, far cry indeed from the doctrine that Bowne was attacking to the "neutrals" of Bertrand Russell, but there is a line of connection nevertheless, though Russell may not take account of such connection. Russell makes reality consist of passing instants, themselves neither matter nor mind. An impression on a sensitive photographic plate and an impression on the human retina are pretty much the same in themselves—neither mental nor material but "neutral." This procession of instants can indeed attain to judgments of the true, good, and beautiful, but the existential reality is the instants. How Russell saves his procession from becoming a succession of merely mathematical points is hard to see. I mention Russell as a sort of logical result of sensationalism. It is more than strange to find one of the foremost mathematicians of an age making no more place for intellectual agency than that of this passing procession, but the system is instructive as showing where the stream of consciousness, taken without any substantial agency as its spring, finally ends. It practically ends in nihilism. Russell even goes so far as to make the Einstein relativity a basis for an anarchy of space and time. There seem to be not one space and time, but space-and-time events. Then Russell cheerily tells us that all space-time events can be brought within the scope of Einstein's all-inclusive formula. To be sure, we must always remind ourselves that the procession of passing instants which happen to be designated by the name of Russell is not practically disturbed by its own fleetingness, but can go on at all times talking edifyingly about important social questions, and education and the good life. I mention Russell simply because he seems to be the ablest of his group. In one way or another the work which the substantial self was admittedly competent to perform, that of relational and constitutive activity, has to be done, and the modern school accomplishes the task by smuggling. It is the fashion of these days to treat the self of ordinary common sense as a relic of superstition, ruling it out cavalierly. Nobody insisted more strongly than did Bowne that if we thus rule it out, it comes back upon us under some other name, such as consciousness, or stream of consciousness, or a psychosis, or a neutral. There is no significant gain for philosophy in ruling out one self only to replace it by a million or so of selves connected with the same physical organism. No matter what we call the psychical agency there has to be an agency. There is a popular theory of knowledge to-day which tells us that in a perception of the outside world we enter into immediate seizure of a transparent section of reality. If such a theory is analyzed, it implies all the mental activities formerly attributed to the self. Bowne professed a natural weariness at having to deal again and again with a philosophy which Hume stated better than do the modernists. Hume's doctrine of the "propensity to feign" which rules among the impressions is as good as or better than the modern associationalistic formulations. There has been some progress of course. We no longer think of images before the mind as impressions stamped on wax. To be sure, untrained thinking, hearing of images on a retina, is satisfied with the fact that the image is there as a total explanation, but almost any student asks as to who, or what, reads off and understands the picture, recognizing that an activity of some kind reconstructs the picture for intelligence. The difficulty is that none of these new-fangled substitutes for the active self are adequate to the task expected of them. They are not units which can conceive a manifold, and they have not even the relative fixity to make possible any degree of memory. The unitary and abiding qualities are lacking.

Again, Doctor Bowne's attacks on the sensationalistic schools have been often resented because he freely used the adjective "materialistic" in dealing with such psychologies. What he meant by his characterization was not that they teach that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile, but that associationalism allows mental activity no true independence of matter. He pointed out that materialism can be judged either by its theory of mind or by its theory of matter, and that any theory of mind which makes mind so dependent upon matter that it has no creative force of its own is materialistic. When Bowne was belaboring the philosophy of associationalism he received a letter from a distinguished physicist asking if he, Bowne, had not heard the new doctrines of physics, namely, that physical forces are basic, and that mental phenomena are merely parallel phenomena wholly dependent on the physical. Bowne replied that, according to this theory, the letter which the physicist had written was the outcome of a series of nervous discharges in turn dependent on other processes of matter; that the resultant was a series of scratches on a sheet of paper, with no thought intervening anywhere as an effective force; that while the theory might not explain the universe as a whole it would explain the letter in question. Whereupon the physicist at first called Bowne's letter nasty, and then admitted to a friend that he had not been able to frame an adequate reply.

Of course there are those to-day who tell us that such letters as this of Bowne were over-sharp; that it is easy to reply to the sharpness if one chooses to; that the dependence of mental on material is as close as the physicist says; that matter does not create mind, but that material activities are accompanied by mental activities which are to be judged on their own account. Accepting this explanation, we are not much further along than Bowne indicated. Suppose the nervous changes are accompanied by noble mental accompaniments—intellectual, artistic, moral. The quick advice follows that we are to sift out the noblest as our ideals. How can we do this without power to choose? We admit that we are not much disturbed at the dependence of mind on matter if we can so control matter as to bring about a better mental accompaniment. Presumably, if we could get a finer material process, we could have a finer mental process, but since "we" cannot do anything effective there is no hope. In any case, however, the parallelism between material and mental processes does not mean anything more than that as a fact the two sets of activities are found to go along together. Long before Bowne passed away, his strictures were being met by a sturdy impatience on the part of newer schools which with a gesture declared that the only thinking we see is connected with human physical organisms—and that settles it. To which Bowne replied that that did not settle it, that no necessary connection had been discovered, or could be discovered between a nervous change and a mental change. All changes in nervous tissues must reduce themselves at last to changes in space relations; and what necessary connection can there be between up and down in a nerve, or right and left, or forward and back, and logical consistency, or artistic excellence, or moral worth? Bowne insisted as strongly as did anyone upon the matter-of-fact dependence of thought-processes on physical processes in a conditioning sense, but not in a causal sense. He laid great weight on the "logical equivalence of cause and effect"; causes must be adequate to the effects attributed to them; there is nothing in material changes that can cause changes in reasoning so far as the logical aspect is concerned. He freely admitted that physical changes may easily cause one man to prefer one logical, or æsthetic, or ethical doctrine to another, but that is altogether a different problem from causation. He saw nothing but ground for amusement in the alarm of some good souls over the increasingly established dependence of detailed mental processes on detailed physical processes. The general fact of such dependence of thinking on brain "was known when Noah went into the ark." He did not see that it was any more terrifying when traced down into the dependence of memory, or any other specific mental function, upon this or that specific tract of brain substance. Once more I repeat that Bowne's criticism was always in the name of knowledge and reason. He argued that there can be no universal skepticism, for if skepticism were distributed over everything alike, it would leave things relatively to one another, and to the whole, just where they were before. Skepticism of the rational kind he believed in, but such skepticism dealt with particular aspects of knowledge. His contention was that the mind finds itself to be a living organism required to make its adjustments to the world in which it must live. If it began by doubting everything, it would limit itself to practical and theoretical barrenness. The fruitful method is, provisionally at least, to take things as we find them, to assume that things are giving a true account of themselves, until reason for doubt appears. In human society we assume, in general, that men are telling the truth, and then we deal with the liars in the order of their appearance.

We assume that our faculties themselves are trustworthy. They may not take us far, but they give up the truth as far as they go. The test of truth is its self-evidence and its consistency with other truths. Self-evidence does not mean truth at first glance; it may be at last glance, when analysis can go no further and evidence is all in. There comes an instant, sooner, as with a direct intuition; later, as with a process of inference, when the mind "is satisfied." It has come to truths which must be accepted on their own account or not at all. We reach a stage where nothing more can be said. There is the truth, or what claims to be truth. We can take it or leave it. There is no use in talking about reasoning if we do not have confidence in reason.

This confidence in reason must underlie all mental processes. Bowne laid down the strictest rules for the scrutiny of the intellectual activity, but all on the assumption that such activity is to be trusted. He insisted upon limits within which reasoning is to move, but these limits are to be set in the name of reason itself. For example, he used to become dreadfully impatient with the students of Kant who would maintain that Kant had introduced skepticism of the mind itself into human thinking. He maintained that there could be no worse misunderstanding of Kant, who had in the name of reason tried to make out the limits within which reason must move. Kant did not, according to Bowne, teach that the mind cannot be trusted. He did not teach that the reason sets limits on itself. He did teach that reason reaches limits which it itself can recognize and describe. Kant would have been vastly surprised to learn that he was teaching distrust of reason itself.

Again, Bowne had a picturesque figure of speech which was a literary favorite with him. He spoke of the necessity of a thinker's sterilizing his intellectual instruments and proceeding with antiseptic care. He would have the thinker be on guard against vitiating his reasoning by germs of assumption which had no part in the argument, or which had too much part in the argument. Perhaps it would be better to say that he sought to detect the assumptions, and not necessarily to cast them out but to recognize them for what they are—assumptions and not reasons. It was the assumption which was not suspected which, according to Bowne, wrought havoc in reasoning. He recognized the play of all manner of subjective forces in thinking, even to the extent of declaring his belief that if thinking were reduced to bare perceptions, devoid of feeling, he did not see how there could be any perception. He did ask, however, that all such subjective elements be brought out into the full light and examined by reason proceeding according to reason's laws, reason maintaining its rights as the judge of everything laying claim to rationality.

He avowed that it was intolerable to have a condition in which the laws of the mind could wage war among themselves, arraying logical contradictions against one another. If the contradictions were real, they were to be taken account of, but Bowne had no patience with merely verbal contradictions. A great deal of atheistic, skeptical pronouncement of his time he condemned as silly word manipulation. The ruling out of the Absolute on the ground that it cannot be absolute and enter into relations of any sort, exasperated him as mere thimble-rigging with a word—a performance that required only familiarity with a dictionary. The Absolute fundamentally means that which is unconditioned except by its own nature; that which is out of relation to anything on which it depends, but which may establish other existences in dependence on itself. I do not think Bowne ever could do justice to a work like Bradley's *Appearance and Reality,* though he often assigned the book to his advanced students for criticism. Bradley taught that anything into which contradictions enter is appearance. Then by a thoroughgoing examination he made almost everything contradictory. After appearance has been ruled out reality is discovered. Bradley may have convinced himself that he had thus found reality, but contradictions were as inescapable in the section on reality as in that on appearance. All of Bradley's work was done in such an unusual reliance on the verbally contradictory as a mark of logical inconsistency that Bowne once in a burst of impatience called him a "bushwhacker." It requires only a slight familiarity with current philosophical and theological speculation to realize how the fallacy of verbalism which Bowne struggled against still persists. Just now the favorite football seems to be the word "personality" as applied to God—a term which gives large scope to the verbalist.

It must be said of Bowne's criticism of Bradley, as we said of the criticism of Spencer, that possibly Bowne was not sufficiently appreciative of the men who make themselves as naught for their philosophy's sake, for the men who walk into blind alleys with a negative result, which is sometimes positive practically, as discovering that there is no thoroughfare. Some foolish things have to be said in philosophy, as everywhere else, for the sake of getting them acted on and disposed of. What seemed to vex Bowne was to hear a thinker who had proved that there was no thoroughfare clamoring that he had found an open highway. In this he expected too much of frail humanity, which has as many human frailties in philosophy as anywhere else. Few philosophers, especially skeptical ones, have any suspicion of their own weakness. What gives Hume a peculiar title to greatness is that he did not take himself with such deadly seriousness as to fail to suspect the unreality of his conclusions.

Bowne felt that if the evolutionary thinkers of his day wished to take skepticism seriously, they should reckon with the *Defense of Philosophic Doubt*, by Arthur James Balfour, a work for which he had high respect, as also for the *Foundations of Belief* of 1894. What he objected to in the skepticism of his day—and the objection holds for this later time—was the use of skepticism against all the forms of knowledge to which the skeptic might take a dislike. Bowne even had a word of patience for the positivist who strictly limits himself to describing the events which he sees passing before him, without raising question as to the back-lying causes. He professed himself willing to concede that in such positivistic research it is not necessary to think of a God back of the phenomena as long as we are considering the phenomena in themselves, the conditions of their appearance and the order in which they come and go. For the purpose of such research it is not necessary or important that we raise fundamental questions. If, however, the positivist does raise such questions, then he ceases to be a positivist and becomes a metaphysician, and must not carry into his metaphysics the assumption of the scientific investigator that the phenomena alone are important. Of course we all know that the positivist seldom holds his thinking to any such philosophic purity. He ordinarily assumes the common-sense world in one sweep, and talks philosophy on the basis of such crude assumption. He has been aided too by the glamour of any successes he may claim as a scientific investigator, inasmuch as even the intellectual world has not yet got beyond the notion that a man who is successful in science is quite possibly equally expert in philosophy. Here, again, we are dealing with a deep-seated frailty in human nature.

Bowne accepted scientific evolution, and strove to guard Evolution, spelled with a capital, from becoming what he called a Gessler's cap, to which the world was expected to bow down without inquiring whether there was anything under the cap or not.

# CHAPTER IV

## THE REALIST

WHILE Bowne was in Germany he began to cast about for a teaching position to be available on his return to the United States. His anxiety on this score amazed some of his German friends. Professor Ulrici in particular wrote a letter in which he expressed astonishment that a thinker of Bowne's ability should have a moment's uncertainty about securing a position in an American university. Ulrici paid America the compliment of assuming that this land would welcome a budding metaphysician with transports of delight. No satisfactory teaching post opened at once, however, and for a year Bowne gave himself to journalistic work, accepting a position with the *Independent,* in New York, a task which he seems to have enjoyed, at the same time teaching modern languages in New York University.

During the year 1875 Bowne was on the editorial staff of the *Independent.* We of a later time can hardly realize the importance of the *Independent* as a molder of public opinion a half century ago. Henry C. Bowen, who was in control of the journal, aimed to make it appeal to all the so-called "respectable" classes in the country. In the seventies "respectability" was a standard American virtue. It was in 1875 that a correspondent of the New York *Christian Advocate* wrote concerning the Wilmington, Delaware, Methodist Conference that the preachers were "men of a decidedly respectable appearance, well dressed." Mr. Bowen strove too to make his paper show that godliness is profitable to all things. In one issue of thirty-two pages I counted eleven of the 24 x 18-inch pages given to advertising matter which told of remedies to cure all varieties of animal and human diseases. Considerable of the editorial virtue under the Bowen management streamed forth in ferocious attacks on the South because the Southerners would not accede to Negro equality. An editorial in the issue of February 18, 1875, attacked Randolph S. Foster, a bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, for a statement made in New Orleans to the effect that Northern Methodists had no intention of trying to compel whites to allow blacks to worship together with them in the same congregations. The *Independent* characterized Bishop Foster as "a degenerate successor of the apostles" and his speech as "vomit."

These journalistic faults belonged peculiarly to the time. On the whole, Borden Bowne passed the year in stimulating and helpful company, though it was in that year that the famous Beecher case was tried in the civil courts. Beecher had at one time been closely connected with the *Independent,* and Henry C. Bowen had his own reasons for fierce wrath against him. Still, the best-balanced and best-tempered statement concerning the Beecher case that I have ever seen appeared as an editorial in the *Independent.* By the way, that *Independent* office must have been humming with discussion of the Beecher affair all through the year that Bowne was there, and yet I never heard Bowne mention Beecher but once, and that in connection with a paper by Bowne on Spencer before a philosophical club at Yale. The reason no doubt was that Bowne took no interest in the Beecher scandal and little interest in Beecher as a thinker.

Glancing through the files of the *Independent* for 1875 it is easy to pick out the material from Bowne's pen. Some of the philosophic reviews are obviously from Bowne, for they abound in the expressions which he continued to use throughout his life. There is an editorial entitled "Of Materialism," in the issue of May 6, which contains in substance Bowne's whole after-statement of the argument against materialism. Among the other articles unmistakably from Bowne are reviews of

Draper's *Religion and Science,* February 4; one on Martineau, entitled "Religion as Affected by Modern Materialism"; one on Ulrici's *Gott Und Die Natur,* December 2; one on "Tyndall on Materialism," December 23. These contributions all stand out like mountains above a plain. They are in contrast to everything else in the issues in which they appear. It must be remembered that the articles were written when the problems they discussed were current. Of Tyndall, Bowne said that "until he gets sufficient control of his moods to write a short article without changing his opinion several times during the process," his work would not have high philosophic value. That judgment was uttered immediately after Tyndall's statement on materialism appeared. Likewise with other judgments on philosophic works. In discussing Ulrici, Bowne foreshadowed his own later method in pointing out that true theistic argument abandons formal deduction in favor of interpretation of observed facts and of the implications toward which the facts point. After half a century of philosophic discussion critical judgment to-day would substantially sanction what Bowne said of the books he discussed in the review columns of the *Independent.*

In all these articles there was manifest a spirit of fairness. In fact, higher praise is given to Tyndall, especially as a stylist and as an expositor, than appears in Bowne's later work. It may be that the continued popular homage paid to the agnostics finally palled on Bowne, blinding him to the excellence of some of their utterances as literary craftsmanship.

There is a signed article by Bowne in the issue of June 10 on the "Religion of Childhood." I quote the following passage:

> Let the children come to Christ; but do not perplex and confuse them by the demand for an adult's experience, nor, indeed, by the demand for any kind of experience. "If ye love me, keep my commandments" must be the supreme test of affection. We have wrought mischief enough among older people by substituting for this simple test of Christ some peculiar psychological affections. Owing to this de-

mand, there are thousands and thousands of our evangelical churches this day whose religious life is a painful unreality, a land of shadows, or a feast of wind. But let not the children be thus perplexed. Let them take their vows with glad hearts and teach them that in this effort to love and obey they have the Divine favor and help. And when the years have come and the ideal of duty has gone up until it seems to transcend all effort, they will learn of themselves the blessedness of the fact that we are God's children not of our own merit but of his free grace. And if to the heart of childhood the earth seems fair and fit for an eternal home, let no attempt be made in the name of Deity to disturb that beautiful dream. The sharp necessities of life will do that soon enough. Let the children learn of a Father's love, and when life's trials come they will have whereon to lean. In short, let the child be a child even in his religion: and when he becomes a man, with the unfolding and deepening of his experience, he will necessarily put away childish things. To hasten the work can only result in mischief. A too early acquaintance with the confessional will make him no better Christian; it will only make him false.

To be sure, all this is familiar now, but will the reader please remember that it was written fifty years ago, when throughout the evangelical churches in this country precious little attention was paid to childhood religion as such. Children were supposed to have religious experiences like those of the grown-up. If the child was reared in a Presbyterian household, he was expected to subscribe to the creed just as his father did. If he was of a Methodist household, he was supposed to come into the Kingdom by the characteristically Methodist emotional upheaval. Large numbers of persons, born into Methodist households in those times, are to this day under the bondage of misunderstanding as to the likelihood and significance of unusual and extraordinary religious states. Perhaps childhood is not always as happy a period as the Bowne article assumes. All the more reason, then, why the child life should not be burdened with mistaken religious teachings.

During his stay with the *Independent* Bowne had charge of the joke column, which was entitled "Pebbles." I have tried to read through those fifty-two columns of jokes. They are of a high order of merit as such things go. Bowne always was addicted to punning. The puns in the "Pebbles" column are passable enough—if one likes puns.

In 1876 a door opened for Bowne in the department of philosophy at Boston University. Under the leadership of Dr. William F. Warren, the University, then only seven years old —it was incorporated in 1869—was making long strides toward educational efficiency of high order. Doctor Warren aimed at the most exacting scholastic standards and a distinctively Christian point of view. He never did a more effective stroke of work in the selection of a professor who could be depended upon to stand for these two ideals than in the choice of Borden Parker Bowne. It was to be expected, of course, that other institutions would attempt to get Bowne for themselves as soon as he became known, but no such effort was successful. President Porter sought him for Yale; and, upon the occasion of the founding of the University of Chicago, Dr. William Rainey Harper held out every inducement to secure Bowne for a professorship, offering a salary of seven thousand dollars, a sum which in those days seemed almost incredible wealth for a teacher. Bowne stayed by Boston University to the end. At any suggestion of removal he would say: "Ephraim is wedded to his idols. Let him alone." There he taught from 1876 to 1910—never less than eight hours a week—his regular courses being Introduction to Psychological Theory, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Metaphysics, Theism, Ethics, with seminars for advanced students in Spencer and in Kant.

The opening years of teaching at Boston, by which I mean the years till the early 80's, were given largely to studies in theism. Bowne was profoundly religious by nature, and approached philosophy from the religious point of view. He afterward considered that the best writing he ever did, from a strictly literary angle, was *Studies in Theism*, published by The Methodist Book Concern in 1879. This book was offered to another leading house—the name of which it would not be fair to mention—and declined on the ground that the limited sale for such a work, important as the work manifestly was, would involve financial loss. Afterward members of this publishing firm expressed regret to Bowne that they had not accepted the manuscript for the honor of publishing such a masterpiece, regardless of loss. By the way, though Bowne became at times impatient with the policies of the Methodist publishing houses, he never forgot that it was "our house" which gave him his start as an author.

*Studies in Theism* is an extraordinary piece of philosophical writing. The English is, if anything, more direct than in the later volumes, and the treatment is more popular. The germs of all the latter conceptions are there, and there is more fullness of exposition and of illustration than in the more formal treatises. The style, in those somewhat ponderous days, was considered by some to be overvivacious but would not be so pronounced to-day. The most unconventional single sentence is that famous castigation of skepticism as having as degrading effect upon the mind as has unchastity upon the character, though even this is tame enough now.

Bowne was fortunate in his friendships in those days. For about seven years he made his home at Boston with the late Bishop Randolph S. Foster, of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Bishop Foster will, I think, have to be reckoned among the determinative influences in Bowne's life. Foster was in Bowne's words "a prince and a great man." He was of imposing physical presence, of markedly commanding power of mind. All his life he had been interested in the profounder phases of theology. Without any considerable formal schooling he had found his way to a mastery of a singularly crystalline style in the discussion, for example, of the Calvinism of seventy-five or one hundred years ago. He was of mighty power as a pulpit orator, the oratory of a lofty imaginative type which from the lips of anyone but Foster might have failed to impress Bowne. Bowne admired Foster, oratory and all, admired his power of sustained reflection, his genuine piety, his personal courage. One of the incidents in Foster's life which Bowne delighted to recall occurred in Civil War days, when, because of the draft enforcement in the suburb of New York in which Foster lived, an anti-Negro feeling aroused a mob which threatened the life of Foster's two Negro servants —a husband and wife. As the mob approached, Foster took his stand in front of the door with an ax in his hand—the only weapon that he possessed. That picture of Foster with the ax was for Bowne, all things considered, as fine a picture of courage as he knew.

Foster would come in from his long journeys late at night, but never too tired to talk philosophy. Bowne would say: "Now let us have a word about pure being," and the discussion would begin, to last possibly till far toward morning. It is only just to say that Foster never quite got through to any satisfactory metaphysics, satisfactory to Bowne, that is. He remained in bondage to common-sense realism till the end. He could discuss philosophy intelligently, however, and was a most excellent stimulus and foil to Bowne. The Bishop was naïve and childlike in many respects, and Bowne often went with him on his journeys to look after him. Foster, if left alone, was just as likely as not to forget his regular dining time and go into a restaurant at midnight, to the peril of his health. Bowne often served as rescuer. The effect of the comradeship on both was wholesome. Foster always relished an intellectual problem of any sort. It was said by Foster's friends that for years he kept a room of his home fitted up as a locksmith's shop, and when he was tired of other tasks, lost himself in the intricacies of puzzling mechanical devices. There was much of the philosophical explorer about him, and he lent encouragement to Bowne's attempt to break new paths in thought. Under all there was in the Bishop a passion for the welfare of mankind. Though he was, as Bowne said, an aristocrat by nature he was a democrat by conviction, and put the good of his fellow men in the first place. It is interesting to note that a trip around the world had upon Foster and Bowne quite similar effects—up to a point. Foster was so distressed by gazing upon India's distresses that he never thereafter could take his theology with any complacency. Some of the effects upon his thinking were so pronounced as to carry him quite a distance, in some details, from the Methodist orthodoxy of his time. Likewise with Bowne, the contemplation of India made him sick at heart, though his philosophy enabled him to make a readier adjustment than Foster had been able to do.

Other friendships in the Boston University circle were with Doctor Warren himself, with Dr. Henry C. Sheldon, Methodism's outstanding systematic theologian, with Doctor Hinckley G. Mitchell, with Doctor William E. Huntington. I am indebted to Doctor Huntington especially for many illuminating glimpses into the finer, kindlier aspects of Bowne's character.

I have entitled this chapter "The Realist," for too many hear of Bowne first as an idealist. To ordinary common sense an idealist is an idealist, and the suggestion is of flightiness, all idealists being alike. A biographical treatment is supposed to treat developments as they occur in its subject's life. Before thinking, then, of Bowne as an idealist it is well to look at the sturdy realism through which he moved to his doctrine of idealism.

Bowne believed in a real and substantial self. That was the first item in his realism, but he did not believe that the self was spinning an outer world from its own inner consciousness. We have seen in a previous chapter that he accepted our faculties as trustworthy. When, therefore, our faculties report a world outside of us Bowne insisted that we must take that outward pointing as to be relied upon. He believed that we stand face to face with an objective order which we do not make but find. When asked as to that outside order, he replied that we have to recognize it first of all in the existence of our neighbors. A rigorous and vigorous young student once got himself into a state of mind which he considered serious by reasoning himself, or by fancying that he had reasoned himself, into solipsism, whereupon he announced himself as the only one existing. Bowne hurt the feelings of the solipsist by asking: "If you are the only one in existence, why do you unload all your troubles on me?" The farce of trying to prove solipsism to anyone outside of oneself is obvious.

Also in the material world we confront an order which we do not make but find. Bowne declared that no one outside a lunatic asylum could think of a dog which might be making suggestive advances as merely a state of the observer's mind, or of a blizzard as merely a tumult in one's own consciousness. We must believe the outward pointing of our mind as pointing to something. I have dealt at length with Bowne's insistence that one element in his thinking was a belief in a certain fairness and condescension on the part of the outside world toward us. That world meets us much more than half way. It is true that in the last analysis we know only our own states of mind—but our own states of mind carry with them this outer reference. We can call the process by which we reach the outer world inference if we like, and as soon as we begin to reflect upon that world the process is inferential, but the fundamental act is one of faith, faith in the pointing of our mind as not leading us astray.

I repeat again and again that with all Bowne's emphasis on the reality of the self he did not deduce from his belief in that reality any conclusion as to what the self must necessarily do. He looked upon the mental life as largely given, raw material thrust into consciousness by processes moving forward under the law of association, the duty of consciousness being to work this raw material over under the law of reason. He went so far as to say that in the study of the self it was altogether permissible to talk of psychology without a soul, if by that we mean to limit ourselves to the study of actual states of mind themselves and of the conditions under which they come and go. In directing the investigations of his students he recognized the scientific mastery of some psychologists in the field of the study of mental phenomena—scientists who denied outright the substantial existence of self—though the Jesuit, Michael Mayer, seemed to him to have produced the best textbook on psychology.

The belief in an outside world, however, did not mean to Bowne that he had to accept the outward pointing of the mind as carrying with it any revelation as to the nature of that outside world. Bowne felt that we could not deny the existence of an objective world without bringing shipwreck upon all thought. If there is any absurdity utterly crazy, that absurdity is solipsism. The pointing of the mind out beyond itself, however, does not tell us the nature of the objective order. That has to be decided by careful reflection.

To see how thoroughly realistic Bowne's thinking was as to the objective order we have only to note the present-day scientific theories concerning matter. When Bowne began to write, back yonder in the seventies, the ordinary conception of the atomic theory was that matter is composed of individual units of hard stuff. The scientist recognized that in dealing with matter he must have a point beyond which division could not go, hence the indivisibility of the atom. The atom was a "limit notion," or a piece of intellectual machinery held without accepting it as literally existing. Even when Bowne was writing, the movement began which conceived of the atoms, not as bits of matter, but as centers of force, and Bowne took notice of and approved the beginnings of that shift. We all know where we are as to atoms to-day. We no longer hear of bits of material, but of protons and electrons, of forces appearing at points in space; of "energizings" through atomic orbits, the orbits suggesting miniature solar systems—nowhere is there inactive matter. All is suggestive of James' "big, blooming, buzzing," but not confusion. The disagreement, then, between

Bowne and the scientists would not be over the question as to whether there is an objective order. The only question would be as to the nature of that order.

So far was Bowne from denying the outsideness of the order of the universe that he maintained as heartily as the most determined atheist the impossibility of telling in detail why events happen as they do, except in the sense of discovering the laws according to which they happen. Knowledge of these laws gives a measure of control over the physical world, but there is no knowing why the physical world is as it is. Faith holds that the world exists for a moral purpose, but we are speaking of knowledge. All we can do is to accept the world and make such use of it as we can. Whatever our theory as to the nature of the forces of the universe, whether they are personal or impersonal, we cannot deduce what they will do in the concrete from any theory about them. Neither the theist nor the atheist can do any deducing. Both must take events just as they come. We have already referred at length to Bowne's criticism of agnostic evolution. His repudiation of agnosticism did not mean that he could tell any better than an agnostic what a particular event meant. All he could do was to wait and see. He stood against the scientific dogmatism that maintained that the evolutionary formula could be used to tell how events have occurred. In this he was more objectively scientific than hosts of the scientists themselves. We shall soon have occasion to consider again Bowne's emphasis on the part played by subjective interest in our speculations, but his recognition of such interest was aimed at the establishment of methods by which to reach the genuinely objective. Many of the hardest-headed scientists are most subjective in their unrelenting attempts to fasten their own conceptions on the world, or to interpret the world according to those conceptions. Many an evolutionist who raves against idealism is entirely willing to rewrite the history of creation, filling in the gaps with affirmations as to what must have happened, and even overruling the plain teaching of the facts themselves in the name of an evolutionary formula. This is the dangerous idealism—uncritical, unrecognized, arbitrary. Bowne was, of course, a theist. If he had acted after the manner of some of his opponents, he would have picked out only the facts which of themselves seemed to suggest a benevolent Creator. On the contrary, Bowne faced all the facts. John Stuart Mill himself, in his putting of the harsh features of the universe, was not more stern than Bowne. Mill declared that the cruelties of the cosmic order forbid our conceiving of that order as the work of a Creator at once benevolent and omnipotent. Bowne looked at the world with just as open-eyed honesty as did Mill. He did not blink a single ugliness or cruelty, though he did not by any means draw Mill's conclusions.

We shall have often to recur to Bowne's stress on the part played by subjective elements in our view of the outer world. The ordinary objection to idealism is that it unwarrantably projects mental elements upon the outside world. I have said again and again that it was part of Bowne's method always to pull unsuspected assumptions out into the light. When he did this he found the hard-and-fast realists smuggling into the objective world purely mental factors in a fashion which would have aroused their rage if employed by an idealist. In a word, in dealing with the objective world, Bowne was more objective in method than many of the outstanding realistic scientists themselves in his contention that, in dealing with the objective order, we must take that order as it is.

As pertinent illustration of Bowne's method in this respect, we need no better material than that found in the treatment of the nebular theory as set forth in *Studies in Theism,* pp. 178-186. In 1879, when Bowne wrote those pages, it was little less than scientific blasphemy to raise question about the nebular theory, though scientists like the late Simon Newcomb were, according to Bowne, far from convinced. The theory fitted in perfectly with atheistic preconceptions. To question it was to commit profanation against an atheistic orthodoxy which was fast making headway in those days. Nevertheless, Bowne did question it, with an avowed theistic purpose admittedly in view, but on a strictly fact basis. In his criticism his familiarity with the principles of mechanics was of service to him. He showed how the theory must meet the demands of the mechanical law of equal areas and how far it was from facing the actual facts, how slight a change it would require in masses or in orbital periods, or in the relative distances, or in the orbital eccentricities to upset the stability of the whole actual system, and he asked how stability was secured. That is to say, the actual system is a complex of intricacies utterly bewildering, lacking the simplicities implied by the free and easy statements of the theory. The elementary questions as to how the nebula is to be conceived—whether as a gas or as diffused matter; if a gas, whether cold or hot—Bowne raised with exasperating directness. Some of the questions he did not himself consider particularly important, but all of them were pertinent as suggesting how little some theorists had pondered actual details or the solar system as problems to be accounted for. No physical theory enables us to deduce in detail the outworkings of a law. Atheistic physics formed its theories, and if a theory was only plausibly stated, let the plausibility go for proof. In all his criticism Bowne took his stand squarely on the reports which the outside world gives of itself. The simplicity of the nebular theory has to be given up if it is to fit the facts. In this judgment scientists are well enough agreed to-day, fifty years after Bowne wrote. Many high authorities in physics virtually reject the theory to-day, or make changes in it which amount to rejection.

The laws of matter and motion, according to Bowne, are capable of application to anything that moves. The materialistic physicists of a half century ago were wonderful deducers. They determined by material laws what the world had to be, and how it had to come about, and then they announced the deductions as truth. It has been urged against Hegel, the outstanding idealist of his century, that he sought to deduce the universe by means of his thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. With Hegel and his followers manifestly striving at deduction of this sort, the world overlooked the deductions of the materialists, and gave them credit for an objectivity of view and method to which they were not entitled. Bowne was known from the first as an idealist. In what meaning the term can be accurately applied to him we shall soon see, but we wish to reiterate, perhaps wearisomely, that his service to philosophy in challenging materialistic evolution was rendered in the name of fact. Bowne never had the slightest quarrel with Darwin, or with any other evolutionist, as to fact. Moreover, facts were so all-important in his eyes that he insisted that it is the first duty of theory to take account of them. In the chapters in *Studies in Theism* dealing with Mechanism and Theology, and Substances and their Interaction, Bowne showed astonishing familiarity in handling mechanical and physical principles. I have referred to E. L. Youmans' savage criticism of Bowne's little book on *The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*. Here is how Youmans wrote on the conservation of energy:

> Thus the law characterized by Faraday as the highest in physical science which our faculties permit us to perceive has a far more extended sway; it might well have been proclaimed the highest law of all science—the most far-reaching principle that adventuring reason has discovered in the universe. Its stupendous reach spans all orders of existence. Not only does it govern the movements of the heavenly bodies, but it presides over the genesis of the constellations; not only does it control those radiant floods of power which fill the eternal spaces, bathing, warming, illuminating and vivifying our planet, but it rules the actions and relations of men, and regulates the march of terrestrial affairs. Nor is its dominion limited to physical phenomena; it prevails equally in the world of mind, controlling all the faculties and processes of thought and feeling. . . . Star and nerve-tissues are parts of the same system! stellar and nervous forces are correlated. Nay, more; sensation awakens thought and kindles emotion, so that

this wondrous dynamic chain binds into living unity the realms of matter and mind through measureless amplitudes of space and time (quoted in *Studies in Theism*, page 204).

At this point, however, some realist may object that it does not altogether meet the point to say that Bowne believed in an objective order. Nobody has accused him of solipsism. Everybody who knows anything about him at all will remember his scornful repudiations of "Christian scientists" who sought to claim his system in behalf of their belief in the potency of "mortal mind." An adherent of Mrs. Eddy once claimed the support of Bowne for the doctrine that, while it may not be in the power of the individual mind to make carbolic acid a poison by thinking it to be poisonous, yet it is the belief of the human mind in general that makes matter—whatever matter is—to be poisonous. Of course claims like this drove Bowne "nigh unto cursing," as he put it. When he spoke of an objective order he conceived of an order objective to all human minds, moving according to laws which those minds do not make but find.

The realist still objects that anyone who believes that things are ideas is not a realist. In reply we insist that Bowne did not think of things merely as ideas. He thought of things as forces, or as the manifestation of forces. The sturdiest realist will often admit, or at least imply, that things are created ideas, or matter with the stamp of mind upon them. Bowne did not, indeed, believe in any matter-stuff out of which things could be created by running the matter into idea-molds, but inasmuch as the created things can show their reality only by some form of activity, it is hard to see how Bowne can be charged with a lack of realism when his doctrine makes forces just as objective as acting things could ever be.

In fine, Bowne was entitled to claim aid and comfort from physical science for this theory. When we get to dealing with forces, the forces are not ideas. There is as much of a gap between force and bare idea, when force is conceived of as the expression of Will, as when force is set out as the activity of an impersonal somewhat. In fact modern physics has gone so far as virtually to do away with things altogether in any intelligible definition of thing-hood. I spoke a moment ago of modern atomic theory, with its positively charged proton, around which the negatively charged electrons move in orbits as vast, relative to the diameter of the electrons, as the orbits of the planets relative to the diameter of the planets. When pressed as to what a proton is, or an electron is, many scientists do not seem quite willing to reply, "An electrically charged particle of matter." That is to say, they do not seem willing to grant matter any substantial existence on its own account. It seems to exist merely as a manifestation of electric forces at points in space.

"At last we have it," says the realist. "Space is the touchstone of objective reality. When we say objective we mean outside, and space is clearly the all-inclusive outside."

We wish to reserve the discussion of space to a later section, but we remark here that this outsideness of space can hardly claim the support of those sciences on which the realist likes to fall back. The most rigorous mathematical physicists to-day are those who are declaring the most astonishing things about space. I am speaking now of what they are saying, and not of justification for what they are saying. They are telling us that there is no absolute space. While it is true that the remarks of many of these physicists reveal that they do not themselves know clearly what they have in mind, it is true also that they do not have the space of ordinary common sense in mind. Understand, the only point I am here urging is that it is not fair to charge Bowne with lack of realism, and at the same instant to attribute realism to those who transform the outside order more radically and less intelligently than did Bowne.

Bowne maintained that the outward pointing, by the human consciousness, was an indication of a true objective order which could not be disregarded. All he urged was that we must critically examine the report. In a notable passage in *Studies in Theism* Bowne avowed that the common sense of the world, in its age-long contact with reality, has wrought out a vast system of philosophy; that it is the sign of wisdom provisionally to accept that philosophy, and then to bring the test of critical judgment to bear upon it. The outward pointing of the common sense of the race has its sound warrant in experience, and is to be accepted and followed. What the nature of this objective fact may prove to be upon reflective examination is an altogether different problem, to be settled by appeals to a course of reasoning which common sense might not at all understand.

Just as Bowne would not hear to the mind's putting arbitary limits on the objective order, so also he would not willingly sit silent, when, in the name of an objective order, some thinkers sought to deny elementary insights of the mind. There was popular among a school of mathematicians in the seventies a trick which is still popular, namely, a denial of fundamental insights in the name of speculation about the objective reality. Take the axiom that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points. If this is in itself not a direct insight by the mind, it would be hard to tell what is. Now along came then, as come now, those who will have it that the direct insight is to be set aside, or modified, when we discover that to persons living on the surface of a sphere the shortest line between two points is the arc of a circle. If it were possible to travel through the sphere, instead of being limited to its surface, the shortest distance between two points would be the cord that joins them. The fact that it may not be possible to travel along the shortest line means nothing to the detriment of the insight. Air-lines—or bee-lines—do not cease to be the shortest lines between points because of any virtue in the practical fact that to the pedestrian the longest way around may be the shortest way home.

So likewise with parallel lines. Those who in Bowne's day and now sought and still seek to prove that parallel lines do meet weary us beyond all patience. They tell us that the energies of the world move on curved lines, that there is a sphericity of space which prevents the lines being parallel, that if they are prolonged far enough they come together in a point. All of which is just nothing at all in its bearing on the validity of the mind's insight, which simply affirms that if lines are parallel they will never meet. In other words, if lines never meet, they never meet.

It is, of course, altogether possible that too much has been made of the Euclidean geometry as holding good for the material system of things in which we exist, in the sense of our laying stress upon parallel lines in the system. It may be that there are not any such lines. It is even easy to see what Bowne would have done with the doctrines of relativity so much in vogue to-day. I refer, of course, to the theories most often connected with the name of Einstein, for the general problem is more or less outlined in the discussion of space in both editions of *Metaphysics*. For the mathematical insight of Einstein he would have had immense respect. The relativity of a particular viewpoint he would have accepted as a commonplace not worth calling attention to. The discussion of absolute as over against relative space he handled in metaphysics, regarding most of such discussion as purely verbal. The attempts to judge the motion of the earth through the ether he would have looked upon as wholly scientific, paying, I have no doubt, due honor to the keenness and ingenuity of the current dealing with the problem of light and ether in the Einstein solution. The gravitation formula he would have accepted for what it might have seemed to him to be worth as a statement of the action of forces throughout space. He would not have had any patience with talk about curvature of space itself, though he would have regarded the workings of forces on curved lines as a problem for discussion and experiment. All this can be freely stated from a reading of *Metaphysics.* Possibly he would have insisted with Lord Haldane that a doctrine which makes so much of highly wrought and finely spun intellectual processes is well on the way toward idealism; but, on the other hand, he might have seen very doubtful allies in the actual relativistic interpreters.

# CHAPTER V

# THE IDEALIST

WE are now ready, I think, to consider the question as to the sense in which Bowne was an idealist. From our previous reflection perhaps we may say that Bowne was an idealist in his method of interpreting the real, or part of the real—that part of the real which we think of as the objective material order. In the meanings and for the purposes of common sense the world was as real to Bowne as to common sense itself. All he meant by idealism was, not that ideas themselves are real in any but a mental sense, but that the forces of the objective universe are the expression of ideas. It was in this quite limited meaning that the term "idealism" could be fastened on the Bowne philosophy. Idealism had to do with the interpretation of the material order.

What, then, becomes of the inert, solid matter which common sense thinks of as so especially real? Bowne said that there was not any such inert matter, and that there never had been and never could be, for only that which in some way acts can be looked upon as being. Here, of course, we must be on our guard against a common-sense misunderstanding. To our everyday eyesight things around us appear to be at rest. We make a distinction between active and passive, between acting and being acted upon. A pupil of Bowne once sought to put his master's philosophy to confusion by asking, "How does this chair act?" The chair, of course, never could have been known if it had not been the expression and outcome of forces. It could not have been seized if it had not had power enough to resist pressure. Every particle of the chair is, according even to the most materially minded physicist, the center of a veritable storm of forces, and one of the dreams of such physicists is to break up the atom and let its power loose for use by man. Scant help, indeed, is at hand for the lump theory of matter in the teachings of modern physics. Force is the ruling word.

Idealism, then, from the Bowne angle of view, means that the material world is realized idea. "Realized" means an idea which has had force put into it. The world is not idea alone, but idea with will back of it. When Doctor Johnson avowed to Boswell that in kicking that large stone which made his foot rebound he meant that if there were nothing but an idea there, his foot would have met no resistance. Bowne never for a moment believed that Berkeley meant to teach any such idealism. The term "idealism" itself is unfortunate, even when qualified by the adjective "objective," for the word suggests a lack of force in the objective world, which Bowne did not intend, and which, according to Bowne, Berkeley did not intend.

It is this lack of physical force that gives us a clue to Bowne's doctrine of the ideality of space. Here, again, the realist does not get much help from present-day physics. Ask the physicist if he believes in an all-inclusive space actually "out there" and he is not likely to reply with the promptness which common sense would expect. He may tell us that space is the relation between things, and when we ask if there would be any space if all the things in it were destroyed, he hesitates. The relativist leaves us with the suspicion that there is no one space, but only spaces, the unity of space consisting in the one-space law which governs our experience. Einstein seems to be a little doubtful whether there is even need of an ether—that last prop of the realists who say that there is no such thing as empty space, since the ether is everywhere. To be sure, Einstein himself comes dangerously near making space something materially real in endowing it with curves strong enough to determine the orbits of planets, but all Einstein's astronomical and physical speculations might be true without requiring a real space. All that would be needed would be that forces be such that in given conditions they act according to given equations. There might be an equation for every so-called place without necessarily involving a real "somewhat" existing on its own account.

Here, again, the objector replies to-day, as he used to urge upon Bowne, that the moment we use the word "ideality" we get into cloudland. If space is ideal, whose space do we "go by" as a standard? We have said that the difference between an idea and a thing is that a thing is an idea made real by force. What is the difference between the spaces I wander about in when I dream, and the space which at least seems to supply a meeting-place with my neighbors?

Once more the reply of Bowne was that he was not trying to prove that space had no reality, but that he was trying to show the nature of its reality. To the above objection he always said that the world-space was the form under which the Will back of all things acted its ideas into existence. The objective world is in space in that it is acted out according to space forms, but apart from the activity of the Creative Will the forms are nothing in themselves. The same force which puts itself into things acts in such ways as to give the things—the acts—the space form. The ideality of space means that, apart from the force which makes the acts appear in space-form, there would be no space. The space of the world is the space in which the forces of the World-Will appear. To ask as to space-in-itself is to make an unreal and artificial abstraction. Anticipating the section on theism somewhat, let us remember that Bowne thought of the world-ground as a Personal Force. In that Person it was not possible to take thought by itself, or will by itself, or feeling by itself. In his conception it was just as unreasonable to ask what a thing is by itself as to ask what an act of will would be apart from the idea it might express. It used to be the fashion to divide the personal life into thinking, feeling, and doing with a sharpness never known in experience. It is not possible to reach pure will stripped of all thought. It would not be possible to get back to a pure thing—an act of the World Will—devoid of all trace of idea. The presence of such idea is the essence of Bowne's idealism. Space conceived of as utter void is, possibly, seizable by the imagination, but even such space smuggles in the notion of an observer, with his right and left, and forward and back, and up and down. Space in itself is nothing. It cannot act. It cannot make itself known. It is the form under which the activities of the Will of the World make themselves known to men. It has reality, indeed, but not substantial reality.

To continue Bowne's argument a little further: Suppose we go back to a former concession. We said a while ago that Bowne trusted the outward pointing of the human mind, and now we have, says the critic, a pointing outward that might just as well be dismissed as false. All is inward and not outward. In reply we are to consider what outward means. It means something outside ourselves, not dependent on us, an objective order in the sense of being something to which we may conform. Space is not merely a creation of my mind. It is not merely a creation of the race. It does not have its reality in being in my thought and then disappearing as soon as I lose consciousness. Another of Doctor Johnson's bright remarks was uttered to a Berkeleian, whom he advised to remain in his presence, lest he, Johnson, might forget the Berkeleian, who would then cease to be. Berkeley never taught that men or things cease to be when men cease to think about them. Even for Berkeley the reality of men and things was in the Divine Mind. If we care to say so, we may avow our belief that space holds good for the Divine Mind. As that Mind looks out upon the world the perception must be under the space form. So that the outward pointing of the mind is genuine. The exact sense in which the outwardness is to be interpreted is a problem for reflection. There is no more deception practiced upon common sense by such interpretation of outward pointing than by the reversal of common-sense notions concerning the heavens above us by the teachings of astronomy. For all practical purposes it is permissible to speak of the sun as moving around the earth. The common-sense intellect can live and die without knowing anything about the astronomical heavens. One can keep all one's daily engagements by means of the assumption of a moving sun.

It may seem to some that I have minimized the force of idealism as taught by Bowne. I have been trying to keep close to the movement of his own mind. The position to which Bowne finally came was personalism. When it was urged upon him that the term "personalism" itself did not seem to suggest the more idealistic features of the objective order, he did not appear to be impressed by the suggestion. He evidently came to believe that personalism, by being more inclusive, gave opportunity to guard against such oversight of the force-element as the term "idealism" sometimes implies.

# CHAPTER VI

## THE TRANSCENDENTAL EMPIRICIST

WE come now to Bowne's consideration of the self, a consideration which led him at last to speak of himself as a transcendental empiricist. If we look at the steps through which Bowne moved toward this conception from 1872 to 1899, we can best understand what it meant to him.

Let us take a brief survey of philosophic development, such as Bowne used to sweep through in his lectures to his classes. He had little patience with the history of philosophy as ordinarily taught. He did not believe it did any good to introduce students to the history of philosophy before they had learned something of the essentials of philosophy, or at least had found out what the important philosophic questions are. To try to master the history of philosophy without something of orientation was to end, Bowne said, in the intellectual "blind staggers."

For the purpose at hand we start with Locke. Locke's doctrine of the mind was that of a *tabula rasa,* like a clean wax, or a sheet of white paper on which figures are to be stamped or drawn. Locke soon came to the conclusion that some elements of the representation from the outside world cannot be directly stamped on the wax or paper. He made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities—primary qualities such as extension, and secondary qualities such as color and sound. The reason for the distinction was not altogether clear.

Locke deserves lasting credit for so simply stating a starting point, though his own answers to his difficulties got nowhere. The all-important question is as to who reads off the figures, or the picture on the wax or the paper. Each part of the picture is external to every other part; only a unitary agent would be equal to the task of holding the mutually external parts together in one grasp. Moreover, the difference between primary and secondary qualities was soon seen to be illusory. Granting that extension is an actual external fact, the mind is not extended. The extension without can be brought within the mind only by being reproduced by the mind's own activity according to a spatial principle, which, in other words, is a statement of the way the mind acts. The spatial law is one of the ultimate facts of consciousness. It cannot be deduced from anything else. The outside space cannot stamp itself on any inside space.

Now arrives Berkeley. With one decisive stroke he cuts away the outside world of hard-and-fast, self-sufficient material existence. He declares that there can be nothing in the mind but impressions. It is inconceivable that any extended substance should stamp itself directly on the mind. Let the impressions in the mind persist, and the external world could fall away without being missed. According to Berkeley himself, God causes the impressions in the mind, and causes them so effectively that Doctor Johnson's foot rebounds from the famous stone. Berkeley disposed of matter as an existence on its own account.

Now comes Hume, who goes Berkeley one better. Hume, was not, like Berkeley, influenced by theological presuppositions, though some students of his life say that his anti-theological ruthlessness was chiefly philosophical, and that there is even reason for believing that, after all his skeptical pronouncements, he remained a theist at heart. Be that as it may, Hume said that if no matter is needed to account for the impressions of soul, no cause or substance is needed to account for the impressions of cause or substance. If there is nothing in the mind but impressions—impressions are all. There is nothing but the processions of impressions. The greatness of Hume is not in logical consistency, for it has been shown abundantly that he achieved his results only by smuggling in the factors which he was denying. The greatness lay in his willingness to follow his reasoning out to the end. As I said earlier, he explored the blind alley.

Hume woke Kant from his "dogmatic slumber," to use Kant's own term. Kant had been teaching the Leibnitzian philosophy in measurably orthodox style, but the skepticism of Hume roused him in dead earnest. Leibnitz had a place for a substantial self, and there Kant started. Ueberweg once made merry over Leibnitz's reply to the affirmation that at a particular moment there might be nothing in the soul—"Nothing but the soul itself." Ueberweg called this an instance of Leibnitzian dullness. Bowne commented that there was indeed a dullness here, but that it was not Leibnitz's.

Starting from the active self, Kant went on to establish once for all the function of that self in knowledge. The impressions are not given to the mind ready-made. In response to stimulus outside itself the mind builds up its knowledge of impressions, and of everything else, according to forms inherent in itself. In the first part of his last book, *Kant and Spencer,* Bowne sought to show that Kant was working productively in the right field, though with an overelaborateness which makes *The Critique of the Pure Reason* tedious in the extreme. Kant had a dreadful fondness for systematization. Instead of putting in his strength enforcing the fruitful principle of the activity of the mind in knowing, he spins out unceasingly schemes of categories for the mind's activity.

To get at Bowne's doctrine of the self, we have to look at two mistakes which he deplored in Kant. After emphasizing the power of the self in knowing, Kant goes on to speak of a back-lying thing-in-itself which we cannot know. It is hard to see just why Kant held thus to a thing-in-itself. It may be that the somewhat common criticism is just—that in his doctrine of mental forms he gives us spectacles with which to look at the world, and then lets us conclude that the world would be entirely different if we could look at it without the spectacles. In this way Kant marked out a path toward skepticism which he probably did not intend. Kant started movements in many directions. Hegel took his start from Kant's thing-in-itself and showed that things must come within thought or go out of existence. If they cannot in any degree be compassed within thought-terms, we can affirm nothing of them whatsoever. If we cannot know anything about them, we cannot know that they exist. This was indeed a fine start on Hegel's part, but he forthwith proceeded to a theory which put thought before thinkers. He spelled Thought with a capital "T," and ended in impersonal idealism. Nevertheless, Bowne always extolled Hegel as having immortal merit. The Hegelian doctrine of thesis, antithesis and synthesis—Bowne used to tell his classes—was a genuine evolution, as compared with the tawdry cheapness of Spencerianism, with its homogeneities and heterogeneities and differentiations and integrations and its concomitant dissipations of energy, and all the rest of it.

Bowne remained true to the Kantian idea of the constitutive activity of the self. He never seemed to be disturbed over a thing-in-itself. His doctrine was more than idealism, strictly speaking. The thing-in-itself came from a false abstraction, the attempt to take a will-element by itself apart from its meaning for thought. Men do not have a sense of effort taken by itself. No man could say, "I will put forth my will," without willing something in particular, and that something in particular takes its place in a network of intellectual relationships. Perhaps this would be clearer if we put it in terms of feeling. Only some extreme mystics would be likely to say that they have feeling apart from thought. I can indeed speak of feeling as a thing-in-itself but I cannot feel without thinking. To be sure, feeling predominates in some states of consciousness, but Bowne used to say that when we declare that we are lost in this or that transport of feeling, we always know who it is that is lost.

The second mistake in Kant which Bowne emphasized was the over-elaboration of the categories of the mind's activity, the result being that the categories, at least in the hands of post-Kantian Kantians, came to be more important than the active substantial subject of the knowing process itself. Bowne insisted, in dealing with the self, that the basic fact is the self, that we tell what the self does by watching what it does, that the categories are classificatory devices for dealing with the self's activities, but they are to be kept always in the second place.

It was chiefly at this point that Bowne transcended Lotze. Bowne's two favorite teachers in Germany were, as we have already seen, Ulrici and Lotze. To both these thinkers Bowne gave credit in the introduction to *Studies in Theism.* He dedicated the first edition of *Metaphysics* to Lotze and said in the book itself that his conclusions were substantially Lotzian, or at least that no great harm would be done in calling them Lotzian. In the revised edition of *Metaphysics* in 1899 he came out for what he called transcendental empiricism. Bowne himself never stated at any considerable length the directions in which he felt that he had gone beyond Lotze, though he did state that he had gone beyond him. It requires only a slight acquaintance with Lotze to see the greater predominance of system as such in his thinking, a predominance which weighs less and less with Bowne as he moves toward his later work, and makes the self more and more central.

This doctrine of transcendental empiricism must be handled with care. If the self is central, it might be a temptation to make the self so much a law on its own account as to deprive of value those fixed principles on which Bowne always laid stress. Thus by misunderstanding the doctrine and making the self the center of the principles by which it works, we might say that the self could cause two and two to make five here and now, not even shifting its scene of activity to some other planet. Transcendental empiricism does not mean that the self does not have fixed laws or insights by which it works. Look, on the other hand, at the idea of substance. The only true substance we know is the self, but after long thinking on such qualities as solidity and permanence as marks of substance we erect substance into an idea on its own account and judge the self by it, aided often by a common sense which cannot grasp the solidity of the self. So also with a conception like cause. By reflection in the abstract on what should constitute a true cause, we are likely to get away from the self or make it secondary to something else.

The word "transcendental," as used by Bowne, did not lift the self out of connection with the workaday prosaic facts of which psychology has to take account. Bowne never ceased to insist that the unitary, abiding agent required by the simplest act of knowledge could not itself be spatial, or temporary. All spatial factors are composed of parts mutually external to one another, and knowledge cannot be reached by laying two spatial elements side by side. Yet after this has been said, nobody could put more stress on the dependence of thinking on bodily conditions than did Bowne, insisting always that there is no way of deducing beforehand what the conditions will bring about. In his *Introduction to Psychological Theory* he dropped incidental remarks here and there which showed the most lively appreciation of the significance of apparently the most inconsequential physical factors for mental activity. For example, he called attention to the fact that it might not be possible to perform the simplest mathematical problems if marks upon a paper, or other material apparatus, did not hold the elements of the problem continuously before the mind, that the mind might be powerless without such aid. He never sought to minimize the force of such dependence.

Bowne seemed at times to be sneering at the detailed results of psychological investigation when he was merely protesting against the wrong use of such results. He would not allow the psychological history of an idea to count in determining the logical worth of an idea once it had made its appearance. For illustration, he was most willing to concede that arithmetical counting began with early man's use of his fingers—and maybe his toes—as instruments of reckoning, but he could not see anything in this supposition bearing upon the validity of the multiplication table or the decimal system. Whenever counting begins, it begins by the unfolding of an innate mental power which has to be judged by its intellectual output, and that output judged in turn by the mind's own power to know. This innate power could not be disputed or dislodged by the discovery that, sporadically, cases of inability to count may be found among men. The conditions under which the mental powers unfold do not affect the validity of those powers. There are certainly suggestions of scorn in Bowne's references to the rummages of the experimental psychologists in the minds of babies and savages, but the scorn was directed against the attempts thus to disprove the innateness of mental powers. He did not object to records of "when our little one began to take notice" if the object were simply scientific observation. His point was that when the little one did begin to take notice it took notice by the response of innate power to take notice. He did not mean that innate mental powers were hidden in the organism; he meant merely that when a mind acts at all it acts according to laws expressive of itself as mind. As "cadaver" practice Bowne used to set before his students works like that of Shadworth Hodgson on experientialism. In the late nineties Hodgson made the most determined of all efforts to show that the idea of space comes through tactual sensations without any space-idea as such, only to end by smuggling in the elements he was seeking to deduce.

I have said that Bowne insisted that it made no difference to the validity of an idea as to how it was aroused in the mind. A word of qualification is needed. William James said the same, but he made his dictum hold good as to all manner of ethical insights. Bowne held that ethical and spiritual insights come out of ethical and spiritual living. James seemed to say that ethical insights are even worth while if they are reached under an anæsthetic, or through physically induced excitement. Perhaps it would be best to say that Bowne would have always held that ethical and spiritual insights are worth while however and whenever they appear, but that they are not likely to appear under an anæsthetic unless the moral life of the patient has led up to them.

When all is said, it must be remembered that Bowne was not especially interested in the results of scientific investigation in psychology. He knew who were the foremost masters of such science and he directed his students to them, but he was not much interested himself. An alienist once asked Bowne to accompany him through an asylum to observe the workings of aberrant minds, but Bowne declined to go. He knew that the "sweet bells of reason" may jangle out of tune, but beyond insisting that it is the same set of bells that rings in tune, or jangles out of tune—that is to say, that no external factor is at work—he paid little heed to the study of minds in disorder.

He was critical of experimental psychology. Much of it he characterized as "discovery of the familiar," but practically, we must admit, all science starts in discovering the familiar. A good deal of it he regarded as a roundabout way of reaching something which could better be approached more directly, and he quoted Gulliver's hero, who was not content to have a suit of clothes made from a tailor's tape measurements, but must have himself calculated in sines and cosines. Or, quoting Swift again, he referred to Gulliver's investigator who had dedicated his life to the extraction of sunbeams from cucumbers.

Returning for the moment to transcendental empiricism—Bowne wrote to Professor A. C. Knudson on April 11, 1899: "The question about my transcendental empiricism had no deep mystery in it. I simply aimed to call attention to the fact that intelligence cannot be understood through the categories, but the categories must be understood through intelligence. In that intelligence is simply a bottom fact which explains everything else but accepts itself. Hence also all attempts to explain intelligence by any mechanical or metaphysical machinery are inverted and must be abandoned."

It may be pertinent to say also that the attacks on immutable natural law by Charles S. Pierce, America's pioneer pragmatist, and by Bertrand Russell in his doctrines of an anarchic space and time, leave the world-system in a piecemeal raggedness that never could be charged against Bowne's transcendental empiricism.

# CHAPTER VII

# THE THEIST

ALL of Bowne's writing was strongly theistic from the first. He seems to have accepted the belief in God from the moment he accepted anything philosophical, and all his subsequent reflection confirmed and strengthened his original tendencies. A notable advantage which he enjoyed over most men was his keen perception of the logical shortcomings of all anti-theistic theories. The ordinary human being reaches a stage where he hears the objections to belief in God noisily, perhaps strongly, stated. He does not often reflect upon the logical difficulties which the rival theories of theism and atheism meet. At the outset the young Bowne saw the logical plight of the anti-theistic theories even more sharply than the philosophic skeptics saw the shortcomings of theism. All his life his defense of theism included attacks on atheism.

The conventional arguments for the existence of God did not appeal to Bowne at all cogently, though, oddly enough, he had more respect for the design argument than did many, perhaps most, theistic philosophers of his time. Especially did he profess himself unable to see that the evolutionary theory had ruled out design. He even seemed to prefer Paley to some of the evolutionists. At least he had high regard for Janet's *Final Causes.* Most atheistic thinking he considered not respectable enough logically to be taken seriously except as the expression of a mood, in which case it belonged to ejaculation rather than to philosophy. As entitled to most respect he regarded the doctrine that things are as they are, and that is an end of it. The holder of this doctrine, however, never will be satisfied that that is the end of it. He goes on to tell us why things are as they are, thus implying that they might have been otherwise. If things are as they are just because they are, said Bowne, there is no use of the atheist's saying anything. Of course it was still open to the atheist to say that his talking was part of things that are because they are.

All this to one side, however, the declaration that things are as they are because they are throws too heavy a strain on the reason or the faith of men, for even atheists are distinguished by a faith amounting to credulity, not to say gullibility. We see matter performing miracles which we most easily associate with mind, dancing according to the demands of equations which only the highest mathematics can grasp. Of course, now, if an atheist is bound to have it that this—equations and all—just is, there is no help for it, except to say, as Bowne did, that such faith is beyond anything in Israel.

Bowne rejected as thoroughly as did the atheist the attempt to see design in everything, especially when those designs had a too human reference. He thought it absurd that anyone should claim that Roxbury pudding-stone was made by the Creator with an especial eye to Boston's paving. So with most theistic exposition or divine purpose. He relished Whately's reply to the argument for Divine Providence which found in the rescue of a single survivor of a shipwreck an instance of the presence of God, the reply to the effect that the argument would have been stronger if there had been no shipwreck at all! Still, he did not think the charge against design could be put as summarily, not to say flippantly, as the anti-theists, and especially the evolutionists, imagined. The formation of an eye in the chick inside the shell, the prenatal furnishings of all living organisms constituted an argument for design that could not be lightly brushed to one side. The only standing the atheistic argument could have at all would be in sticking stiffly to things being as they are just because they are. If the atheist is wise, according to Bowne, he will not appeal to chance, for in the presence of the intricacies of the actual order the human mind will not hold to chance for long. The balances required in the cosmic system are too fine and delicate for that. Out of all the range of degrees of temperature the human organism cannot in itself vary by as much as ten degrees about a normal without coming to destruction. A slight variation of earthly conditions would make organic life impossible. If the believer in chance insists that in infinite time just such conditions as ours will be realized, the reply is that in the same infinite time all the upsets will be more than realized. The only safety for the atheist is in insisting that things are as they are. All the possibilities are wrapped up in primeval matter, and they automatically come forth because they do. This practically amounts to defining matter so that it includes mind, the beginning, so that it includes the end. Just as sheer strain upon the intellect this is worse than the crudest theism.

So far as logic goes Bowne held that the decisive argument for theism is the intelligibility of the universe. The fact that we can read the universe at all is an indication that it was founded in thought. If things are not founded in thought, our minds can never reach them, and they can never reach our minds. There is no door by which the universe can get into our minds except through our mental act. That the universe is intelligible in any of its parts leads us to believe that it is intelligible to mind in all its parts. When Bowne said that the universe is intelligible he did not mean fully intelligible to men. He meant that men could not know that it is there at all if it were not fundamentally intelligible. The full meaning of the message it may take an eternity to decipher; some of the meaning may be forever beyond our grasp, but we can be sure that there is a message there. All this on the assumption that reason can be trusted at all. It is abstractly possible that the universe may be deceiving us. There may be nothing outside ourselves, but we are not so made as to hold such belief for long.

Understand, now, Bowne insisted that the *argument* for theism is in this intelligibility. We have minds capable of knowing, we have a system of things intelligible to us, we move most easily and naturally to the acceptance of a Mind which created our minds, and of whose thought and feeling and purpose the world is an expression. We must not, however, make the argument prove too much. Intelligibility alone does not prove the moral nature of the Mind back of all things. To conclude that the Mind back of all things is God, with all the moral attributes with which religion has endowed him, is to put more into the argument from intelligibility than the argument itself will bear. Our full belief in theism is the outcome of many factors, besides the formally intellectual, but, according to Bowne, if theism is to rest at all on reasoning of the formal type, this intelligibility of the universe is the argument most worth while. It was from the outward pointing of the soul that Bowne took his start in formulating his theism. Indispensable as is the constitutive activity of the individual self in knowing, that activity is always bearing witness to something beyond itself; the categories themselves, under which the mind acts, are not creations of the individual mind itself. The soul may possess an indispensable power, but the power is limited. The individual soul finds other selves acting like itself. The likemindedness of the souls makes a common-to-all which according to Bowne can best be thought of as the deed of the World-Soul, which has set finite souls over against itself, the finite selves sharing to a degree the World-Soul's own nature, and on the basis of that common sharing able to enter into communion with one another.

The outward pointing is not only there in the nature of the finite mind itself, in the laws according to which it acts, but in the content of its own thinking. At the instant when the self seems to be most self-controlled in thinking, at that instant the content of its thought seems most truly given from outside. It is interesting to note that in the experiences of seer and mystic the period of most intense attention is followed by the flashing of the vision which seems to come most genuinely from outside, or by inspiration.

Again, Bowne emphasized the idea that the relation of the will of the self toward the outside material world is directive and not creative. At the time of Bowne's death, in 1910, the pluralists were beginning to make some stir with their doctrine of selves as true creators. It might have seemed reasonable to expect that Bowne would be glad to see his doctrine of the self pushed out to a logical extreme in pluralism—the individual souls possessing independence from eternity to eternity, and creating with underived power. William James lent some aid and comfort to this doctrine, but Bowne never regarded it with anything more than amusement. Virtually, the human will is creative. A power even to arrange and rearrange the materials of the world in which we live is in a practical sense creative. An inventor is a creator, but all he does is to change the form and spatial relations of materials. He cannot create anything outright. Bowne taught that the ability to tell how things are made in the genuinely creative sense is forever beyond us. Men always deal in the last analysis with something found or given. No doubt, in the workaday relations of life the choices of finite wills enormously change the direction of the natural forces playing upon men's lives. Bowne used to cite with approval George P. Marsh's *Man and Nature* as illustrating the extent to which man has changed the material conditions under which the human race lives. None of this, however, reaches to creatorship. The physical relations of men and women no doubt determine the appearance of new souls on earth, but fathers and mothers do not create the bodies of their children, to say nothing of their souls. No, the will of man is directive and not creative. A man may be the captain of his soul in the meaning required by poetry, but he cannot create even the conditions under which his soul sails. He has, indeed, to thank whatever gods there are for his unconquerable soul.

This manifest dependence of the finite on Something outside itself always made Bowne slow to deduce by logic just what the World-Ground would do. A little later we shall see how far his faith in the World-Ground carried him, but he was exceedingly careful not to make extravagant claims for logic, in detail. The design argument, which he treated with such respect, would not of itself put us in possession of unity in the Cause back of all things. A fair show of reasoning might be made for the world as the outcome, not of design, but of designers. Looked at as it is, the world might be explained as the seat of rival designs, these at variance one with another. The argument from intelligibility, however, did seem to Bowne to make for unity. Even if there are finite gods—to use the latest phrase—they seem to meet in a common space and time, and common laws and methods seem to condition their activities—all this leading us to reality which is not futile.

I repeat, however, that though Bowne made his theistic argument, as argument, base itself thus on intelligibility, he would not hear to any claim that we could deduce from intelligibility itself, anything which would do away with our learning by patient induction. We may legitimately convince ourselves that Reason is back of the universe. We can never deduce the actual universe, however, by reflection upon what Reason seems to call for. All we can do is to look and see, or wait and see. This led to an emphasis on the inductive method in science altogether unusual in a metaphysician. I said in an earlier chapter that Bowne was in many points more inductive than the scientists themselves in his determination not to allow a theory to dictate what the facts had to be. This accounts for his openness toward the evolutionary theory, so long as it aimed at telling of the facts. To the element of increasing differentiation into increasing complexity he always allowed importance in the description of actual evolution, provided we make allowance for the fact that the simplicity of the appearance in earlier evolutionary stages is simplicity for the senses. Primeval stages must have had their own complexities in plenty.

Some of the identifications of the more amateur evolutionists sent Bowne forthwith to the seat of the scornful. He thought enough of Henry Drummond as a person to buy George Adam Smith's biography, but his opinion of Drummond as an evolutionist was positively fierce. An inquiring youngster, fresh from reading *The Ascent of Man,* once asked Bowne as to the validity of Drummond's claim that the selfish and altruistic qualities in men are the development of the nutritive and reproductive instincts respectively. "Worthless to the point of humiliation," was the reply. "Altruism is an interest in another and reproduction implies interest in another. That is all there is of it, and such an identification is worthless." Verbalism like Drummond's seemed to Bowne the bane of evolutionary thinking. It is to be regretted that he paid no attention to the element of truth in Drummond as it was set forth, for example, by Peter Kropotkin. He was likely to be thrown out of sympathy with the optimistic evolutionists by their strenuous determination to make evolution prove everything. In evolution he saw as the significant factor what Jacob Gould Schurman called the "arrival" of the fit. The fact that the fittest to survive do survive seemed to Bowne no marvel. The wonder always was that the fit had arrived—were on hand, on time, to do the surviving. Again, long ago, years before the insight had become common, Bowne was pointing out the ambiguity in the phrase, "the survival of the fittest." In dealing with causes effectively at work in the world the evolutionist spoke of the fitness as a fitness to survive. In accounting for the higher progress of the race this fitness to survive became an ethical fitness. All this juggling was calculated to drive a sincere thinker to fury.

It is a question, after all, as to how seriously Bowne took evolution. He was open to any light which might come from science, but he looked upon all theories of origin of species as likely to be artificial. He used to call attention to the significance of the remark of Asa Gray, the botanist, who, when asked if he believed in the transformation of species, replied, "Certainly; I have transformed a good many of them myself by the simple process of reclassification." As a tracing out of the orders of descent and of relationship Bowne always conceded the worth of evolution, but he saw in the theory as expounded by many would-be metaphysicians the lurking-place of swarms of fallacies. No doubt, Bowne said, men's dwelling places can be arranged in order from a hole in the ground to a modern palace. The "ascent" means that mind has been at work upon a concrete problem, out of growing intelligence making better and better dwelling-places, with more and more adaptation to environment. The fact is a series of dwellings capable of being arranged in order of their appearance. Even the hardiest evolutionist would not say that a primitive man's hole in the ground had itself developed into a palace, though as soon as the Indian's wigwam appears the evolutionist begins to talk of the evolution of the wigwam into something higher. Nothing happens to the wigwam. The Indian continues to live in it as long as he continues to be an Indian in cultural likes and dislikes. When the hole in the ground is filled up, or the wigwam abandoned, not man, but some man or men build better homes. So in the organic realm. No missing link ever was transformed into a link not missing. No subhuman ancestor of ours ever became human. The most that could be said would be that subhuman individuals took their places in an ascending scale. Now, Bowne would not let his pupils forget that the order of actual changes takes place in the concrete, and that the facts are what they are. No concrete organism of itself develops into anything higher unless that higher is already in the lower, in which case we have only a drawing out of the hat of what is already in it. The possibility of arranging the organisms in order of development means that the Creative Will is working according to an ascending scale. The advance takes place through the Will working in and through laws presumably to express a plan.

I say "presumably" to be true to Bowne's conception. Bowne did not cherish false aims for formal reasoning. A few theologians in these later days have told us that we must think of God scientifically, accepting those attributes of his character which scientific study forces on us. As I have tried to show at perhaps too great length, this is the ideal for science, but Bowne made it clear that survey of facts has never revealed the character of the Divine. Take evolution. There is indeed a sweep of majesty about a plan running through the ages, but the actual facts of evolution leave about as many mysteries unexplained as any other theory. In evolution there seems to be a deal of fumbling and mussiness. "Vestigial survivals"—left-overs, and hang-overs—do not throw much light, except to suggest a raw workmanship. Here is the mark of a gill-slit in a human embryo. If the power of God is immanent, the gill-slit is there for a present purpose. The survival talk helps us little. The trouble with Paley was that, having once grasped the idea of design, he worked it to death, telling the purpose of everything, whereas, except in the most meager way, we cannot tell why anything is, in detail. That a vermiform appendix had a purpose once, and no purpose now, does not help us much toward detailed understanding of the steps of creation. Science is indispensable in its sphere, but it tells us precious little about divine purpose. How things came to be, in the order of their appearance, and the conditions determining their appearance, science can tell us, but not why they came to be. So strongly did Bowne feel this that he declared that science, as such, would do better to get along without any reference to God. He did not see that such reference would do any more than confuse issues and create false hopes and false despairs.

What, then, was the basis of Bowne's theism? It is formulated in the introduction to both editions of *Theism,* but perhaps the best putting was in an article in the *Methodist Review* in 1884, entitled "The Logic of Religious Belief." In that article, to which we shall have further occasion to refer, Bowne avows that acceptance of theism comes through belief. The mind finds itself in a universe with which it must come to terms, if it is to live at all. The evolutionists are always talking about adjustment. Here is one phase of adjustment that evolutionists overlook—the adjustments men make in their views, and the extent to which these intellectual adjustments affect the practical aspects of the universe in which men live. In some respects men have to surrender to the universe. In some respects they compel the universe to surrender to them. In other respects there is truce, or compromise. The mind feels that it can know, and puts reason at the center of things. From the fact that anything is intelligible it infers that everything is intelligible, or acts on such assumption, if "inference" seems to be too deliberate and purposeful. The mind spontaneously takes to knowing on the assumption that it is placed in a knowable universe. Now, the God of Reason is assumed as the necessity of our thinking. So likewise with Beauty and Righteousness. We find ourselves moving out toward regard for Beauty and Righteousness and act on the assumption that these are embodied in cosmic Beauty and Righteousness.

At this point, of course, the Bowne theism to-day confronts the doctrine that God is just the sum of our ideals. We love God because we see in him the projection of our own best thought and purpose. Anyone who cares for noble ideals—those of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness toward which our lives turn—can be a theist, if he sees in the Divine the summation and crown of our ideals. Much that passes for theism to-day is thus easy-going. Bowne, however, held to Reality for these ideals. God was to him a Person living forth a truth, goodness and beauty, of which our best understanding is only a feeble glimmering. All this proceeds frankly on assumption and not proof. There is no way of proving the existence of God. Bowne felt that Kant had given the death-blow to all hopes to prove theism. Only, he made it clear that theism is not a vague, shadowy hope standing over against a proved reality like atheism. Atheism too is a theory based on assumption. Bowne maintained that a thinker can do legitimately what the inductive scientist does—he can observe the orders of sequence and concomitance in phenomena and thus add to the world's store of fruitful knowledge without raising any question as to backlying reality whatsoever. Or, on the other hand, he can raise the backlying questions, on the understanding that when he does so on the basis of assumption like any other theorist, he becomes a theorist; and if his theory is atheistic, its atheism itself establishes no presumption in its favor. The field must be fair, with no favors.

It is well to note the difference between Bowne's theism and the old ontological arguments which it may seem to resemble. The difference is that the ontological argument professed to depend on exact reasoning. The idea of the best, so ran the argument, includes the idea of existence, hence God as the Best must exist. As argument Bowne rejected this outright. Nevertheless, he insisted that we spontaneously and naturally posit a Reality which is the fulfillment of our cognitive, æsthetic and moral ideals. We do this in our process of adjusting ourselves to the total situation in which we find ourselves. Moreover, he repeatedly chided the atheistic evolutionists with lack of consistency in not doing likewise, for the vast theistic systems are part of the means by which, to use the evolutionist lingo, inner relations are adjusted to outer relations. They are the outcome of a process of natural selection, because of their survival value. Contentment of mind, satisfaction of the deeper impulses, a sense of being at home in the universe—all this makes for survival. It can readily be seen that Bowne could turn the tables on the evolutionists with the use of their own terms. All such terms to one side, however, Bowne insisted that theistic belief is a resultant of our reaction against the universe. It is an intellectual dwelling place which we have built to make life itself more tolerable.

# CHAPTER VIII

## THE PERSONALIST

IN 1905, just before he started on his trip around the world, Bowne told his friends that he had decided to call his system *Personalism.* This title he thereafter adhered to, avowing that as a personalist he was the first of the clan in any thoroughgoing sense. Professor A. C. Knudson has developed, once and for all, the relations of Bowne to the personalistic movement. It would be presumptuous for me to attempt to enter the field so masterfully worked through by Professor Knudson. For adequate treatment of personalism the reader should consult Professor Knudson's book. I deal with the system here merely as the culmination of Bowne's thought.

The volume by Bowne on *Personalism* is the outcome of a course of lectures given at Northwestern University on the N. W. Harris Foundation. In the book occurs the chapter which Professor William E. Hocking calls a powerful piece of philosophic criticism, the chapter entitled "The Failure of Impersonalism." This chapter is a summing up of the essentials of the critical work of Bowne through nearly a third of a century. His judgment of all impersonalistic systems was that they were totally inadequate to account for the world, or for knowledge of the world. All sensationalistic philosophies go by the board as not supplying the unitary and abiding agent necessary for knowledge, and as not supplying adequate ideas of substance and cause. Professor Hocking wrote in the *Methodist Review,* 1922, page 374: "Thus 'personalism' becomes the distinctive name for Bowne's contribution to metaphysics, and as a summary account of the curve of metaphysical speculation since Kant, there is no more powerful and convincing chapter in metaphysical writing than that of Bowne on 'The Failure of Impersonalism.'"

We must note in passing that William James commended *Personalism* most highly, and said in a note to Bowne that at bottom he and Bowne were laboring at the same problem. We have already seen that James concealed from himself the lack of an abiding agent partly by figures of speech and partly by making the successive instants themselves responsible for the task to which only a substantial self, by whatever name one called it, could be equal. All these systems go down because of their failure to deal with what may be called "relating" activities. The famous dictum of James, that ideas are like buckets in the stream of consciousness and that the relations are the "free water" between the buckets, shows to what desperate extremes systems which do away with personal agents are driven. The same inadequacy in dealing with relations appears in Russell, to whom the idea of self is anathema. Russell really makes consciousness a procession of agents without any relations. It is hard to see how he saves his procession from vanishing into a series of mathematical points, with no one to observe the passing of the procession.

The absolute idealistic systems likewise fail through impersonalism. We can see how to pass from thinkers to thoughts, but how can we get from thought to thinkers? To call thinkers "specifications" of thoughts is well enough if we mean that an Infinite Thinker creates finite thinkers according to plan, but Infinite Thought, strictly speaking, would have to remain Thought and not Thinker, Thought too without a Thinker thinking it. We have already noticed the regard in which James held Bowne. We note too that Josiah Royce likewise highly regarded Bowne and felt that he and Bowne were close together. Bowne felt that in the *World and the Individual* Royce had not pulled himself clear of Hegelianism. Probably all three thinkers, James, Royce, and Bowne, fundamentally meant the same thing, irreconcilable as the statements of their various views appeared.

There are reasons why the term "personalism" has been slow in coming to wide acceptance. Bowne used to say that there never had been any serious criticism of his work which he had not provided for, or at least foreseen. There are those of us who know that some objections to personalism had been brought to his attention, only to be dismissed as of little consequence. For example, some of those closest to him asked if the term suggested fully the place of the objective system in his thought; whether, after all, objective idealism, or personal idealism, would not have been better. Bowne was not impressed with the suggestion. Personalism seemed to him to be more inclusive, inclusive at least as making provision for the will-element in reality. The upshot is that many who judge philosophic systems by the title fail to discover that Bowne in his own philosophizing did continue to make provision for the objective order. I have been saying all along that no one could have urged more strongly than did he that finite persons are in the presence of a system which they do not make but find. He at all times strove to make it evident that many aspects of the meaning of reality may be beyond our reach. He once stood looking out upon the sea from an Ipswich, Massachusetts, headland and exclaimed: "I wonder what He is making of that." Just at present much is being said of the indifference of nature to human interests, or at least the neutrality of nature toward such interests. So far as our finite affairs are concerned nature does seem to be indifferent, but Bowne insisted that all this could be put in personalistic terms. The Infinite Intelligence has plans far beyond our grasp. We can at present make nothing of them, and they naturally seem to move on impersonally. He used to say that the demand for knowledge of some aspects of the universe is as reasonable as if a cellar-digger or a foundation-layer should ask to see the plan of the completed house and should protest against the aimlessness of his drudging task. All that could be done with such protest would be to tell the protester to go on with his business, that the final outcome was none of his affair, as yet. We are nowhere near final knowledge.

At times Bowne seemed almost remorseless in insisting that the universe is in many of its aspects none of our business. If he had been an impersonalist, believing that nature moves on utterly indifferent to human affairs, he could not have taught more positively than he did that we have no means for knowing in detail what the universe is for. "If you wish to know your own limitations," he once said at a club where the members were glibly settling some vast problems, "suppose you pull yourselves together and write an essay on the ethics of the Almighty in his relation to cosmic affairs." Looked at just from the point of view of inductive observation, Bowne affirmed that the universe resembled nothing so much "as the dreamings of a blind demi-urge." Believing though he did that every least detail of the ongoings of the universe is ruled by reason, he threw up his hands in despair and even in horror when men undertook to announce the meanings of things or events from the divine point of view. He believed in God as few men do, but was almost wholly agnostic as to God's purposes in detail. We can, indeed, in Emersonian fashion hitch our wagons to the stars, but the main purpose of the stars is more than to pull our wagons.

The emphasis on idealism as a descriptive term seems to assume that things will stick together better if a sort of idea-cement holds them in a system, but Bowne was sure that the purpose of a Living Person was the best of all cements for a system.

A second objection to personalism is that the term itself seems to set individuals off too much by themselves. A World-Idea specifying itself into concrete individuals, or a World-Spirit filling all things and men with itself, seems to some thinkers preferable to personalism. Bowne did not and could not agree. There is no way of a World-Idea's getting itself concreted into individuals except as a Creator posits individuals according to a plan. A World-Spirit cannot "fill" anything except as stimulating spirits to activity like its own. There is no way in which Spirit can get into spirits except by the active response of spirits to the Spirit. The acceptance of a common thought in like-mindedness is a better security for the organization of persons into togetherness than any metaphysical spiritual stuff binding them together. The system of persons, according to Bowne, must be one of voluntary co-operation rather than of metaphysical compulsion, if it is to be worth while. Even socialists, of the more enlightened groups, admit this. Bowne would not yield on the central importance of selves as active agents. Under all is the Divine Person carrying on personal activities which make possible a stage for the activities of the finite selves whom he has called into being, a stage in which the selves can find themselves, and find their fellows—and find God. There are some phases of the universe intended for the finite selves as individuals, some intended for the finite in groups, some intended for the Infinite Self alone. Whenever a self comes upon a realm of knowledge not intended particularly for himself, or open to himself, he feels himself in the presence of what seems to be an impersonal element. Or, on the other hand, when he confronts the great common-to-all in experience he feels that he has come upon the impersonal, as if that which concerned the most persons had the least to do with persons.

Another objection, common to anti-personalists to-day, is resentment against the word "person" itself. A curious doctrine it is, that that which is in man the crown and apex—full personality—should seem to be in the World-Ground mean and belittling. The tenderness of feeling of some anti-personalistic philosophers, who shrank from impairing the fineness of the Divine Force by calling it personal, always called forth Bowne's sharpest ridicule. There must be some deep-seated cause for this perennial appearance and reappearance of objection to the avowal of belief in God as personal. Some causes are not difficult to discern; chief among them is most likely the one which we had occasion to mention in dealing with John Fiske and the early evolutionists—the notion that personality implies limitations. Fiske avowed that his theism called for an infinite and not a finite God. To him personal life meant limitation and finitude. Much of this objection was merely verbal. It was the old stuff about an Infinite's ceasing to be Infinite after entering into relations with the finite. All Infinite means when we are dealing with theism is, according to Bowne, that the Infinite is limited by nothing outside of its own choosing and positing. If the Infinite, out of the fullness of infinite resources, chooses to put the finite over against itself, the Infinite is not impoverished thereby. A good deal of the difficulty about the Infinite disappears as soon as we take account of how words must be used in living speech.

Spencer himself contrasted the powers we call personal with the physical powers somewhat to the disparagement of the former. In a well-known passage he retorted to those who would speak of the quickness of thought that light is much quicker. He did not pay much attention to the truth that without the mind there would be no perception of light or measurement of light. In fact, it seemed to Bowne that the physical scientists were constantly taking the product of thinking to discount and disparage thinking itself. The mind perceives light, theorizes about light, and then rules out the mind as inferior to light. It was, Bowne said, a good deal as if an eye should survey the universe without finding anything which would serve as a mirror or reflector to reveal itself to itself. Beholding everything else, it might come to the conclusion that all these marvelous objects exist on their own account, and it might laugh at the notion that an eye is perceiving them. All the time the true marvel would be in the vision of the eye itself.

Somewhat akin to this objection is the inability to picture personal life, or we picture it as some ghostly spirit, and then the impersonal forces seem more important. This picture-thinking always has been, and perhaps always will be, a powerful aid to those who refuse to take personality as the best term for reality. Here Bowne insisted that we cannot get any revelation to the senses except as the personal forces report themselves in what they do. Causes must be thought. A truth reached by genuine thinking is just as true as one revealed to the senses. There is no use in trying to picture a self in itself. It must be thought. This difficulty is always with us, and will probably prevent the Bowne philosophy from ever making the most cogent appeal to the popular mind. The race has for ages half grasped the idea of an immaterial self, but only half grasped it. We think we could see spirit if we had fine enough eyes. The unseen world is seeable to sharper vision than ours. A distinguished psychologist, friendly to theism, sought to help us out some months ago by suggesting that the brain-cells of men might be the seat of a higher consciousness—a divine consciousness—at the same time that they were serving as a seat of the lower, human consciousness. Far be it from me to try to pass upon what the Divine Personality can do through human brain cells. I mention this psychological suggestion just to show how hard it is to dissociate the idea of personal cause from matter. At first glance it would seem that the psychologist's hint would leave us without a God until human brain substance had been developed. In any event, on such basis, the primacy is with the physical forces.

Causes, we repeat, must be comprehended by thought. The higher values are for the mind. As soon as we hear that causes of an unpicturable kind are at work we nevertheless try to picture them. We think of the senses indeed as Kantian spectacles through which we look out upon the effects the causes are producing, and then we ask why we cannot take the spectacles off and see reality as it is. If we tried to look thus upon reality as it is, we should find that it had no "look" at all, and then we should think there was nothing real there. Take so acute a mind as William James. His strength and his weakness were in picture-thinking. I have remarked that his students used to report that in discussing Bowne's doctrine of the spiritual self he would say that in this doctrine Bowne had crawled into a hole and had pulled the hole in after him. If this was James' state of mind, what wonder that the dependence upon picture-thinking constitutes an almost insuperable objection to getting the unpicturable self as cause into the common thinking! No one admitted more readily than Bowne that with hosts of professed thinkers the plight is hopeless. It was like asking to see a reason. Reasons are not visible. To be sure, scratches can be made upon paper, but the scratches are not reasons. The house dog can see all that Sir Isaac Newton saw of the mathematical demonstration on the sheet of paper as far as eyesight goes, but insight is a different affair.

Another objection is that set out in James' phrase—the tightness, or the overtightness, of personality. This is altogether different from the verbal play with the word "infinite" which I mentioned a moment ago. The human soul longs at times to get out of itself. There is a craving for wider grasp. We seem shut in upon ourselves, and this is to us a mark of personal existence. Hence so much mystical yearning after absorption in something else—a stirring after the ineffable.

Now, Bowne was quite uncompromising as to the impossibility of a person's getting outside of himself, but he made the largest place for whatever spiritual expansion seems worthy. The only way we can enter into the mind of another is to think that other's thought after him. By what process of absorption could a mind be caught up into a mathematical astronomer's gaze upon the heavens? Only by thinking through the astronomer's equation and catching the thrill of his comprehension. In this direction there is unlimited possibility for sympathetic sharing of knowledge and feeling. The feeling of "tightness" is at bottom just one of the limitations, and the limitations which cause much of the tightness can be overcome.

In fact, Bowne saw in the development of personality the only path to expansion. The physical forces are the tightest of all. Light, which impressed Spencer so profoundly, is shut up to its own laws as in a prison-house. It is confined within a tightness closer than anything possible to personality.

Another difficulty is that, in spite of all our talk about the dignity of personality, many of us think of personality meanly. We see mean lives around us, in comparison with which the ongoing impersonal forces take on splendor and majesty. Light, with its terrific speed; gravitation, with its never-relaxing grip; the electric powers, in their many-sided effectiveness; the vastness of space and the sweep of time—all this appears to dwarf the powers of mind into a pigmy feebleness by contrast. Not so with Bowne. He used to say that it was the power of mind to understand all these powers which, after all, puts them into secure place, and delivers man from their tyranny. The simplest act of perception is, when the last word is said, more wonderful than the play of an impersonal force, no matter how mighty.

To another the dependence of mind on organic physical states seems to put the mind in a secondary position. Bowne did not seek to minimize or gloss over the facts. To the inductive observer the most irrational events do take place. The reflections of the profoundest philosopher may be halted any moment by a material event absurdly insignificant in itself. The best thinking takes place in conditions of mind brought about by physical nourishment or rest, a physical favorableness which may be upset at any moment. The most important thinking may be halted by a twinge of neuralgia or an ignominious toothache. Reasoning may be stopped permanently, so far as we can see, by any one of a million trifling accidents—a misstep upon the highway, a mouthful of tainted food, a sting of a mosquito. All this Bowne granted, but the essential remained firm—the superiority of the self in the very power to recognize all this. In his thought all physical forces were but expressions of the activity of the Supreme Self, and the manner of their operation and the events they brought about were but part of the mystery of the working of that Self. The likeness of the finite selves to the Supreme Self was revealed in the power to know.

In a word, follow the hint given in the unitary and abiding self out to its conclusion, and we have a cause adequate to the demands made upon it. Strip the World-Mind of that dependence on matter which is such a weakness of finite minds and we do have a resting place on which to build up a consistent theory of the universe. The physical forces are inadequate. They fall short, especially at the point of explaining knowledge. Unconscious intelligence means just nothing at all. Since we have to rest in the end upon assumption, let us assume something adequate to the purpose in hand. A full-orbed personal life, without variableness or shadow of turning, in entire possession of itself, would be adequate. We can conceive such life without logical contradiction, though admittedly we cannot answer the child's question as to "how God is made." We must come to a stopping-place in our thinking at last, but why stop before we have reached the end? Remember, the choice is between theories. If we have to be content with theory, let us push on till we reach finality, in theory at least. Impersonalism does not go far enough. Nothing goes far enough that stops short of personalism. Here it may be well to mention a detail of opposition which Bowne, in common with other teachers of a doctrine similar to his, had always to meet. I refer to the old objection which theists, in particular, have been encountering ever since the days of the Greeks—the objection that if anything took to thinking, it would conceive of the universe in terms of itself. The Greek philosopher had it that if an ox took to philosophical or theistic reflection, it would certainly think of the World-Cause in terms of oxen, with horns and hoofs. All down through the years this illustration has been appearing in one form or another. Theodore Parker, according to Bowne, made the interesting substitution of a buffalo for an ox; and did not Spencer tell us that a thinking watch would conceive of the universe as a scheme of springs and wheels and escapements? So man thinks of the universe in terms of personality, and is, presumably, as far off as would be the philosophic ox, or buffalo, or watch.

Bowne at once laid his finger on the weak spot in all this. Before oxen, or buffaloes, or watches could form any theories they would have to take to thinking, and if any one of them concluded to a thinking cause back of the universe he, or it, would not be far astray. The *thinking* would be the all-essential. If the thinking went far enough, the ox, or the buffalo, or the watch might reach the conclusion that thinking as such does not depend on horns, or hoofs, or springs, or wheels. To imply that theology or philosophy has conceived of God as in the form of a glorified physical man is caricature, or rather it is false. Philosophy conceives of God as infinite Subject.

For Bowne personality was not horns, or hoofs, or springs, or body, or nerves, but self-consciousness and self-direction. If ox, or buffalo, or watch had self-consciousness and self-direction the spiritual power would be distinctive and unique, altogether different from anything which has horns, or hoofs, or springs could accomplish, no matter how important any or all of these might be as supplying the conditions under which the thinking might take place. Bowne is especially needed to-day to correct and supplement the current emphasis on the physical organism as expressing one's personality. There is a legitimate meaning and purpose in such emphasis, for it is laudable to seek to make body the expression of personality, but the step over to body as personality is, with many, fatally easy.

Still more serious objection to personalism as the key to the universe and all its meanings arises out of the belief, common enough in scientific circles, that personalism implies freedom and that freedom is not compatible with law. The scientific objector professes to have no partiality for physical forces as such. He definitely repudiates materialism. He avows, however, that he must stand by law. This is a universe of law. It seems to him unfortunate that at the epoch in the world's history when men are beginning to adjust themselves to the claims of inescapable law, we should seek by a doctrine like personalism to divert the attention of men toward the arbitrary and lawless.

We pass over with bare mention the inconsistency here. If law rules everything, it rules in persons. Of course the scientist will have to admit that, on his own interpretation of law, affairs in the personal realm are bad enough, but it pleases him better to conceive of whim and caprice as the outcome of law than to look upon an apparently wise decision as the result of free choice. We have been all over this ground before, however. If whim and caprice are the resultants of law, there is no chance for science, for science implies intellectual standards and the power to choose in accordance with them.

Bowne labored to make it clear that there is no contradiction between freedom and law. The finite self finds itself in a system which it does not make—a system of laws. Its life begins in subjection to those laws and may never rise out of subjection to them. A self may be merely a thing among other things with only consciousness enough to be aware, or half aware, of what is going on. It can never rise above law in the sense of being free from law, but the self can use law. It can choose the laws which it will obey and through such self-imposed obedience rise to still wider realms of freedom. In an onslaught on freedom John Fiske became eloquent and cried out that if freedom is a reality, the sculptor may, in the exercise of freedom, hack to pieces the statue which he has just made, the creation of the statue and its destruction coming alike out of the impulse to freedom. Fiske declared that the debate on freedom was a great opener of the flood-gates of rhetoric, and Bowne replied that in the presence of such outbreaks as that of Fiske it certainly was. Fiske had curiously turned things around. If there is no freedom, and all acts are alike as coming from law without the mark of rational choice upon them, then practically all things are alike lawless, for there is no way of discerning what is according to law and what is not. Everything stands on the same plane.

Bowne wrought effectively here with his doctrine of the Fallacy of the Universal; in other words, the fallacy of the class term, which though in itself only a term, too often passes itself off for substantial reality. We lump all laws together under the term "law." Then Law becomes almost a deity on its own account. The actual facts are events occurring in such and such ways. From the resemblances among the events we deduce the idea of law. Occurrences take place with more or less uniformity, and after uniformity has become evident enough we speak of a law. Suppose we should drop the word "law," and talk of the "ways" of events. After a while we might speak of the rule of the "way"! Now, Law has, indeed, more than a verbal significance. It points, we believe, to reason and intelligence. It is an abstraction from the method of an intelligent Reality when it gives a clue to a meaning as a control over life, but it does not rule as a substance.

We may get help here in the understanding of Bowne by using a figure of speech from William James, though I do not mean to suggest that James himself adopted Bowne's idea of freedom. I take the illustration from a passage in which freedom is not under discussion. James says that some events may "pull triggers" in human consciousness. The consciousness is loaded with content relevant to a particular theme, and a word or event discharges the load into utterance or deed. Adopting this figure of speech, we may state the Bowne idea in the suggestion that men move always among loaded powers with the triggers to those powers within their reach. They may pull triggers right and left with no regard for consequences, or they may carefully select the triggers they will pull. Whether they select or not, however, the consequences always occur, and occur according to law. A soldier in war time moving among guns might pull triggers without heed as to their discharging missiles against either friend or foe, or he might direct the weapons only against his nation's enemies. No matter what the direction; the missile would fly according to the laws of moving projectiles.

Still, even if we do not place upon the World-Self the limitations of the finite self, what is to assure us, if we make that World-Self free in our theory, that by arbitrary decree the World-Soul may not in a freak wipe everything out, or reverse all processes? To which Bowne replied that we live by trust at best, and that if we are going to trust anyhow, we would better trust something worth trusting. Personal existence is the highest form of existence we know. There is more reason for trusting a Self, acting in the light of full intelligence and under the control of moral purpose, than for trusting anything impersonal. What warrant have we for the trust that under an impersonal system things can be depended on to go anywhere in particular? Bowne had some sharp darts to shoot at those who took the monotony of their own thinking for a regularity of the universe. As for the Reign of Law, that can go on with a progressive weaving, to be sure, but with a weaving followed by an unweaving. Practically speaking, anything and everything can happen according to law.

Bowne did not expect that his personalism would find ready acceptance, but he did feel that philosophy would finally have to come to a platform essentially personalistic. He felt that thought could follow one of two courses: it could either confine itself to a positivistic observance of sequences, or push on through to a personalistic outcome. He could see no stopping place in between. Did he foresee the turn considerable thinking is taking at the present day—some seekers finding in the unconscious activities of the soul the key to reality, and others looking for a reality higher than personality?

There are passages in Bowne's *Metaphysics,* and notably in an article in the *North American Review* in 1910, in which Bowne hints at activities of the soul as an agent which do not rise into full consciousness, or even into consciousness at all. I refer to his admission that the self may legitimately be regarded as the constitutive force in the shaping of its physical organism. Bowne did not prefer this view himself. He conceived of the Infinite Self as positing the finite selves and as carrying through concomitant changes in the organisms with which those selves are in closest relationship. Here, again, we have a conception which would simply have to be thought and not pictured. Bowne had little patience for an Unconscious as such, but he does seem to have conceded the possibility of an active agent of constitutive power with a range of possibilities not reporting themselves in consciousness at all. If our selves determine any direction of the functions of our bodies—not to speak of influencing the organism itself—we are not aware of the influence. Bowne conceded this as a logical possibility. That he did not take the pains to do more than allude to it would seem to indicate that he dealt with it chiefly for the sake of formal completeness. He was discussing the relations of self and body. He sought to show the impossibility of the body's being an agent in the creation of the self, and then turned to the self as the agent in the building of the body as more worthy of acceptance than the former view, ending by stating his own thought that the body is a form of activity on the part of the Infinite to serve the finite self maintained by the Infinite. We admit that it is surprising that Bowne conceded so considerable a measure of legitimacy to the theory of the self as the agent in constituting the body. Such activity is something of which the self never itself becomes conscious. Bowne seems to have thought of the self as better meeting the demands of thinghood than could matter, though it is hard to see how those demands are fairly met through activities of which the self knows nothing. Our wonder at Bowne's paragraph on such a function of the self is all the deeper when we reflect upon his aversion to doctrines of the Unconscious. He wrote to Dr. Gideon L. Powell, under date of February 11, 1910:

> Professor James' work on *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is an interesting book, perhaps more interesting than valuable. It is interesting as coming from him, and has all the charm of his personality; but when people begin to talk about subjective mind and subliminal consciousness it seems to me they are giving only misleading names for rather simple and familiar matter. All that this subliminal consciousness means is simply the fact that our actual consciousness does not exhaust the possibilities of consciousness. It does not now reproduce all that we have experienced and it does not now exhaust the possibilities of future experience; but when they begin to talk of it as subliminal, and divide the mind into two realms, the very phrases themselves are misleading. By and by we hypostasize the subconscious mind and use it to explain a great deal, whereas in reality it explains nothing. On the whole, language may be an advantage, but it is without doubt a great source of error, a large amount of philosophy being simply a disease of words.

The questioner now asks if Bowne did not, after all, glide into pantheism in the teaching that the physical organisms are flowing forms of the divine activity. Can we hold the curious position that the body is from God while the self is not? To which Bowne always replied that his view of the material world was pantheistic, in that all comes causally from God. The self, with its measure of self-consciousness and self-determination, stands over against God in enough independence to escape from pantheism, as its free choices slightly, though really, influence or affect even the Infinite in dealings with the material world. If pantheism seems more enlarging and expansive than personalism, Bowne had at hand the reply that there is scant relief in an expansiveness which expands God into all the evils of the universe.

Still, the questioner asks if there may not be something beyond personality as a key to the Reality back of the universe, something which includes personality and yet transcends it. We speak at times of the subconscious; may we not as well, or better, speak of the superconscious? At this point those who sat under Bowne can well fancy him enjoining us to rid our minds of phrases. What could we mean by transcending personality? If we think of something which is neither matter nor mind, we have to remember that this something must be capable of being grasped in thought, or we should never be able to get hold of it; and that, if it were a creation, it would have to be constituted by thought-relationships. If it were entitled to thinghood on its own account, what other marks of selfhood could it have than those which make a thinking subject? If the questioner has in mind states, or conditions of consciousness, beyond anything possible to the human lot, let him remember that Bowne declared to his students that he did not believe the human being could ever attain fully to the divine method of knowing. We can see that a consciousness, beginning as human, might develop to the power where it could grasp all material reality in one space seizure. If men just had eyes in the backs of their heads, they could sweep the whole circle of a horizon at once. How would it be with the time-intuition? From of old, long before Bowne or Kant or anyone else had fashioned the doctrine of the ideality of time, the theologians were proclaiming that time is nothing to God. Now, we can well believe that God's knowledge of time includes an understanding of the human before-and-after, but can we conceive of the human mind's rising to a grasp of time in which there is no before-and-after? Here, again, we have to do with a conception which must be thought. We have experience of nonspatial realms in the unpicturable relations of logical thinking. Such thinking is not under the space-form. We have no experience, however, of non-temporal thinking. Still, we can think of an experience which grasps reality nontemporally.

So also with the distinction between the grasp of truth by intuitive insight and by formal reasoning. Bowne used as illustration here the difference between the mind which is mathematical by endowment of genius and the mind mathematical by mastery of processes. The genius sees the truth at once. The learner has to plod his way slowly through to understanding. The genius no doubt recognizes that his intuitions can be put in logical form but such plodding means little to him. The plodder, on the other hand, enters but seldom into the realm of the direct insight of the genius. It is these personal powers in their highest manifestations from which we must take our cue in thinking of the universe in terms of personalism. It would hardly help us much to conceive of the Infinite Person as struggling along with formulas; but Direct Insight, founded upon a moral nature, forever acting in full light and full moral responsibility, is, Bowne said, the best, the only worthy characterization of the World-Ground.

# CHAPTER IX

## BOWNE AND PRAGMATISM

IN the late nineties a new term appeared in American philosophical circles which since its appearance has probably been, or seemed, characteristically American. I refer to *pragmatism*—the doctrine that the test of a philosophic theory should be the "way it works." Like many other doctrines which appear sun-clear when we first look at them, the sun-clearness of pragmatism becomes more dubious the longer we examine it. It will be remembered that the Hibernian philosopher, Mr. Dooley, defined pragmatism as teaching that truth is a lie that will work. There is a trace of justice in this jibe in that too many of the professed pragmatists have, by their emphasis on the more "practical" results, allowed such interpretations to pass unchallenged. With some, pragmatism is only a brand of utilitarianism, without the place for moral values which utilitarianism has usually allowed. Moreover, the definition of what "works" has been expanded till it has lost precision. Bowne wrote to Professor Knudson, January 18, 1905:

> Schiller's *Humanism*, Dewey's *Pragmatism*, and James' *Will to Believe* are all one-sided but useful. I find nothing in them beyond what you suggest—reaction against an overdone intellectualism. Schiller's fancy that he has anything new is certainly naïve. At best, it is only a specification of Kant's *Primacy of the Practical Reason*. However, it is the vogue just now, and we must understand it. You will find Dewey's utterances in a book on *Logical Theory* published some two years ago. On the other hand, Bradley is just as one-sided. The truth lies between them. The fact is in this matter, whichever one has the last word wins the day. Bradley's criticism of Schiller is capital, and the retorts of Schiller are excellent.

I think we are not dealing unjustly with pragmatism as such in judging it by its own emphasis on practical outcomes, or by the re-enforcement of such emphasis which has come out of the teaching of pragmatism. The outstanding pragmatic leaders in this country have been William James and John Dewey. Both seem to have turned to pragmatism in protest against absolutist currents which ran so strongly in philosophy thirty years ago. James had a veritable horror of any scheme which seemed to him "tight." He was fond of loose ends. He craved a philosophy which would come out of the air and down to earth. He was in a perpetual state of rebellion against anything like Hegelianism, even in such modifications as that of Josiah Royce, and Bowne's doctrine of the Infinite pleased him but little better. He desired something he could use, and in his complaints against the theists insisted that he, and not they, effectively provided for a God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, a God of the living. He could not breathe an absolutist atmosphere.

It soon became evident that after one had announced oneself a pragmatist the next announcement in order would have to tell what else one was. For pragmatism made it philosophically lawful for a man to believe whatever suited him. The pragmatically minded after a while showed themselves so completely at loose ends that James, in letters published after his death, implied that he was much disturbed at the low ideals which had taken possession of the mind of the time. He protested with vigor against the worship of the "bitch-goddess, Success." It is noteworthy that the other leading pragmatist, Dewey, quoted this word of James in the *New Republic* not long since. Yet success of whatever sort might have been legitimately taken as an aim by the thoroughgoing pragmatist. The nobler spirits among this new school included in what is "useful," "practical," and "workable" all the finer ideals of humanity, Dewey making especial place for the worthier social values; but this is a far cry from the suggestions which pragmatism at first prompted. Those of us who remember those first expositions of pragmatism recall how the new theory started almost at the beginning to widen the meaning of useful. A pragmatist, asked if high astronomical truth is useful, replied in my hearing that it is useful to the astronomer in satisfying him. On this basis the absolutist's highly abstract reflections had a basis in pragmatism as satisfying the absolutist. As was to be expected, Bowne repudiated outright the word "useful" as employed in this ambiguous fashion, declaring that such ambiguity is a surrender of strict pragmatism, since it recognizes that the mind has its own rights apart from the "useful" in any ordinary sense.

If, however, we could speak of a higher pragmatism, Bowne was a pragmatist. In an article in the *Methodist Review,* in 1884, he stated the position afterward embodied in the introduction to *Theism,* namely, that the self has rights and needs of its own; that by the exercise of those rights it makes adjustments to the universe for the sake of its own best and fullest life; that if it thus attains to life, it assumes that it is at least on the path to reality, and then takes further steps. For the sake of mind itself it ventures out upon the assumption that the world is the expression of reason. For the sake of its feeling for beauty the self assumes that beauty is fundamentally objective. For the sake of moral will it assumes that the universe is constitutionally moral. The test of the truth of these assumptions is the degree and quality of life which result for the individual and society from accepting them. In all this Bowne did not claim originality. He insisted that he was stating for his own time and in his own manner a truth which Kant had set forth in *The Critique of Practical Reason.* After Kant had in *The Critique of Pure Reason* shown the futility of trying to deduce God, freedom, and immortality by any strict logic, he showed in *The Critique of Practical Reason* that we have to hold fast to all three of these ideas as "regulative" for the sake of any moral life whatever.

It will be seen that pragmatism of this noble order fits in harmoniously with personalism. If persons are the ultimate expressions of the real, then we must follow the needs of persons in our quest for the real. We have here the key to Bowne's whole scheme—philosophy, religion, ethics. The self takes from the universe what it needs. If in doing so it finds itself built up into keener insight, finer awareness of the beautiful, larger power for righteousness, it will not believe that it is on a false trail.

Now, the distance between this putting of pragmatism and that which talks of the "useful" is evident at once. By a moderate feat of logical sleight-of-hand it is possible to maintain that these higher goods include the lower, but the most that the strict pragmatist would be entitled to claim is that the lower goods include the higher—which the common sense of men rejects. Pragmatism of any variety, however, has its value in calling in another test of truth than the barrenly syllogistic. It emphasizes that the self, or consciousness, or life, has other interests than the deductively logical. In all its varieties it gives a valuable hint as to method—Try and see! Only, the seeing must not confine itself to wooden, material consequences. The mind's and the heart's own power to see must be kept before us. With this understanding pragmatism is a worthwhile method of truth-seeking.

In the early pages I tried to show how in all his work as critic Bowne stuck stubbornly to logic. I did not mean by this any inability on his part to appreciate the non-logical or the extra-logical factors in reasoning. All I meant was that when Bowne found a system calling for acceptance because of its strictness of reasoning he insisted on holding the system to that logical test. The evolutionary systems made a pretentious show of being logical. If they appealed to logic, said Bowne, by logic they should be judged. Their assumptions should be pulled out into the light.

Now, in his own system Bowne moved frankly on assumption, and on the recognition of and use of extra-logical factors. He maintained that he was willing that all these factors should be openly acknowledged, and he strove always to seek them out. There are interests of the total self which, he taught, determine the weight we shall give to reasons of one sort or another. For example, even the narrowly logical activity of the mind is beset by a passion for unity, and unity is an interest. There is at bottom no cogently arguable ground for unity rather than complexity, but we are bound to have unity if we can get it. This thirst for unity has been responsible for many amazing performances in the history of philosophy. Or, take the desire for system. Bowne was fond of quoting Doctor Shedd's remark that a system was its own best argument and defense, and that what a system called for it was entitled to take. The liabilities to abuse in such handling of a system are obvious, but when these possibilities are kept out in the open, and we know what we are about, we are intellectually safe enough. Bowne belonged to a club in Boston composed of the leading liberal Christian ministerial and educational leaders. A forward-looking but reckless member one night undertook to declaim against the character of Jesus, affirming that we have only the gospel record, and that the record lets us see infirmities of temper on the part of Jesus, concluding that he—the club-member—had an uncle who was a much nobler character than Jesus. When it came Bowne's turn to comment he remarked that in dealing with such a theme as the character of Jesus we could not dispose of problems quite so neatly as his friend had suggested, that the gospel evidence is not quite the same as a report in a newspaper, or the remarks of a circle of acquaintances. We are dealing with a vast movement which came out of a history itself vast, and which shows in itself possibilities of inaugurating still further advances. The nature of the system in itself had also to be considered, as on the whole making for good. The total situation, then, warrants our raising a question—and preparing ourselves for a favorable answer—as to the exaltedness of the nature of Jesus, a question with which we should not trouble ourselves in dealing with men as we see them come and go around us. In the light of the total situation, then, Bowne remarked that, considering the nature of the Christian system, he would not think of putting "our friend's uncle" quite on the same moral plane with Jesus. More had come out of the character of Jesus than out of the friend's uncle, or was likely to come out of the lives of any relatives of any members of the club.

Again we have the oft-quoted remark of Bowne that Saint Paul may have had a fit on the road to Damascus, but that it is the only known fit followed by such mighty historical consequences. In an instance like this Bowne would insist that the system out from which the student looks upon the scriptural record would be determinative. The reports of a physician or an alienist, working scientifically upon the slight references in Acts to the physical event, might rule against Paul's experience as having more than a significance for his own set of nerves; but a student of Christianity, who might conceivably accept as physically true the report of the alienist, would come to a conclusion as to significance quite otherwise. An ambitious theologian once attempted to draw a parallelism between the resuscitation of a man apparently dead, out somewhere near Newark, New Jersey, and the report of the resurrection of Jesus, leading Bowne to comment that he did not see that any help toward the solution of the New Testament mystery was likely to result "from anything happening in Jersey."

As was to be expected, the students of professedly close scientific habit of mind resented fiercely this attitude on Bowne's part, but in discussions with them he would force them either to silence or to the admission that in thinking it is only a question of more or less as to assumptions, for all thinkers make assumptions. Bowne, in substance, said: "Here are my assumptions. Let us see yours. Here is my world-view.

Show us yours!" When, then, the scientist said that he had no world-view, Bowne would proceed under his opponent's own eyes to lift all the veils off that opponent's assumptions. Bowne's method here must never be forgotten. It is always important. What a man sees through a telescope, or a microscope, or in a test-tube, or on a statistical chart, will depend on the world out from which the seeing eye looks. James himself once said that the scientist who goes into a laboratory staring about, without any presuppositions or expectations, is the "veriest" duffer. If, Bowne said, we look upon the world with the assumption that the central purpose of the universe is to keep $\frac{1}{2}mp^2$ a constant quantity, we may draw entirely different conclusions from those likely if we lay emphasis more exclusively on high moral values. Moreover, these apparently inexorable scientific conclusions are drawn by the scientist to satisfy a subjective interest.

Bowne knew and said that all this is a dangerous procedure, but what other procedure is possible? It is not, according to Bowne, anywhere nearly so dangerous as to make the assumptions unwittingly and then suppose we have made no assumptions. We are to keep our eyes open as to what we are doing. We must have a scale of values stated in human terms. We must not forget, to quote Bowne again, that, whereas we use geometry and the higher mathematics some of the time, we use ethics all the time.

All this called forth the criticism that if we are to think with world-view values thus before us, we "mix everything up." To which Bowne replied that when we do this with our eyes open we take the one course which will guard us against mixing everything up.

I have stated Bowne's thought so summarily that I may not have done justice to him. I have said that he taught that the seeing eye itself is determinative in what shall be seen. No doubt I ought to qualify this, or at least urge that I do not withdraw what I said about Bowne's vigor in search of facts.

He never bullied the facts, or ignored them, or dismissed them lightly. We have seen enough of the results of propaganda in the last two decades to realize how harmful it would be to allow a pragmatic sanction for the claim that anything sincerely believed in has the effect of being "so." Bowne held, as I have tried to say so often, to the objectivity of truth. Truth is something we do not make, but find by reproducing it in our own thinking. The truth once announced should have to run the gauntlet of all conceivable buffeting tests. Bowne was really adding to the tests of truth. If some statements are merely instrumental, let us know it. If some come out of tempers of mind in which emotion or sentiment predominates, let us know it. If we have a world-view—and we all do—let us see what it is. Let us see how our beliefs meet the tests of the great common-to-all of human knowledge and knowing. Bowne spoke of a "survival of the fittest" among beliefs. Let us test the adequacy of our mental conceptions by their adequacy in meeting human needs through stretches of time. All sorts and degrees of truth are around us and all sorts and degrees of lies. Let us analyze our own processes of thinking in order better to find what is true. Only let us not seek too narrow a basis for truth.

In this direction a skeptical movement has gone on in recent years which the Bowne philosophy distinctly guards itself against. I refer to the development of what is called fictionalism. Fictionalism distinguishes itself from the use of hypothesis, which is the assumption of a position merely provisionally, with the purpose of finding through experiment whether it is true or not. Or we hold an hypothesis as the most likely explanation with the evidence at our disposal. The nebular hypothesis we accept as having enough of warrant for our liking it till we can find something better. Fictionalism, on the other hand, declares that we make assumptions which not only never can be proved, but which can never be true, and that these so determine our thinking that the result must be skepticism. In philosophy, in science, in the courtrooms, which are necessary for the stability of society, we resort to fictions because we cannot help ourselves.

Bowne dealt with all this, in principle, from the beginning of his teaching career to the end. In *Studies in Theism* he discussed the older idea of the atom, which conceived of matter as divisible into bits which could be divided no further. The atom to-day is treated as a fiction by such a philosopher as Vaihynger in the *Philosophy of As If*. Now, Bowne always called the atom a practical fiction, or a fiction used for practical purposes. What it means is that we agree not to think longer in a given direction. We stop dividing matter, because if we do not we are prevented from drawing certain conclusions which are valuable. Or we assume positions which we know cannot be maintained in strict logic, because they make it possible for us to get on to some other positions which can be maintained. Resort to the atom helps us to bring order into many a domain in chemistry and physics, putting in our hands the most useful conceptions. The fictionalist does not, indeed, deny this usefulness, but he does insist that in the end we have not attained to truth by such thinking, that the world is not composed of atoms, and never can be; in other words, that we must think in such a fashion that we are shut off from the truth. Your strict fictionalist will have it that all such notions as God, freedom, self, are fictions. We must use these terms because they are the only ones we have to use. If in dealing with the fiction of the self we put into speech what we must strictly say in truth, speech would become at once impossible.

Bowne met all this, in principle at least, before it appeared in present-day form. He would not have allowed any merely formal contradictions to deprive us of the selves and of the Self as real. He did always characterize the processes by which these were ruled out as verbal. He always discriminated between the true, the provisional, and the fictitious. In the end he defined truth as something much more vital than a set of abstract propositions. The fullest life of the self was truth, and hypothesis and fiction—so called—were instruments to help on toward the largest life. If the fictionalist responds that he is aiming at the same outcome, the reply is obvious that there is a huge difference between Bowne's self, real and central, and the fictional self of the "As If" theory.

Perhaps it may be well to stay a little longer with this point, because of the danger of confusion. Let us take the atom, for illustration. I have referred to Bowne's characterization of the atom as a convenient practical fiction. That does not mean that we must always remain in the dark of skepticism concerning the nature of the physical universe. It means, rather, that in our thinking about physics, let us say, we reach a point beyond which we cannot go without calling in other than purely physical considerations. In the old days thinkers stopped explaining when they got to the back of the tortoise on which the earth rested. Now, Bowne did not think of the earth as on the tortoise-back of the atoms. We can go beyond atoms, but in doing so we have to depend on arguments other than the physical. The unpicturable activity of the Infinite works under all things material, but for practical purposes we stop dividing matter when we reach the atom. The indivisibility of the atom means that we stop our dividing at the frontier of the atom.

Bowne insisted that such reasoning, all out in the open, does not vitiate reasoning as long as we see what we are doing. If we say that the atom is all, that there is nothing beyond it, we do indeed expose ourselves to the objections of fictionalism. We must use the fiction to help us on. After we have got on we can render thanks to the fiction, with no harm done, provided we have not been deceived into thinking the fiction a truth. There are probably, I repeat, few thinkers who have insisted more forcefully than Bowne upon taking facts as facts and meanings as meanings, and theories as theories.

The test of truth is life, if we make the definition of life large enough. I am anxious so to guard all I have been saying as not to give the impression that Bowne left things at loose ends, much as loose ends pleased the pragmatists of the James type. Let us judge the pragmatist by a simple test—his treatment of the "problem of the neighbor." If we were to take pragmatism in complete literalism and ask how we know that our neighbors exist, and try to use our standard that usefulness is the test of reality, we might start some serious questions. Bowne taught that we naturally and spontaneously infer the existence of selves like ourselves from the fact that we see effects which seem to come from activities like our own. At first we find selves in everything—rivers and trees and stocks and stones. As far as we can, we adjust ourselves to the selves around us, using all the instruments we can. When we understand and sympathize with and work with other selves we feel our own selves enlarged. Of course there are selves with whom we cannot get into sympathetic communion. We may think of all such as evil. It would be fine, Bowne once said, if at the end we could discover that these evil selves never had existed, except as artificial phenomena for the development of good selves, but all the pragmatists in an eternity could never bring us to such a conclusion. There are some selves apparently out of relations to and opposed to everything that can be fitted into our notions of rationality, of beauty, of moral worth. We meet them on the plane of the lowest common denominator of a common humanity, but we do not profess to understand them. We cannot fit them into any scheme of common-to-all on which we reach other selves. Still, we have to be on our guard lest we think that because a man's life seems peculiar it is not true. The peculiar man, out of harmony with his fellows, may share deeply some thought of the Infinite Self to which others have not attained.

It was in this personal communion, communion with other selves, communion with the Infinite, that Bowne saw the highest truth, as he saw the highest beauty and the highest righteousness. An abstraction might be useful for a particular purpose, but Bergson himself does not believe more thoroughly than did Bowne in concrete and living experience as the heart of truth. Abstract conceptions, provisional statements, fictional concepts, theoretic systems, all have their value in the degree to which they help on to living insight. The living selves are the realities and all else is instrumental. The Infinite Self may be expressing some truth and beauty for itself alone, other truths as a common-to-all, other truths for individual selves alone. Other selves still may, through the exercise of self-will, land in error, constituting an insoluble problem for themselves and all others. Still, this total view of selves and their relations makes, according to Bowne, for the fullest and finest living, and such life is the end-in-itself, and all else is instrumental.

If we take the bearing of this conception on a central problem like theism, we have to admit, as Bowne did, that the theistic conviction rises and falls in the individual and the group as the tide of the total personal interests rises and falls. Bowne used to quote Lowell to the effect that some people have the idea of God "fattened out of them." In others the higher interests simply evaporate. In still others the shock of affliction may deaden faith, or may, on the contrary, open the eyes to new aspects of reality. Bowne said that intellectually he never doubted, but those close to him know how deeply the blows of various afflictions hurt him. When the word came that an old classmate—roommate, in fact—had lost his life in a hotel fire he exclaimed: "There is so much of this!" He quoted at times jestingly the line of Stevenson about the apology due from God "to a gentleman like me," and then added that, while God would do no apologizing, he would doubtless one day do a deal of explaining. Once after the death of a favorite student he remarked: "Call me no more Naomi, but Mara, for the Lord hath dealt bitterly with me." Once when a companion had expressed the hope that a course of events might turn toward one quarter rather than another Bowne asked if he did not think it was already fixed that it should go whichever way it was to go, the total circumstances suggesting a hard-boiled fatalist, or Calvinist, for Bowne always made a distinction between fatalism and Calvinism.

The late Lorenzo Dow McCabe, for a half-a-century professor of philosophy at Ohio Wesleyan University, was a determined fighter for human freedom, and in his battling reached the point where he avowed that if human choices were to be free, God could not foreknow those choices. One evening Bowne stopped off at Delaware, Ohio, to spend the night with McCabe. The two remained up nearly all night talking about the divine foreknowledge. When Bowne was leaving next morning McCabe called after him, "Do you think God could have made a world like this if he had known how it was coming out?" To which Bowne replied, "Do you think he could have made a world like this if he had not known how it was coming out?" Which indicates how, after depressing facing of tragedies personal and cosmic, Bowne's confidence in a just outcome rose to the surface. Much of what he said, and of what I have said in reporting him, could imply that he felt that the free selves might be allowed to play too vast havoc in the universe. But he did not mean that. He was never grimmer than when he was urging that there is a Plan in the universe with which men are given the privilege of co-operating. They can lift up their wills to that Plan and say "Amen" in joyful co-operation, and go along with it to increasing life. "Or," he added, "they can say 'No' to it and be dragged along, themselves losing their selfhood, while those who say 'Yes' rise to fuller and finer life." The universe is founded in moral principle, and moral principle is to have its way in the end. The doctrine of personalism has no place for mere cosmic amiability.

I may remark that for the last ten years of his life Doctor Bowne read everything that appeared from the pen of Father George Tyrrell, believing that even in the close and cramping limits of Roman Catholicism Tyrrell had found a way to utilize the methods of a spiritual pragmatism. Bowne did not live to witness the tragic outcome of Tyrrell's religious explorations. The work of another Roman Catholic—Newman's *Grammar of Assent*—Bowne regarded as akin to his own theological method.

# CHAPTER X

# THE ACHIEVEMENTS IN ETHICAL THEORY

WE have at last reached the stage from which we can survey the achievement of Bowne in ethical theory, where he made some of his most distinctive contributions. All his treatment of ethics turned around the primacy of the human values. Having found his way through to the conceptions of persons as ends-in-themselves, all else became to Bowne instrumental. Though he did not give the title "Personalism" to his system until after he had laid down the essentials of his ethical theory, that theory is nevertheless personalistic throughout. It can best be studied in the *Principles of Ethics,* but an article in the *Methodist Review* in September, 1909, on "Morals and Life," an article in *The Methodist Quarterly Review* of the Church South on "Religion and Secularism," in 1899, and a lecture before Harvard University on the "Moralization of Life and the Vitalization of Morals" do much to set the ethical conceptions forth as applicable to many fields.

The essential contention is that human life in the normal development of its possibilities is the chief concern in ethics. The question as to the primary good in morals is dealt with at the outset. It is not any abstraction called The Good to be reached by logical theorizing. It is not Virtue on its own account. It is the life of persons in the normal relations of daily contacts. It is not an impersonal moral law to be obeyed at all hazards and costs, regardless of the consequences for human living. Bowne seems to take delight in showing how most abstract ethical philosophizing works itself out into sterility and barrenness, so far as any human significance goes.

Bowne always thought of himself as a reconciling agent in the theory of ethics. I have already said that in the college days at New York University he conceived and wrote out in a "commonplace" book the essentials of ethical theory as he always afterward expounded them. Starting from the aim of ethics as making the most of persons, he saw a way first of all to reconcile the intuitionalist and utilitarian schools. The difficulty with the intuitionalist school has always been that its expounders have sought to settle everything by direct moral insight. This has ended in erecting formal moral dictates into an impersonal system on their own account, without much regard to results conceived in human terms. On the other hand the utilitarians have seemed to be complacently content to give themselves to a calculating of results which has too often left inner consequences out of the reckoning.

With the intuitionalists Bowne held that the law of Good Will is absolute as a disposition. If two persons meet anywhere in the universe, they owe one another good will. To have to argue this position with a person would be a bad sign as to that person's moral state. The trouble begins when we assume that good will can tell us what to do in a concrete situation. We owe all men good will, but what good will calls for is to be determined only by the most earnest calculation of consequences. These two aspects he held tightly together—of the absoluteness of the law of good will as disposition, the relativity of concrete problems which can be solved only in the concrete.

The essential always to be held fast is the living interest of living persons. Persons know some things by direct moral insight, such as the obligation to good will. As soon as Bowne began to talk about the necessity of calculation of consequences, those who had not mastered his emphasis on the human values charged him with having lowered the moral ideal. He never used the term "calculation" in any but the highest significance. It was because consequences mean so much for human life that he was so concerned about them. It must be admitted—perhaps I should say that it should be gloried in—that Bowne was terribly sarcastic with all who sought to solve actual moral problems by a flourish about the Golden Rule, or by a profession of good intentions. To mention one problem which we shall have to consider again in another connection, Bowne insisted that it was a first duty so to deal with material things as to get a larger productive response from those materials. On the foundation of the natural, moral beings are to rise to the spiritual. That was not first which was spiritual, but that which was natural and afterward that which was spiritual, was a passage he was never weary of quoting; but he felt almost as a personal burden the lack of enough of the natural, or the material, on the part of the mass of mankind to supply the conditions of the genuinely spiritual. Hence his never-failing stress on the need of efficiency in one's daily task as a moral obligation. Socialism, for example, had not been taken seriously in his day in America, but he had studied socialism nevertheless. Unlike some others, he saw and gave credit to the unselfish and Christian aim of much socialistic thinking, but he feared it as tending to slacken material productivity. He did not see how it would do much good to begin dividing wealth on a socialistic plan which might yield less to divide. That fear of cutting down humanity's available supply of things with which to work was constantly before him. There must be enough of the material to make the spiritual possible.

Socialism, however, was not in his day an important factor in any schools in our country. His thought about the need of increased productivity had to do more with the individual's obligation to take seriously the task of his daily money-earning. He had a positive horror of the poverty which stunts human growth and development. To be sure, no one could have inveighed more wrathfully against what he called the animal *menu* in rich circles than did he, but he feared the excesses of the worthless rich less than the poverty of the poor. Hence his interest in all forms of technical and expert education as a social duty. There was in the Methodist Episcopal Church an educator connected with a denominational college who put in much of his time at the seat of a Legislature trying to cut down the appropriations to State universities, so that denominational schools might have less rivalry. That man's activities came in for their share of the Bowne denunciation. Much as Bowne valued the distinctively Christian outlook of the denominational college, he would not stand for the slightest obstacle to the releasing of power through scientific command of material resources imparted at State universities.

Bowne's idea of the moral life insisted on this element of fullness, at least of opportunity. He never allowed the will-to-do-right to slip from the center of his ethical system, but with that central disposition established, there must be goods with which to show forth the good disposition. He used to say that the child, the savage, the poverty-stricken beggar could all alike manifest that devotion to the moral will which made them citizens of the moral kingdom, but he did not believe that kingdom could adequately reveal itself through children, savages, or beggars. When he asked, "Could we think of a moral kingdom composed chiefly of Lazaruses," he did not mean to belittle the good will of Lazarus; but anyone will smile to imagine Bowne's feelings in a community of Lazaruses, no matter how well intentioned they might be.

I mention this rigorous emphasis, which at times seemed harsh and uncharitable to those preachers of ethics who laid their chief strokes of accent on good intentions, with the reminder that there was a most charitable side to the Bowne ethics, as will soon enough appear.

Bowne took moral duty seriously. He saw no easy path to solutions. The road must be found by survey and exploration with the sternest kind of stern thinking. With the warm heart must go the cool head and the stiff will. For the man of good will to assume that his intentions alone would settle anything was maddening to Bowne. Yet he always kept his own balance. He would not tolerate anything that would in the least minimize the significance of the good will. Some questions he would not admit as open to debate, such as that of loyalty to good will itself—to truthfulness and justice and to all the virtues which make up good will. Only, he would not admit that the good will itself tells us in detail what to do to show good will. The right spirit may call for one course with one man and for another course with another, or for different courses with the same man at different dates. Admitting that the elimination of selfishness is most potent in sharpening the discernment as to what good will calls for, he nevertheless declared that the sharpened eyes must themselves do the seeing, and must have the privilege and responsibilities of the seeing.

I referred a moment ago to the inherent charitableness of the Bowne system. This was due to his recognition that, to quote Amiel, the self is born into the world a candidate for humanity. Our lives begin on the natural plane with the possibility of being lifted to the spiritual plane—so that in most human beings we find half-way stages and deepseated imperfections. This necessary mark of the human states, Bowne looked upon as a call for patience and charity. He had only resentment for those who saw in this in-between stage —that is, between the natural and the spiritual—an occasion for cynicism. Even in those farthest down the ladder of moral development he saw an essential humanity entitled to respect. He beheld in the best of men stretches of wild land yet to be redeemed, but the proof that the work of redemption was not complete did not warrant the charge of hypocrisy.

The second element in the charitableness of his view lay in the consideration already adduced, namely, that the solution of a moral question consists so largely in thinking through a problem that those thus actually doing the thinking ought not to be hectored by the outcries of those outside of the thinking process. Bowne once used as an illustration a physician at a patient's bedside annoyed by the bawlings of ignorant outsiders calling on him to cure the sick man. The cure of the sick man would be the aim of the physician even more truly than that of the irresponsible authors of the outcries. So, said Bowne, in the moral field an essential task is the application of expert skill to a tangled intellectual problem. The expert should not be harassed, certainly should not be denounced, by light-headed pleaders for the Golden Rule who have not the slightest awareness of the practical difficulties involved.

In the discussion of this phase of Bowne's work it is difficult to see a trail through the movement from good will to intellectual hardheadedness, and back and forth, unless we take as a guide the central importance of the human values. In his pages on social problems there is much that seems little pertinent to us now, but let us remember that when Bowne died in 1910 the social questions as we now meet them had arisen only for very few. Bowne had already seized essential principles for handling the questions, but in his own utterances he said much that may read strangely to-day. We seldom, however, or never, find him astray in his guiding principle, that principle being the right-of-way of the human interests. When Ida Tarbell was publishing her *History of the Standard Oil Company* in serial form, Bowne bitterly denounced the company for its policies as the investigator reported them, though his utterances were for a circle of friends, and not for the public. When, after Miss Tarbell's exposures, Dr. Washington Gladden led the famous protest against the acceptance of tainted money by a missionary society, Bowne was even more strenuous against Gladden. Now, here is a course which contradicts itself, yet in each case Bowne was looking at the human results. He pronounced the conduct of the Standard Oil Company socially bad, and yet the refusal to accept oil-money for a work of human relief seemed to him an absurd method of protest. He maintained that the social consequences of the policies of huge financial concerns should be examined and dealt with by public opinion. He took

Gladden's protest as a manifestation of good intentions, but of intentions only, and never gave Gladden and his followers their due in arousing that public opinion which, according to Bowne himself, would in the end have to settle all such matters. Let us remember too that Bowne considered social problems very much in individual terms. For the wrongdoings of the Standard Oil Company he was likely to hold individuals responsible, as individuals, not the company as an institution. His own principle here was sounder than his application of it, namely, that the social consequence had not yet become evident enough to lead to a decisive moral judgment by the people. Practically, Bowne's thought suffered from an excess of individualism, but even so, let us not forget that all this was in the days when popular thought was just beginning to concern itself with such social issues. In those days, unless some outstanding violation of rights was committed, Bowne was likely to take the side of the industrial leaders. He went so far as to say that he doubted if anything of importance against the public welfare had been done, except in individual personal instances. Here, again, we see the emphasis on the importance of the producer and of giving producers a free hand. At all costs material productivity must not be slowed down. Almost anything was to be put up with rather than to have the stock of world's goods diminished. Even if there is a faulty distribution of those goods, better that than to have less to divide. He could tolerate the arrogance of a few rich men better than the increase of the poverty of the many poor. The one aim that remains sharply defined is always the welfare of the many.

After Theodore Roosevelt began to try, in the name of the public good, to curb the power of industrial giants Bowne gave him hearty support. He spoke of Roosevelt as having practically identified himself with the people, and felt that he was so carrying through his campaigns as to make for the total welfare—the goal which Bowne always held uppermost.

After we have looked at an attitude toward the possessors of power which may seem to us to-day to be too lenient, let us note that in some specific social reforms Bowne from the start took an uncompromising position, regardless of what anyone might think. His *Ethics* was published in 1892. In that book he not only came out openly for woman suffrage, but he poured the vials of his wrath upon the opponents of suffrage. It is clear, as we read Bowne's pages, that he did not think of the anti-suffrage arguments as having any sense whatever. He called the reasons for withholding the vote from women "droll whimseys," and said that the argument that women should be denied the ballot because women were intended to be the mothers of the race should be extended to men also, because they were intended to be the fathers of the race. It is significant that he was noticeably patient before the tactics of the extreme suffragists in England, evidently feeling that anything that would arouse English public opinion was worth while. One cannot help contrasting this attitude with his scorn for the Gladden group over "tainted money." I quote a passage from "Woman and Democracy," in the *North American Review,* 1910.[1] He is telling what women might say about proposed man-suffrage if women, instead of men, had secured the vote first.

> Let us, then, list to some fine old dowager, less acerb and more philosophic as she argues the matter:
>
> My sisters, let us not be too hard on the men. Of course, they are not women and cannot be, but we must beware of arousing sex antagonism. Let us, rather, inquire if there be not plain indication in the nature of things of what man's sphere is. And if we look about, we see at once that this sphere is very definitely marked out. Men are manifestly intended to be the breadwinners of the race. And the sphere thus indicated is certainly great enough to consume all masculine energy and satisfy all masculine ambition. Let us, then, be careful of adding to the labors of men the additional burden of thinking on political problems.
>
> And when we rise to the higher thought of fatherhood, what a sacredness this bestows on man, and certainly he can ask for nothing

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> higher. He should, therefore, prepare himself for all his duties in this august relation, and not trouble himself about these other relatively unimportant matters of managing the political world. And I cannot but deplore that our educators have not paid more attention to the fact. They seem never to have considered that a man is to be the father of a family and should have special training for his duties as such. Some of the heavier work in housecleaning would very properly fall to his lot. A course in scrubbing and tending the furnace and many similar things would be of far higher utility than much of the vaunted education.
>
> Of course this does not mean that men are without intelligence. Some of them are very bright and might properly be trusted with the suffrage. And, furthermore, it is not from any enmity or hostility on our part that we are opposed to men voting; it is, rather, from our love for them and our unwillingness unduly to burden them that we protest against their enfranchisement. And they are safe in that love. We will guard their interests. If they wish anything, let them apply to us and we will see to it that the right is done, but let them abide in that sphere in which it has pleased Providence to call them.

Once more, however, we must not forget that Bowne's general charitableness toward financial and industrial leaders did not blind his eyes to the nonsense which they, like other people, attempt to pass off at times as reasoning. In the presidential campaign of 1896 Bowne, of course, was for McKinley. I say "of course" because it is beyond the power of imagination to picture Bowne as favoring Bryan. The "cross-of-gold" speech he considered a joke. Still, there is the other side. He regarded the speeches of the late Edward Atkinson, of Boston —that high-priest of the gold standard whose utterances New England took as sacred writ—just as huge jokes as anything that Bryan said. For example, there was the "hammer argument" used by Atkinson. Beat a silver coin with a hammer till the image and superscription are gone and the coin loses half its value. Beat a gold coin with a hammer till all trace of government stamp is gone and the coin is worth substantially as much as ever. The argument overlooks the limited demand for silver in the one case and the unlimited demand in the other, the unlimited demand being for the purpose of government coinage. The claim of an "inherent" value apart from the demand for coinage is here vastly overworked. Bowne instanced the "hammer argument" as showing how presumably intelligent persons would be misled by a show of reasoning with no substance whatever.

One broad general remark to be passed on Bowne's application of ethical principles to social questions is that he did not make much of the importance of group action. He spoke most often of the fallacy of the abstract and the fallacy of the universal, or class term, as the cause of havoc in the discussion of social questions. I do not mean to say that Bowne did not know of the dangers of his overprotest against abstraction, for he frequently sought by direct warning to guard against it. His own concern, however, was so entirely for the living persons whom he thought of as the only realities, that at times he seemed to overlook the significance of institutions. The only realities in institutions, he said, are the persons composing them. He once went so far as to say, in speaking of the theater, that there is no such thing as the theater as an institution. There are men and women engaged in theatrical activities. Take away the men and the women and nothing is left. This was unintentionally an overstatement to keep the responsibilities on the persons. Take away the men and women from the theater and there is a good deal left, among other things a body of traditions and customs, a way of looking at life, practically a standard of ethics characteristic of the theatrical profession. Moreover, Bowne himself taught that even material elements, when taken together, act differently from the way in which they act when taken singly. In one sense the only realities of an actual order are persons, but persons act differently in differing forms of institutional relationship. In one group a man acts better than he would were he alone; in another he acts worse; in another he develops or reveals power whose presence in himself he had not suspected. Now, Bowne knew all this, but in his anxiety for the central importance of the self he allowed it to drop out of his focus. He declared that the only way to improve institutions is to improve the men who compose the institutions. For the idea that there may be socially a vicious "system" which men cannot escape until they act together socially he did not leave much scope, although he was well enough aware of the truth and recognized it at least by implication. In a word of warning at this very point he used to say to his classes that if we are not circumspect in our reference to individuals, we can empty the significance even from national traits. For example, he said we might unwisely conclude there is no France, except geographically, but only Jeans and Maries. He bade his pupils remember that the search for the concretely real, carried thus far, would lose sight of immensely valuable national peculiarities in human beings.

The main masses of human beings in their daily labors were the essential objects of the Bowne system of ethics. He had his deepest respect for the ordinary men of good will, doing their best to think their way through the tangled perplexities which come every day. He had no use for ethical puzzles, such as the moral duty in dealing with burglars, or the question as to whether a lie is ever justifiable. All fictitious and artificial ethical enigmas filled him with loathing and disgust. He believed in the sound moral instincts of plain people, instincts which ought to be brought out into the light of full recognition, and yet he was severe with all people who were content with unideal conditions and who adjusted themselves to such conditions with complacency. Here, again, we find ourselves facing an aspect of Bowne which seems cynical, though there was not a drop of cynicism in his veins. He could not find a place in his scheme for the life which can be comfortable in degrading conditions. He quoted, with understanding if not with approval, the remark of Doctor Johnson to Boswell about the street-sweep.

"Sir," said Boswell, "you talk as if you would jostle a street-sweep."

"I would," said Doctor Johnson, "and I'd jostle him hard."

For deliberate criminals Bowne had no patience whatever. He divided moral offenses into two groups—offenses of the flesh or sense—which in his thought were easily pardonable—and offenses of soul like betrayals of individual or social trust. For this latter breach he had little or no charity. One of his friends once went to considerable pains to help a self-confessed thief to a new start, but got no sympathy from Bowne. "A man who will steal like that," said he, "is a thief at heart." Under the circumstances the words seemed harsh, but Bowne avowed he had no patience with the social redemption which has "all bowels for the criminal and none for the honest man." Here, again, we see that unresting desire for the welfare of mankind to be worked out through the daily task of the "honest man." Such daily labor Bowne declared to have as much moral significance as even the organized church. At some of these points Bowne seems quite academic. He knew, for example, almost nothing about the actual temptations which lead to criminality under an industrial and social system like ours. His own early experiences at work after he left home had been strenuous, but not impersonal. All through his working days he had been treated fairly and kindly. The temper produced in workers by modern impersonal conditions he did not know at first hand. Along toward the close of his life he became interested in the social effects of improved transportation systems, but his interest was one-sided, having to do with the social benefits of improved methods of intercommunication among communities. The possibilities of social damage and disaster when a single railroad magnate could wreck a city by a change of freight rates did not seem to arrest his attention. He was likely to dismiss a question about such a possibility with the crisp judgment that inexpert outsiders were not in a position to express an opinion—an altogether summary closing of the case.

This one interest in the large human values is the clue to a central purpose which was consistent in spite of appearances to the contrary. In speaking of the anti-slavery orators he would praise and condemn almost in the same breath. At one instant he was out of patience with William Lloyd Garrison for an utterance which seemed to him but little short of lunacy, and at the next in absorbed admiration for the passion for human rights which the abolitionists showed. Yet, in the interest of truth, it must be recorded that in what they actually said they all tried his soul. Dr. Leonard Woolsey Bacon, of Yale, once published a series of essays called *Irenics and Polemics,* though the relation between the first half of the title and the content of the book is not obvious. The book was out of print years ago, but Bowne had a copy, and from it used to regale an occasional visitor with selections from the essay on "The Abolitionists." Bacon held that after the overthrow of slavery a tendency toward the canonization of the abolitionists set in which was in danger of obliterating all memory of what they actually were. It seems that in his fighting days Garrison was furiously anti-whisky, but that on a trip to England he had reveled in the hospitality of an anti-slavery whisky-distiller, who put his product before the world with the seductive title "Buxton's Entire." Garrison's inconsistency gave Bacon his chance, which he improved with a caustic satire worthy of Jonathan Swift. The inconsistency was that of a mighty prophet who now and again let his zeal carry him forward without looking beyond his nose; but Bowne had no sooner showed his relish for Bacon's inimitable essay than he would manifest a deep appreciation of the unfailing devotion of the abolitionists—with all their wildness and contradictions—for the cause of humanity. In almost the same sentence Bowne would quote with mirth the Concord judge who, when he was not able to attend the funeral of Wendell Phillips, said that he nevertheless approved of it, and would marvel at an oratory so forceful that the only way Phillips' enemies could answer was to hurl cobblestones at the orator. So with Theodore Parker, for many of whose deliverances Bowne had not the slightest tolerance. Nevertheless, Bowne repeatedly expressed his admiration for Parker's courage, and his approval, under the circumstances, of the most radical utterance that ever fell from Parker's lips, namely, his remark that if Massachusetts was to help slave-chasers hunt down runaway slaves, he for one would make the change of a word which would transform into a curse the time-honored court-cry—God Save the Commonwealth of Massachusetts!

Enough has been said, I think, to establish Bowne's essential position in ethical theory. All ethical precepts are conditioned by the view of life and its meaning which the ethical teachers hold. Personalism gives the key to the Bowne system. Persons are the ends in themselves, all else being instrumental. The feeling of the person of an obligation of good will toward other persons is absolutely binding as a disposition. Then there must be the use of all the light available, to find what the good will calls for. Moral development takes the paths of deepening the appreciation of the worth of persons, of bringing more and more persons within actual reach of the workings of the good will of the moral agent, of enlarging the reach of moral values throughout the universe. It will be seen that Bowne brought his view of the Infinite Person into ethics, as supplying the dynamic of the moral life. Personalism throughout is the best description of the Bowne ethics. There are no abstract categories, no hard-and-fast codes, but living persons on the ascent toward the fullest and the finest moral experience.

To qualify and supplement this chapter I quote from an article on "Secularism and Christianity," published in *The Methodist Quarterly Review* of the Church South for April, 1899.

> And this I conceive to be the deepest thought of Christianity. The forgiveness of sins is essential, but it is only introductory. The forms of worship and practices of piety are important, but they are

only instrumental. They are not the thing; and their significance consists entirely in what they help us to. The thing, the central thing, is the recognition of the divine will in all life, and the loyal, loving effort to make that will prevail in all life; first of all in the hidden life of the Spirit, and then in family life, in social life, in political life, in trade, in art, in literature, in every field of human interest and activity. Religion must be brought out of its abstraction by being brought into relation to every aspect of life. Its concern must be not to make men abstractly good or pious, but to make them concretely good in the complex relations and duties of actual life. The religious spirit must have all fields for its own; at the same time we must remember that all that is normal to man has its place and justification in the divine purpose.

From this point of view we can better estimate the narrowness of the religious spirit. From its separation of the secular from the religious, it has tended to destroy all sense of dignity and holiness in common life, which, nevertheless, is the ordinance of God. For the same reason, it has withdrawn hosts of men and women from the real duties of life as it is in the divine order by engaging them in the artificial duties of a mistaken and fictitious piety. By fixing men's thoughts on salvation, mainly conceived as an escape from hell, it has often reduced religion itself to one of the most abject forms of selfishness, in which one misses all generous and loyal devotion to the kingdom of God. The mechanical and immoral conceptions have intimidated the intellectually defenseless masses of men, and have reduced religious thought itself at times to a grotesque mixture of physical horrors and moral hocus-pocus. The only final and perfect remedy for such things is a clear insight into the divineness of the life that now is, and into the further fact that the Christianity of Christ does not aim at an abstract salvation of the individual, but at the concrete salvation of the individual and of all that belongs to him. As Freemantle has it, the whole world is the subject of redemption. And even salvation is not the deepest thought of Christianity; life, large, full and abundant, is deeper still.

From our point of view we further see that the church is not the only institution of humanity. It is but one, and by no means the most important. The family, the state, the school, the great ordinance of labor, are also necessary. All of these institutions are of God's appointment, and through them all God is working out his will concerning men. Each of these has a function which the church cannot perform;

and in comparison with any of these the church, as the organization which concerns itself with religious worship, rites, and ordinances, is relatively insignificant. None of these institutions is perfect until it is possessed and pervaded by the Christian spirit; but that spirit, in turn, misses its own proper aim until it sees that the field is the world. This visible life is indeed a poor thing when cut off from the visible. This is the condemnation of secularism. But, on the other hand, equally one-sided and no less pernicious is the religious view which would ignore or depreciate the great normal interests of the life that now is in the supposed interests of a life that is to come. So long as we have a Christianity that does this, so long we shall need secularism to save both the world and the church.

## CHAPTER XI

## THE DEFENDER OF BIBLICAL RESEARCH

THE years through which Bowne did the thinking recorded in the preceding chapters reached, speaking loosely, to about 1900, with the exceptions of the study of ethical questions. From 1900 to 1910 was devoted to practical rather than speculative activity. The first thirty years of Bowne's life were so completely absorbed in what he called "long brooding in silence" on the backlying metaphysical questions that he had had little opportunity to indulge himself in many tasks in which he naturally felt interest. As a single instance, he was profoundly interested in the popular presentation of essential Christian principles from the pulpit, but during his studious life he had almost no chance to watch Trinity Church under Phillips Brooks. By the time Bowne had finished with Spencer and Tyndall and all that ilk Brooks had passed away. As Bowne read, with thorough satisfaction, Allen's biography of Brooks he expressed regret that his time had been so taken up with the battles on the frontiers of religion that he had not had opportunity to enjoy the work of those who, like Brooks, were nobly expounding the truth to believers.

About 1895 the controversy over the so-called higher criticism of the Old Testament broke on the Methodist Episcopal Church through attacks on Professor Hinckley G. Mitchell, of the department of Old Testament in Boston University School of Theology, though the attacks did not become serious till about 1900. Mitchell was a scholar of unquestioned proficiency. A graduate of Wesleyan University, he had gone to Germany in the days when brilliant Old Testament students were breaking the paths in the veritable discovery of facts as to dates and authorship and composition of the Old Testament documents. Historical research in the long course of its career has seen no more remarkable triumphs than those which redated the books of the Old Testament by the discernment of the true relation of the prophets to the law. Mitchell got his training in Old Testament from the men who were leading in the revolutionary studies. A singularly open and honest mind, with a simplicity of spirit amounting to naïveté, he came to Boston in 1882 and taught the truth exactly as he saw it for fifteen years, without much opposition. Men like Dr. Charles E. Jefferson, of New York, and Dr. Charles R. Brown, of Yale, have repeatedly borne witness to Mitchell's helpfulness in their student days in introducing them without strain or jar to the view of the Old Testament which has since met general acceptance. I have said that Mitchell was a singularly unsuspicious and honest mind. He used to tell that once a progressive Methodist bishop asked him to prepare an outline of Old Testament history for incorporation into the "Conference Course"—in those days prepared by the bishops for study by the young men coming into the Methodist ministry. Mitchell complied with the request, and sent on an outline, including among other items the documentary hypothesis of the Pentateuch. The outline came back with the comment—this was back in the late eighties—that the bishops did not feel that it was quite what they wanted; and Mitchell never saw the humor of the incident.

Boston University School of Theology had a provision in its charter to the effect that the appointment of professors must be renewed every five years, and that for such renewal at least two bishops must give formal sanction. The bishops themselves would not give sanction except by majority vote. The first uproar over Mitchell took place in 1895. There was a second battle in 1900, in which Bowne played a leading part. The final battle in 1905 occurred while Bowne was in the Orient, and after an all-around scuffle in which neither trustees nor bishops were particularly to blame, and yet in which neither trustees nor bishops acquitted themselves with any positive credit, Mitchell was removed. With the 1905 struggle Bowne had nothing to do, but the outcome of the struggle aroused his animosity to ecclesiastical organization.

The attack on Mitchell in 1895 Bowne viewed rather scornfully. It was the expression of a group of high-minded students, many of whom came to posts of importance in after years, was phrased respectfully, and left the decision of the question with the proper authorities. After those authorities had decided that Mitchell had not passed beyond the limits of legitimate freedom, the students accepted the result, went on with their classes—and some of them became devoted partisans of Mitchell. Bowne's contribution consisted in peppery comments on the opportunities which earnest and conscientious youths, in the period of rigor and vigor, are likely to improve in making fools of themselves.

The attack in 1900 was marked by bitterness and rancor, though Mitchell himself maintained an unruffled serenity throughout. It early appeared evident to Bowne, however, that unless some defender came to Mitchell's side the bishops would fail to give the necessary approval for his continuance in his professorship. The Boston trustees and the friends of Mitchell were not taking the situation seriously enough. Protests against Mitchell were coming in to the bishops, two or three of whom were rabidly anti-Mitchell, and the case seemed likely to go against him by default. Suddenly Bowne awoke to a realization that the "ship was already in the breakers." It was his bold support of Mitchell that was decisive in preventing wreck. Not that the bishops were especially influenced by Bowne himself, but Bowne influenced those who in turn did have standing with the bishops. He did much to show that Mitchell was himself essentially orthodox, and the teachings of the Boston Old Testament department were such as any Methodist might legitimately hold. The views dealt with the method of divine revelation and did not necessarily affect the validity of the biblical message itself. In June of 1905 Bowne wrote to Professor Knudson: "Mitchell is perfectly orthodox, and I do not think that at present, whatever may have been the case ten years ago, any complaint is to be made of his methods of teaching. It would be too ridiculous to have dropped him for holding views which are held by a large number of the bishops themselves, and which in the scholarly world are about as well established as geology and the Copernican astronomy."

The recrudescence of an antiquated doctrine of biblical revelation to-day makes it appropriate, it seems to me, to speak somewhat at length on the position from which Bowne approached the discussion of the Mitchell question. We may find in his view some conceptions not widely held to-day, but we shall see also some guiding principles never out of date.

In his youth Bowne seems to have held in the main the theory of the Scriptures which passed current at the time. His own field was that of metaphysics, and he did not feel called on to pay any especial attention to biblical themes. In any event he would have stood against the so-called Tübingen school, a school which has been proved to have rendered indispensable service by suggesting a sound method in biblical study in bringing out the significance of "tendencies," while its own particular findings have long since been abandoned. Tübingen rendered a better service to essential orthodoxy than it may have intended.

In his discussion of evolution, however, Bowne lighted almost at the outset on the idea that if we once get hold of the truth as to the Cause back of evolution, the method of the evolution itself is harmless. If we can believe in the Supreme Person in the revealing movement, we may then well leave it to that Person to make the revelation in his own way, inductively discovering for ourselves what that method is. Bowne was not any more willing to deduce the divine method in revelation than anywhere else. He said repeatedly that, in general, a plan running through long ages is just as marvelous as one which seems to be realized suddenly. Out of this came his doctrine of the supernatural natural and the natural supernatural. That is to say, all that seems to us natural roots in the supernatural as its Cause; nature cannot run itself, but is dependent upon the continuous activity of the immanent Cause. On the other hand, we should expect the Cause to work through natural methods, which are the orderly expression of the purpose of the Cause. It is obvious that from this basis Bowne would not have been disturbed if every element of the miraculous had been ruled out from the record of the revelation.

In truth, however, Bowne did not conceive of the problem as quite as simple as this. I will not say that he provided for miracle in his system, but he allowed for it, in case there should be reason for it. That is to say, he looked on all events as proceeding from the will of the Infinite Person, a Person acting according to reason and reasons. If departure from the usual method seemed wise to that Person, there would be departure. The usual method would for the instant be left aside for one not so usual. That would be all. There is no such sacredness in one method that another cannot be employed if occasion demands. Bowne himself "felt inclined," as he said, to a view of the God-life which he described as "pantheism applied to God"—personal distinctions without such separateness of individuality as we see in finite wills. He accepted for himself, though he never urged it on anyone else, the Christological doctrine which was once debated as Kenosis, though his view was not conceived in any of the usual formulations. He was impressed by Coleridge's term "depotentiation," and declared, in private conversation, that the "depotentiation" of the Son of God, living under human terms, could go to any length that did not impair moral worth. Holding such a notion of the possibilities, Bowne was prepared to believe that in making a revelation to men for their spiritual and moral uplift toward himself, the God of All might depart from the usual methods upon whatever occasions might seem appropriate to his infinite wisdom.

Now, this must not be understood as part of Bowne's formal teaching. He held to all this for his own intellectual and religious satisfaction, and was most careful not to make it seem a doctrine to be held dogmatically. His close friend, Professor Henry C. Sheldon, of Boston University, was as firmly devoted to Christian essentials as he, but there is no trace of Kenoticism in Sheldon's theology. On all such points Bowne would not tolerate dogmatism, which leads me to say that what he objected to in the discussion of miracle was the dictum that we must say that miracle must be or must not be. It may be, if the Infinite Wisdom finds adequate reason.

In determining whether there has or has not been miracle, we are not dealing, according to Bowne, with objective evidence in the court-room manner. Miracle has to be considered with reference to one's conception of life and the world. No matter how exalted our estimate of the human values, we must not avow a belief in miracles in spite of adverse evidence, as we must not rule out evidence that does not happen to fall in with an impersonalistic and naturalistic interpretation of the universe.

For the attitude of Bowne toward a miracle which is often under discussion to-day, and more or less under discussion at all times, I refer the reader to pages 385-86 of *Studies in Christianity,* published by Houghton Mifflin Company, where the virgin birth is dealt with. There Bowne *says that so far as he knows,* he believes the doctrine. The italics are mine, but the author in a half-dozen words suggested the question as to how far anyone knows what belief in the virgin birth means. Does it mean verbal assent to historic evidence? Do we know ourselves intimately enough to know whether such assent is fundamentally genuine or not? Bowne goes on to say:

> I certainly do not deny it. . . . At the same time I should strongly protest against making it an article of the standing or falling of the faith of the church. . . . [It] can never be put to any decisive test. . . . [It] will be held because of its beauty and æsthetic fitness as

> inaugurating a new era in the great order of divine revelation . . . But in any case the doctrine is nothing which affects our fundamental Christian ideas at all. Nothing of importance depends on it. . . . The person of Christ and his incarnation are the important thing and not the manner of his birth.

Bowne stated later in the same chapter that the minister who becomes so obsessed with progressiveness as to be always using his pulpit to attack secondary doctrines like the virgin birth should be cashiered, but he definitely indicated that the cashiering should be for inefficiency, in too often raising nonessential questions. Everywhere Bowne was insistent upon rooting out inefficiency.

With this attitude toward miracle once established, Bowne went on to stress in the divine revelation the orderly, usual ongoings as the chief channels of the communication of the truth. The demands of those hankering after or craving the marvelous could not be allowed to dispute the findings of scholarship. In its own sphere scholarship is supreme, provided its assumptions all stand out in the open light, and that its aims are frankly avowed.

If scholarship finds in the biblical revelation traces of survivals of superstition and ignorance, the results must be accepted, not forgetting the power of a revelation of divine purpose which can make itself known through such unseemly channels. To use Bowne's own analogy, if the Lord desired to reveal himself to kites and crows, he would have to adjust himself to the kite-and-crow view of the world and speak the language of kites and crows. Only, a higher type of mind is not to hold fast to the kite-and-crow type of revelation as especially sacred, or as binding on intelligences above kites and crows. In this field each mind must make what it can of the materials at hand. Bowne once urged a Methodist Conference to hold fast to the literalness of the story of Jonah and the whale if they could not otherwise keep their faith in the loving purpose of God as revealed in Christ. Whereupon the Conference broke into applause. When quiet had returned Bowne added, "But don't ask me to believe in the literalness."

Biblical inerrancy and infallibility he set aside at once in favor of practical certainty. We have no such infallibility now, even if the original documents had it—as they did not; and, moreover, we could make no use of infallibility if we had it, for it would thwart the living processes of living minds at once. Bowne quoted with approval Kant's remark that the wisdom of the Divine in dealing with men had been shown quite as truly in what had been kept dark as in what had been set out in the light. If we had an infallibly dictated revelation, all development in religion through the self-exercise of the moral mind and will would be irreparably thwarted. Bowne insisted that a religious revelation is instrumental, that it must meet the test of its effects on moral, human, spiritual insight. We are not to forget the purpose of a revelation by surrendering ourselves to anything approaching the worship of the revelation itself.

For all spiritual purposes the Bible makes itself understood, no matter how inadequate the science, the conception of the world, through which the revelation gleams forth. All this seems commonplace enough to-day, with the Bowne thought of revelation so widely accepted, but it was another matter in the late nineties and in the first decade of this century. The distinguished ecclesiastic who told the Boston Preachers' Meeting that as he sailed through the Red Sea and looked off toward Sinai the conviction was born in his soul that Moses wrote the Pentateuch; the other ecclesiastic who declared that Moses wrote the first chapter of Genesis—and if he did not get his knowledge from God, where did he get it?—were in the land, and with them were groups of followers who had no chance to learn of such questions themselves, and therefore "stood by" the leaders. Very intelligent laymen for a season looked upon Bowne as a disturber of the peace of the church, until he finally won out, gaining at last the approval of the same leader who got his knowledge about the Mosaic authorship from looking off toward Sinai, wherever that was. After a while it began to be apparent that Bowne was chiefly teaching that a revelation, to be a revelation, must be understood. Anything that helped on the understanding helped on the revelation. Bowne did excellent service in his teaching of understandableness as the mark of effective revelation, and on the check to understandableness, so to speak, in all doctrines of strict infallibility and inerrancy. One day a pupil remarked to him that it was too bad that as great a mind as Bishop Berkeley should have written as stupid an essay as that on the virtues of tar-water, to receive the somewhat crushing rejoinder that the best of Berkeley's idealism is found in the essay on tar-water. Now, just as Bowne held that a quite ordinary student in philosophy in reading *Siris* ought to be able to tell what is idealistic philosophy and what is tar-water, so he felt that any fairly alert mind, in reading the Scriptures, could tell the difference between the temporal and inconsequential and the eternal and significant, if it were not for the blighting notion of a literal infallibility which put all parts of the revelation on the same plane as alike divinely inspired. Bowne himself was a master in interpreting the Scriptures as human documents. Some of his students have happy recollections of seeing him sit with the Bible open before him, reading such an account, let us say, as that of Joab's word to the messenger who was to report to David the death of Uriah. Joab said that King David might ask how it happened that so many of his soldiers were lost in rushing too close to the wall of the besieged city, in which event the messenger was to report that Uriah the Hittite had died also! Bowne felt that understanding of the working of good and bad in human hearts had never been more unmistakeably revealed than in some apparently matter-of-fact biblical passages. Commenting once on the criticism that the scene which describes the dealing of Jesus with the woman taken in adultery is to be questioned as to its claim to have a place in the Scriptures—or at least in

John's Gospel—Bowne said, "The passage is perfect, no matter who said it."

To get back to the importance of being understood as insisted upon by Bowne, it is well to take note here of the advice he gave to his students as they went forth to discuss controverted biblical issues. On the one hand he had no use for the time-server who keeps still when the cause of academic and religious freedom is attacked, and, on the other hand, he was impatient with the men who were not at the pains to go as far as possible to make themselves understood, leaving to one side the persons who will misunderstand anything. A youth once came to him with a *Credo,* which this youth intended to read to a group of ecclesiastical examiners, who, by the way, had not asked and were not likely to ask for the *Credo.* The youngster avowed that he was doing all this for the sake of being honest with himself. Bowne told him to be honest with himself by all means, but not to be dishonest with himself. Going through the questions, he then pointed out that each answer would leave an impression the direct opposite to that intended. In other words, the utterance, satisfactory enough to the writer himself, was in effect a declaration of what was not true to the writer's own intention.

In spite of Bowne's own attempts to make himself understood he was in 1904 charged with heresy and brought to trial. That is to say, charges were preferred against him which ought never to have been entertained. The late Bishop Edward G. Andrews, who had as fine and just a sense of what was fitting in ecclesiastical court procedure as anyone in Methodist history, expressed the opinion that when charges were preferred having as little merit in them as those against Bowne they should be forthwith thrown into the waste basket. Dr. Charles S. Wing, "presiding elder," as the term was then, was of the opinion that the charges ought to go to trial to let the Conference put itself on record. He knew that the Conference never would vote to sustain the charges, and he advised Bowne to render a service to the church by standing trial to clear the air. Why the air could not have been even better cleared by the refusal of the Conference to entertain the charges is a mystery. With Bowne's own consent, the trial went forward, ending in complete vindication of the accused. Under all the circumstances the trial was an indignity, in the opinion of hosts of Bowne's friends. Indignity is not too strong a word even though Bowne consented to all that was done. The charges were so absurd on their face that they should have been summarily thrown out, though Bowne himself said in a letter to Dr. F. M. Larkin, April 23, 1904, "The decisive and unanimous declaration of my doctrinal soundness is a great gain."

I am indebted to Dr. George Elliott for the following statement of the charges and the essential portions of Bowne's testimony. The statements are taken from the *Methodist Review,* May-June, 1922:

> In the spring of 1904 at the session of the New York East Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, of which Doctor Bowne was a member, charges of heretical teaching were brought against him by a member of another Annual Conference. These charges were wholly based on passages taken from several of his published works. He was charged with teaching:
>
> 1. Doctrines which are contrary to the Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church.
>
> 2. Doctrines which are contrary to the established standards of doctrine of the Methodist Episcopal Church.
>
> *First Specification.* He denies the Trinitarian conception of the Deity and also the moral attributes of the Deity as set forth in the first and fourth Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church.
>
> (This specification was followed by extended quotations from Bowne's *Metaphysics* and *Philosophy of Theism.*)
>
> *Second Specification.* His teaching on miracles is such as to weaken if not destroy faith in large portions of the Old and New Testaments. His views on the inspiration of Scripture are contrary to the teachings of the Scriptures themselves, contrary to article five of the

Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and tend to destroy faith in the authority of the Bible in matters of faith and practice.

(Quotations from Bowne's booklet on *The Christian Revelation.*)

*Third Specification.* He denies the Doctrine of the Atonement as set forth in the second and twentieth Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church and as taught by our established standards of doctrine.

(Quotations from Bowne's booklet on *The Atonement.*)

*Fourth Specification.* He teaches such views of the divine government and of the future of souls as to destroy the force of Christ's teaching about the future punishment of the wicked and the future reward of the righteous.

(Quotations from *The Atonement* and *Metaphysics.*)

*Fifth Specification.* He teaches views on the subject of Sin and Salvation, on Repentance, Justification, Regeneration, and Assurance of Salvation through the Witness of the Spirit that do not represent the views of the Methodist Episcopal Church as expressed in our standard works of theology.

(Quotations from *The Christian Life* and the *Philosophy of Theism.*)

The Conference session was held in Simpson Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., under the presidency of Bishop Cyrus D. Foss, April 6-12, 1904. The Select Number appointed to represent the Conference in the trial was made up of fifteen of the most distinguished names in that body, many of them outstanding leaders in the church at large. Here is the list: J. E. Adams, D. W. Couch, John Rippere, Francis B. Upham, Herbert Welch, J. O. Wilson, A. H. Wyatt, Francis L. Strickland, George Preston Mains, C. H. Buck, S. O. Curtice, David G. Downey, Charles L. Goodell, J. Wesley Johnston, William V. Kelley. The Rev. Dr. Frank Mason North was appointed to represent the bishop in presidency at the trial. Dr. James Monroe Buckley appeared as counsel for the defendant. The prosecution was represented by A. C. Eggleston, B. F. Kidder, and Arthur W. Byrt, by appointment, whose function was chiefly to secure for the complainant, who was a member of another Annual Conference, his full legal rights at the trial.

### THE FIRST SPECIFICATION

After the alleged evidence against him had been presented Professor Bowne took the stand.

Mr. Chairman and Brethren: I am astonished with a great astonishment to find these things brought forward as proofs of a Unitarian view. They really have no more connection with the specific doctrine of the Trinity than they have with the binomial theorem, or the Roosevelt administrative policy of the Panama Canal. Those propositions would prove me guilty of stealing horses just as quickly as they prove me guilty of Unitarianism. I simply cannot make any reply whatever to these first pages. I can make no reply because there is absolutely no occasion. I was arguing in a general way some points in epistemology, etc. And as I go along, I make these statements with as utter innocence of any thought or bearing on the Trinity as could possibly be. That I must simply rule out.

In the next place, a statement is made here as to the relation of the world to God. I say the world is neither in nor out of God in a spatial sense, and that God is neither in nor out of the world in a spatial sense. That is, God is not a great circumference with the world inside of him. Nor is God a spatial circumference here with the world outside of him in picture form. In thinking in these regions, thought carries us at once beyond the regions of spatial picturing. The world depends unpicturably upon the divine power. We do not think of the thoughts of the mind inside of the mind in the spatial sense. Thoughts are not in the mind spatially. Neither are they out of the mind spatially. But thoughts are in consciousness. We think and we know that we think. That's the end of it. The world is not in God spatially, and God is not in the world spatially.

As to pantheism, the essential distinction between pantheism and the idealistic Theism which I hold is found in the freedom and self-hood of mind. Now, we have this measure of self-hood, this measure of self-direction whereby we are constituted persons with the power of self-control, to some extent, constituted moral persons, subjects of a moral government. That is not pantheism. And that is my view. . . . As to this other question, all that that statement means is that by way of speculation we should not get very far into the nature of God.

### The Second Specification

After many extended quotations from his works had been made and interpreted by the complainant, Professor Bowne continued his testimony.

Mr. Chairman: It hardly seems worth while to take up your time. You know very well that these biblical questions have been burning questions of late years. There has been a great deal of uncertainty in popular thought, especially among educated people, graduates from our high schools and colleges, and those who have been familiar with the literature there, and when I wrote this book, or these books rather, I meant to meet difficulties which are in the minds of those persons. Philosophy is not everybody's affair, and so biblical discussion is not everybody's affair; and this is so in the religious use of the Bible and biblical questions. There is many an old saint whose reading is "The Lord is my Shepherd, I shall not want," and there is a religious use and a great use of the Bible by a great majority of people. But then there are these other questions which belong to scholarship and which, in the long run, are very important. In the confused condition of things it has seemed to me very desirable to reach some point of view which would serve as a kind of *modus vivendi*, and so I have raised the question, What is the central thing in Revelation? and I have said it is the revelation of God. It tells us what God is, what he means, what his relation to us is, what is his purpose concerning us, what he is going to do, and what the meaning of life is. Now I consider we get through Revelation certain ideas which I call the "Christian Revelation," the essential thing, and I believed it was important to fix our thought upon these central things in order that we might have the great value of Revelation. For, really when we take the book from many a point of view, and look around for specific treatises in speculative theology, it does not seem that we have much of value, and when you look upon it as a Revelation of God we see the significance of it. We as Christians are living in the light and power of certain great Christian conceptions which are here, have been here, are believed here, and will be here as long as the world endures. . . . If we hold these central ideas, we are Christians. I think you will admit that I affirm nothing here. I affirm nothing as to the composition of the Pentateuch or the Second Isaiah. A great many scholars at least agree concerning the Pentateuchal question; that we find something originally written by Moses, but also redactions and additions. Let that turn out as it may, they still have the Christian idea. Or "The Second Isaiah." They still have the Christian idea. Now, these are questions for expert scholars. I do not claim the ability to decide them, and I know very well that many cannot; they are questions for expert scholars, and will be decided by expert scholarship, and nothing can be settled by hue and cry. Those must be settled by scholars, and we must be perfectly assured that, in the long run, the truth will make its way—*truth will make its way.* In the meantime, we fall back on the great essential ideas of God, what he is, what he means, and we live in those ideas, and we rule our lives by them. It is a *modus vivendi* which I conceived, and to secure such, I wrote the book.

Now, concerning page 65: "However we insist on the presence of mythical and unhistorical matter in the Bible, it has not prevented God's highest revelation of himself. . . . All we can insist upon is, that the record, the legend, the myth, if there be such, shall not obscure the purpose of the whole, the Revelation of God."

My thought is that the revelation of God is the great central thing. There are persons who say it is a myth and unhistorical matter; and I say, well, suppose that is so? nevertheless, it does not obscure the great thing, the great revelation of God; the important ideas concerning God, what he is, what he means—these come to us along the lines of revelations in the Scriptures.

Doctor Buckley: The complainant in this matter has mutilated the passage and withheld from the church and the committee a very remarkable passage which runs in the other direction. I will read from the book and request the committee to compare what I read with what is presented in the charges: "However we insist on the presence of mythical and unhistorical matter in the Bible, it has not prevented God's highest revelation of himself. This is the treasure which the vessel of Scripture, however earthen, demonstrably contains. What the Christian thinker should maintain is the divine presence and guidance in the rational movement as a whole. He need not concern himself about details whether for better or for worse." Why that was omitted in the affirmative proposition concerning nature or revelation I do not know, but that was omitted.

Professor Bowne: Now, with regard to the remarks on pages 79 and 80. I think that there is no question that the Jews spoke of the supernatural in a way that showed that God was the agent in all things, and they referred things to God without reference to a secondary, intermediate causation. The Lord said this, the Lord said that, etc., in which case they may have been entirely correct in the standard of causality. In other words, had we seen anything that looked divine, it would have looked as the plague of locusts looked, or like the plague of grasshoppers in Kansas now. The locusts flew very much like as they do in the West. This does not seem like a divine power in the matter. As I said in the book, suppose an Armada should be sent on the coast of Palestine, and one of the old prophets had described it, he would have described it in the form of a divine standard: "The Lord sent out his lightnings and he blew upon them and they were scattered," etc., etc. But if you had been there, and had seen just such a blow and a scattering you would have believed that the Lord directed them and not angels flying about and raising a wind. That is all that means.

Now, with regard to this other passage: "When we come to the distinctively miraculous, to that which breaks with the natural order and reveals the presence of a supernatural power, we may still look for some of the familiar natural continuities. Miracles which break with all law would be nothing intelligible." While we believe in a good deal that is supernatural without affirming that it is miraculous, we believe in the Divine Presence in our lives, but we do not mean by that that we have angels or anything of that kind coming and directing us. But we believe that our times are in God's hands. And so our lives go on, and we still believe we are in God's hands. There would be a supernatural guidance without anything miraculous grating with the laws of life and psychology. I believe that all the processes of nature are supernatural. They obey the divine will and are carried on with the ever-living will in which we live, and move, and have our being. I do not think everything is miraculous. On the contrary, there are other ways of doing things.

But, suppose we come now to the distinctly miraculous. How think of it? It would be no more divine than the outdoings of the world; no more dependent upon God than the sparrow which does not fall without the Father. What is the meaning? Why, it would be necessary to attract sense-bound minds who would otherwise be immersed so that they might know God as theirs.

A. C. Eggleston: Do you believe that?

Professor Bowne: I am a crass supernaturalist.

Doctor Buckley: Speak of the resurrection of Christ.

Professor Bowne: "Miracles which break with all law would be nothing intelligible." That sentence as it stands is not very clear. It means this: that when God works miracles, still there is a great body of law, and that, connecting the miracle with these other things through that body of law, there is no break. Suppose God wrought a miracle and enlightened a common person. We can imagine a distinct break. Take Saint Paul's case. Law was such and held in such a way that God did not make Paul a new being without some reference to the old body. When he wanted to work a miracle he worked for us. God might have performed the same miracle in the mind of Peter and James as in the mind of Paul. The miracle was wrought on the foundation of law, and Paul was able then to go on with all that back-lying amount of law and nature and developing into something which, without a miracle, James or Peter could never have reached.

A Voice: Do you apply that to the resurrection of Christ?

Professor Bowne: I believe in the resurrection of Christ. I believe in it.

A. C. Eggleston: You say, "With this view you can dispense with everything else." What does that "everything else" convey? Is it a general feeling that whatever was said—

Professor Bowne: Of course the language must be applied to the subject under discussion. If we are able to hold the Christian view concerning God and man; and if we are Christians and have that, we are Christians. We can let everything else go that need be. It must apply to a great many persons. Many are not sure of this or that.

But I say if you can hold on to God and Christ and to the view of the relation of God to us, with the Christian view of what God is, and the meaning of life and destiny, leave out other things.

A. W. Byrt: Let other things go.

Professor Bowne: It is unessential for Christianity. I do not hold that in order to be a Christian one must believe that the ax swam.

D. G. Downey (Quoting): "When we consider it as a dogmatic treatise in abstract speculative theology, or as a textbook in ethics, or as anything but a revelation of God, it is easy to doubt whether it has any special and abiding religious value." The Professor does not intend to teach that the Bible is not a good textbook in ethics.

Professor Bowne: It is a question what we shall put first. It used to be a good way on works apologetic to begin with the supreme difference in Bible teachings in ethics. There were deep and profound essentials found in the sacred books of the East. And the answer was always then, People have to rummage about among other sacred books to find something as good. They made a good talk about the Golden Rule. They said they could not find anything like that anywhere, and they rummaged about in the works of Confucius and pre-Christian writings, and there were a lot of books and a lot of talk, but I have said the important thing is the Doctrine of God, and out of that comes the very important theological teaching. But the central thing is the revelation of God. Dr. Harris' book, in which he makes the whole discussion of revelation, turns on the title, *The Self-Revelation of God.* That is the new form which Apologetics has taken on with all those whose writings command much attention now. The central thing is God! There is a very excellent little book, now out of print, entitled *The Chief End of Revelation,* much better than recent works. In this the especial emphasis is the revelation of God. All the ethics and theologies are important. I do not think with regard to abstract theology that that thought leads into the ground, but I remember this, that there was a theology which taught that in God there was one essence, two processions, three persons, four relations, five notions, and a circumcession.

Doctor Kidder: In the passage referred to, pages 41 and 42, as a quotation you say: "This conception of a dictated book has always ruled popular theological thought, and for manifold reasons. The notion of a revelation through history, through the moral life of a community, through the insight of godly men, is comparatively difficult and uncertain." Do you give these two as the only interpretation of inspiration of God's revelation to man as recorded in the Scriptures or out of the Scriptures? Do you mean that the revelation through history through the moral life of the community, comparatively uncertain though it be, is the better revelation or the more accurate revelation of God?

Professor Bowne: I think that is the way revelation has been made. Revelation has been made in that way, and that the Bible has not come through such dictation. There may be passages, here and there, where it says, "The Word of the Lord came to me."

Doctor Kidder: Then the conception of a dictated book you rule out?

Professor Bowne: I lay that aside.

Doctor Kidder: Then we have no other alternative except this: "through the moral life of a community, through the insight of godly men." If that is the only other alternative, does your conception of the Bible mean that God is still making a progressive revelation of himself with equal authority by which he made it through Isaiah, Paul, and John? You say there is a middle ground that is not defined. In other words, as Bishop Foss said, referring to Doctor Horton's lectures at Yale, does God still reveal himself to us in precisely the same manner as he did to Isaiah and Paul? Or did those men have the inspiration of the Holy Spirit of God revealing himself to them, so that they spake with authoritative utterance?

Professor Bowne: It would depend altogether upon the contents of the revelation and the cogency with which they appealed to Christian thought. As a matter of fact, the Christian Church has agreed that we have received a revelation through those men which outranks the revelation in any other way. If anyone should start up with a revelation that was distinctly contradictory to the revelations which came through those men, we should think this new revelation was a mistake. At the same time it is also perfectly clear that the subjects which they had have been brought out in their meaning in the light and life of the church, as the Spirit was promised to lead us into Truth. The early Christian Church accepted the germ, had no such clear ideas as we have. I say nothing at all about it, but there is a question whether Saint Paul himself had as clear a conception of what was meant as we have now. We cannot separate the authority of the Bible from the authority of the church and the authority of the Christian consciousness that would set up one as independent of the other. This question of authority is something which can never be settled except in practice. To attempt to discuss authority in an abstract way and get it drawn out in logical formulæ always ends in confusion. Precisely the same thing you have in the general question of certainty. How do I know that I am saved? The next thing is to plunge into the very depth of uncertainty. I fall back upon the use of our faculties, and reach such certainty as experience gives. And so with regard to the Bible and religious certainty in general. There is a great blunder that the churches largely make. First, we have churches resting on the authority of the church. It is a perfectly easy thing to explode. Then we have the Protestant Church with the authority of the Bible, and it is perfectly easy to take that abstract thought and make it uncertain. We have the authority of the church and the Bible, the authority of the religious community, all the work of God, including great conflicts, vital functions, but there is no possibility of separation. I do not believe, for instance, that any church would long consent to accept statements in the Bible which were agreed upon as distinctly contradictory to reason and conscience. On the other hand, I do not believe that reason and conscience would very long support themselves without the use of the Bible. I do not think that either one of them would support itself without the Christian community in which the Christian life were going on.

Doctor Kidder: The point has not been quite reached. We will set aside the "dictated" conception of the book, and we accept the manifestation of God's presence to the human mind and heart in spiritual relationship now. But Jesus said, "Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me," and Paul said, "All inspiration, given of God, is profitable . . . for reproof," etc. . . In another place, "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The point is this. The church at large has held that through the writing contained in the Scriptures there is a special concentration of light touching man's relationship to God that does not come with equal authority through any inspiration that a man may receive directly from and now apart from those sources. And in these statements here there does not seem to me to be any necessary acknowledgment of that fact, although there would not be any necessary denial of it. And I would like an interpretation, whether this "insight of godly men" is equally authoritative as that of the prophets.

Professor Bowne: One cannot say everything at once. I have said elsewhere that this knowledge of God, which I have spoken of as of exceeding value, a great source of light and inspiration, "the light of all our day"—that this comes to us along the line of God's revelation to man through his Son. If any modern prophet arises I should be willing to listen to what his revelation might be, and probably discount it.

A. C. Eggleston: Where do you make a difference or distinction between the "insight of godly men" and "man's invention"?

Professor Bowne: Insight is one thing, and invention is another. . . . Revelation leads to insight.

A. C. Eggleston: How did Moses come upon that wonderful characterization of God, "long-suffering, full of compassion, and that will not acquit the guilty"? Did he get that from his insight?

Professor Bowne: God gave him the insight. That is the way I should put it. I suppose he had the insight that God was there.

A. C. Eggleston: I suppose that, too. But now about this "inerrancy of the Bible." "And thus it appears how barren and practically irrelevant is the abstract question as to the inerrancy of the Bible" (page 57). How does that come in there? "The doctrine is of no practical interest."

Professor Bowne: Well, it is not. Let me talk about that for the moment. I am speaking of the "absolute inerrancy of the Bible," the technical inerrancy, such absoluteness of statement as forbids the notion of mistake. . . . For instance, the inscription on the cross in several forms; there is a high probability that one was not exactly so. Then you have thousands of different readings in the manuscripts, and it is plain that there cannot be absolute equal inspiration in everything. The great thing is to obtain its general trustworthiness. One says, "If you admit inerrancy at all, how can you be sure of anything?" I say, that is an abstract question which does not admit of answer and which doesn't need any.

Doctor Buckley: I would ask, Doctor Bowne, whether you believe that the revelations in the Bible have come with abiding power and definiteness in the world's thought and life, only along the line of God's revelation of himself and God's providence.

Professor Bowne: All this I steadfastly believe.

Doctor Buckley: I am asking whether he believes certain things here; I would like to find out whether he believes these things. Do you believe that when you compare Christianity with outlying religions we feel its measure of superiority?

Professor Bowne: All this I steadfastly believe.

Doctor Buckley: When we compare it with the revelation of nature, etc.?

Professor Bowne: All this I steadfastly believe.

## THIRD SPECIFICATION

The charge as to heresy on the doctrine of the Atonement was wholly based on extracts from Professor Bowne's little book, *The Atonement*, in which he criticizes substitutionary, commercial, and governmental theories as being based on excessive literalism.

Professor Bowne: Our wheels drag heavily. My purpose in writing this booklet was as in writing the other. However clear theologically that may be in itself, there is certainly a great deal of misunderstanding among many thoughtful young people who are trying to consider this question on the basis of their good sense, and view of right and wrong, etc. I had a letter from a woman in Washington which was an attack on the doctrine of the atonement as a rational doctrine. She set forth all the difficulties that were in her mind. I refer to that as an illustration of the kind of cases that I meet very often—young people in colleges especially. And it was to help them, not to instruct theologians, that I wrote it.

Now, first of all, as I think I have said here, I have declared the Christian Church has always held that the great work of divine grace has been wrought for the salvation of men. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son." "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto . . . but to give himself a ransom for many." I could give you many quotations. I believe most emphatically, without any reservation of any kind, in the great redemption wrought by our Lord. And, as I have said here in another passage, in my thought there is nothing beside. The great work of grace has been wrought. The Father gave the Son for the salvation of men. That is what I consider to be the fact of the atonement. There is nothing which demands theorizing. It is the expression of the divine love for the blessing and the salvation of men. Up to this point we have a fact. But then the rational nature always insists upon rationalizing, systematizing its views, and, of course, that demands thought. Now, out of that come the various theories of the atonement. The church has always held to the fact. It always will. The fact given up, there would be nothing distinctively Christian, nothing left worth preaching. The incarnation for the purpose of atonement to mankind is the very gist and evidence of Christianity. But then as to the theories. Now, you know what very crude theories were held at an early date. The mind of the race went into eclipse brought about by having heathen notions thrown upon the Christian mind; there were a great multitude of these which were pagan notions. The Christian thought remained in that condition and then they began to rationalize in theory, and from that time it has gone on down to the present day and we have had a great many theories, and we have still many now. Doctor Miley, in his book, on the *Atonement*, quotes somewhere one who says, "There are thirteen theories of the atonement." But Doctor Miley thinks that some of these do not so differ as to be separated. And the end is not yet. What have these men been trying to do? To form a theory of the atonement. These theories of the theologians have been in the highest degree unsatisfactory, and I have sought in a fashion to say things, not to give an entirely new interpretation, but an interpretation of the atonement which is in entire harmony with the Scriptures, more in harmony with the present type of Christian thought, with all the enlightenment there has come to it in the illumination of the Spirit and of experience, more in harmony than the theories which have hitherto obtained among us. And a good many of the Bible students find what I do not find. There is not an entirely satisfactory theory. The work of grace is set forth in a variety of ways in the Temple service and Roman law. Paul gives no consistent view. He says a good many things, all of which are significant and of value, but we have not a perfect system in the Scriptures and not in theology. Neither have we in our Methodist teaching. Our Methodist teaching was originally somewhat a satisfaction view. It remains a modified satisfaction view in the Southern Methodist Church still. In our own church it has gone over somewhat to the governmental view, set forth by Doctor Miley, but that by no means commands the acceptance of all the members of the church.

Doctor Couch: Do you urge the governmental view?

Professor Bowne: I reject anything which needs to be carried forward. It was carried forward from the things behind it, but we are compelled to go on.

Doctor Couch: "That God might be justified, and become the justifier of him that believeth."

Professor Bowne: All these expressions I accept. It is a matter of interpretation of what these things mean. I myself use the Scripture terminology with great freedom. I have no difficulty with using such a hymn as "There is a fountain filled with blood." I can sing it with great zeal, but after you have said that, how do you interpret it? It is an adumbration with a great meaning behind it. We try to get the meaning into the minds of men. I do accept and use the language of the Scriptures. It has never occurred to me to find the least difficulty in them. I do not butt against analogy. I am after meanings.

Now it is said that I have spoken against "satisfaction." That term—satisfaction. We have a satisfaction and a substitution theory, and when I speak of satisfaction it is not satisfaction I am speaking of. I am speaking practically of that doctrine of penal substitution, *penal* satisfaction, which our church rejects. And when I say, "It is a satisfaction that does not satisfy," it means that. If that view were true, perfectly true, exactly correct, then it would follow that since the work of Christ all for whom Christ died would be necessarily free from the consequences of sin. The Calvinists always drew that conclusion, and the Calvinistic Universalists always draw that.

Now, I use the term "satisfaction" with regard to that theory. Doctor Miley draws himself that conclusion, and makes it one reason for setting aside that view. And I found him drawing precisely the same conclusion; and I say a great many times—unfortunately expressed perhaps—that we are having a satisfaction that does not satisfy, and an expiation that does not expiate, because we are left to bear the visible consequences of our evildoings, and that leads to the suspicion that on this view some of the unseen consequences may come around to us.

We are setting forth simply the logic of the doctrine. Various views are given and finally we must interpret this work of God and his grace in accordance with our ethical ideas. We cannot interpret it satisfactorily on the forensic plane.

### Fourth and Fifth Specifications

On these final charges much less time was taken in the trial and Doctor Bowne was called upon for but little testimony.

Here is a short statement as to the defendant's views on future punishment:

Professor Bowne: The only force of this charge is that I am a Universalist. I am not. I would like to be if I could, but I am not.

Doctor Couch: Would you like to be?

Professor Bowne: Only in this sense; I should like to believe that it was God's purpose finally to bring all souls into obedience unto himself. I should like to have that faith if I could. I am not a Universalist. As to these remarks about metaphysics and the light, I have said simply that, left to metaphysical reasoning, we should not get very far concerning the future of the soul. That is all. Any positive conviction we have depends on our moral nature or some word of revelation.

Doctor Buckley: I ask him whether he believes that there will be any probation after death for a person thoroughly instructed in the gospel of Christ in this world?

Professor Bowne: I do not know of any such thing, and I should feel perfectly unjustified in telling anyone, "You shall have another chance."

### The Verdict

After two hours of argument by the prosecution and the defense, the full Select Number of Fifteen being present, votes by ballot were taken on each of the Five Specifications. The result in each case was the same: Sustained, none; not sustained, fifteen.

The verdict of the Committee was expressed as follows:

The Select Number, to whom were referred the charges against Borden P. Bowne for "disseminating doctrines contrary to the Articles of Religion and our Standards of doctrine," report:

That all the evidence and testimony offered by complainant and defendant in this case have been received and carefully considered, and that counsel for each has had ample opportunity for the presentation of arguments.

That the Select Number, by unanimous vote taken by ballot, find and decide that of the five specifications none are sustained, and that the charges are not sustained.

(Signed.) Frank Mason North, Chairman.
Wm. H. Burgwin, Assistant Secretary.

There were indeed some good results from the trial. Bowne got a chance to say in fresh form many things well worth while. Another good fruit of it was a closer friendship between Bowne and the late Dr. James M. Buckley, of *The Christian Advocate,* who acted as counsel for the accused. No two minds more unlike could have been found in Methodism than these two, and yet good came of their being together. In the former days the two took an occasional shot at each other. At a Methodist young men's congress in Pittsburgh, in 1895, Bowne read a paper on ethical legislation by the church. Buckley had been advancing reason after reason here and there against Bowne's advocacy of the repeal of Methodism's famous amusement clause, and with Buckley in mind Bowne replied:

> A plausible argument may be made for anything. The argument for religious persecution is perfect. The argument for a state church is irrefragable; that is, in both cases, from an abstract standpoint. Descending from these high themes, a very good argument might be made for adding to the form for the admission of members to our church the following:
>
> "*Question.* Will you be a diligent reader of at least one of our official church papers?"
>
> "*Answer.* I will, the Lord being my helper."
>
> When one considers the necessity of supplying the people with sound, wholesome and edifying religious literature, the needs of the worn-out preachers, and the demands of denominational loyalty withal, the argument is seen to be very strong. Excellent reasons can be given for each detail of both question and answer. (*Methodist Review,* May, 1898, p. 379.)

The contact with Bowne did much to enlighten Buckley on the question of the newer approach to the Bible, and possibly saved the church from a series of editorial attacks which might not have helped any cause. On the other hand, Bowne got at least a glimpse into the limitations under which an ecclesiastical leader has to work. He recognized the worth of Buckley as a steadying force, especially in keeping bishops in their place. Buckley had enormous power in General Conference and seldom used it unfortunately. Bowne believed that Buckley was right in compelling individual bishops to face the consequence of their errors in administration or temper. In our professedly wiser day we tinker, sometimes harmfully, with a whole system rather than courageously deal with the individuals responsible for trouble. Bowne, however, never had much use for bishops.

There came out of the trial too a feeling of gratification at the applause the favorable verdict called forth throughout the church and the country. This joy, however, was not without alloy. Some men, whom the Professor had considered his supporters, said nothing till the trial was over. The height to which their joyous cries then reached did not make him forget the profundity of the preceding silence. Especially gratifying, however, was the attitude of the Boston University trustees, who assured him before the trial that his position as professor was not in peril no matter what might happen at the Conference.

Speaking of those days of excitement on biblical questions, it is only fair to say that, in Bowne's judgment, a "great and conclusive" document came out of the controversy in the form of an article by Dr. William F. Warren, of Boston University, published in the *Methodist Review,* May, 1899. Doctor Warren held an essentially conservative position on biblical criticism, but he issued a most remarkable plea for liberty of discussion. With characteristic originality he used a totally new illustration to show the complexity of critical problems. He took the Bishops' Address in the *Discipline* of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, in 1898, and the Bishops' Address in the *Discipline* of the Methodist Episcopal Church for 1896, also the address in the *Discipline* of 1852. He went on to show that in these documents we are dealing with only two out of more than fifty existing recensions and versions of Coke and Asbury's letter commending the book of *Discipline* to the laity of the Methodist Episcopal Church. He labels these versions D1, D and D2, and shows the fearful puzzle it would be to try to untangle them if scholars should come upon them two thousand years from now and had little but the documents themselves as material on which to work. His point is that a living church organization, out of the demands of its own increasing life, creates and recreates documents, which documents are likely to be co-operative in authorship, worthy of closest study, always on the understanding that too narrow a specialism in the study may lead to excesses of artificial results. Bowne always considered Doctor Warren's article as unanswerable, even though the writer did not wholly sympathize with the newer biblical views.

I quote here excerpts from letters written by Doctor Bowne to Professor George A. Coe, dear friend and former pupil, then at Northwestern University The passages are taken from an article on Bowne by Doctor Coe, published in the July-August, 1910, volume of the *Methodist Review.* The dates of the letters do not appear, but Doctor Bowne is dealing with the general question of attack on liberal views in the church.

> There seems to be a kind of renascence of this sort of thing in the church at present. Catholic and Protestant alike have an ignorant fear, something like that which stampeded the Gadarene swine down a steep place into the sea. There is really nothing like the liberty in the Roman Church at present that there was in the mediæval period. I am meditating writing a paper on ecclesiastical institutions and the truth, for there is really a strong tendency on the part of an institution and its ministers to betray and crucify the truth. When the church is at all large, men of mediocre intelligence and submediocre character and rather unspiritual instincts come to the front and get control, and from the nature of the case they are pretty sure to be indifferent to truth and progress. "The fear of change perplexing monarchs" is theirs, and they become hyperorthodox from the nature of the situation, and then we have the infamies which fill the pages of Buckle and Lecky and Andrew D. White and others. The tendency is so marked that every church must be on its guard against it. We can see in our own case pretty clearly how it goes. Ignorant men, unfitted for their position but having a vote, feel perfectly able to de-

cide with the slightest knowledge or study of the case. They cannot discuss but they can decide; they cannot refute, but they can condemn; and they have so little interest in the truth that they are willing to listen to all manner of false witness if it falls in with their notions, and are deaf to anything that makes the other way.

In sober earnest, it is a great stupid ass of a world in pretty much all respects, and notably so in the matter of religion. I don't see how any thoughtful person can help seeing it; and I think one needs to see it in order to understand the world and be charitable toward its Bœotianisms. But it is not well to say much about it, and less well to get wrathy over it. In my youthful days I did a great deal of this; and no one was any better for it, least of all myself. Well, I have gradually come to a more cheerful way of looking at these things. God is in no hurry, and he puts up with it; and we must do so, too. I am only slowly developing a fund of patience and cheerfulness in such matters, and I enjoy it more and more. And very often I find a unity of the spirit beneath very different forms of speech. I don't think I am in any immediate danger of translation, but I do find it easier to put up with a great many things than I used to.

In fact, we are the orthodox. . . . We should never consent to be placed in the position of heretics. We should, rather, insist that we are the true Christians, the true believers in the Bible, the true race of those who seek to live in the Spirit. This we must show by keeping sweet and reverent and alive, so that our fruits shall bear witness of us, and by showing the superficial, and hocus-pocus character of much traditional speech. At the same time we must exercise due wisdom in showing what Origen calls the "scandals, offenses, and impossibilities of the letter." In other words, we must not "yank" out the tares. It is better to let both grow together until the harvest than to pull up the wheat in our determination to root up the tares. It is slow work lifting men from the mechanical and external plane to the ethical and spiritual plane. We ought not to sit down and be quiet; that is just what the enemy wishes. We must assert our portion in Jacob and our inheritance in Israel. We must not accept the position of suspects under surveillance, but we must assert our position as the truth indeed.

In connection with the above we all do well to heed the advice given in an article in *Zion's Herald,* March 7, 1900:

"Again, the progressive student must not fail to notice the complex adjustment of belief to life, and the slowness with which changes of real belief take place. Thought and feeling tend to mutual adjustment and equilibrium. In this way many things in themselves unimportant or irrelevant often acquire a factitious significance because of their association with important things. The habit of feeling is not easily changed, and there is not sufficient critical insight to separate the essential from the accidental. Hence few persons can make profound mental readjustments without pain and some breaking up of the great deeps of life. Truth itself is disturbing and embarrassing until it has been assimilated, and assimilation is a slow process. It is not merely a logical process but also a psychological and vital one, and this requires time and experience. It may not be hurried or forced without violence and damage. The progressive student, then, must be content to wait on the slow processes of mental life and growth, setting forth at all proper times the truth that is in him, but leaving to time and the hours to mature the fruit. He must also put himself in his hearers' place and have intellectual sympathy with them, and consider how what he says sounds from their standpoint; otherwise he may be as narrow and provincial as he supposes them to be. Moreover, if he finds it impossible to convince them, it may indeed be their fault; but he will do well to consider, for his part, whether he may not have overlooked something which they justly wish to conserve. Again, the rank and file of these advanced students themselves have commonly not been out of Egypt for a long time; and as they are conscious that they were not bigots and dolts and cowards when they were in Egypt, they may well rise to the faith that others who still remain there may be fair-minded for all that. Of course exception must be made of the professional ark-saver. His eye is never single, and his whole mind is full of darkness. Furthermore, they should remember that higher criticism has kept very bad company in times past, and that even now the enemies of the faith are largely gathered under its banner. If there be any denier of prophecy, miracle, and the supernatural in general, he is a higher critic as a matter of course. It is not surprising, therefore, even though it be unwarranted and unjust, that the faithful Trojans should be suspicious of the critical Greeks, even when they claim to bring gifts."

# CHAPTER XII

# THE RELIGIOUS GUIDE

ONCE started in the definitely practical phases of Christian leadership Bowne found that participation in the biblical debate led on to more personal and spiritual questions. Men began to ask him as to the intimate phases of Christian experience. His replies were given in personal interviews, in articles in the religious press, and finally in a book called *Studies in Christianity*. Such guidance took up a goodly share of the last ten years of his life.

The Methodist Episcopal Church began with an emphasis on inner experience in the heart of the Christian. It is customary to date the vital beginning of Methodism with that experience of John Wesley, in which he found his heart "strangely warmed." The outstanding features of those early years of conquest were the decisive conversions attending the preaching of Wesley and his followers. They taught that a man might know inwardly that he was saved by a witness of the Spirit, and his subsequent progress in the Christian life was supposed to be marked by definite inner crises.

As the years went by the church came to demand almost a standardized experience. The witness of the Spirit was so taught that it seemed to mean, to younger believers especially, almost an audible voice sounding in inner consciousness. Many of the theological students who sat under Bowne's teaching had been taught to believe that such experience was normally to be expected.

The present generation does not know much about that former teaching of old-time Methodism, but we are more and more hearing an emphasis on mysticism which is just as perplexing and baffling. What Bowne said about the experience, overemphasized by Methodism, can be repeated concerning much mysticism to-day and at all times. As long as men feel there is some strange, peculiar, and unusual quality in the Christian life, or some unique faculty which bears witness, apart from the conviction begotten as the whole life turns toward obedience to the divine will, they need teaching such as that of him whose guidance we are studying.

Let us start with one of Bowne's unforgettable illustrations. "A brother arises in the prayer service and says that the devil told him not to come to the meeting." Are we to infer, asks Bowne, that the brother had an infernal interview? Not at all. The fact is that he felt disinclined to come. The rest is his way of putting it. By the way, a group of Methodist preachers resented this illustration, and wrote demanding that Bowne tell how he knew that the brother didn't see or hear the devil!

Suppose, now, there are listeners who take this brother's word in all good faith. The ignorant may be there, and children may be there. These do not understand. Even those who are neither children nor ignorant may think the speaker means more than that he felt a disinclination to come, and quite likely the brother himself thinks he means more than that. So that the door is open to misunderstanding. Let now the testimony be not to a voice of the devil but to the voice of the Lord. Let it be repeated by scores upon scores of testimonies; let this go on through generations, and we have confusion, from which only the good sense of the hardheaded believers can save us. Bowne turned his effort to helping on the cause of good sense in religion.

He always adhered faithfully to his one standard of the fullest and best life for men. The God he believed in was trying to bring men into fellowship with himself. In 1890 Bishop Foster delivered a series of lectures at Ohio Wesleyan University, and for use in those lectures sought answers from a score or so of religious leaders as to what it is to be a Christian.

Bowne's answer was given in twenty-five words which set forth following the Lord Jesus as the gist of the matter. I remember, as a college student, being struck with the exceeding brevity of Bowne's answer as compared with the long, cumbrous paragraphs of the other contributors. Following is the statement which to the Bishop seemed best:

> A Christian is one who believes and practices the truths and doctrines of Christianity, consisting of the facts of Christ's life and his teachings as found in the four Gospels, and the doctrines based upon them by his apostles. One may, therefore, be a good Jew, a good Buddhist, a good Confucian, a good Mohammedan, or a good Agnostic, and be no Christian; for though he may believe some truths and practice some virtues which are taught by Christ, he rejects the gospel and refuses supreme allegiance to him.
>
> Christ's first teaching was to call to repentance; his second, the necessity of a new birth; his third, faith in himself as essential to salvation. The believing penitent God accepts, forgives, and brings into right relations to himself. By an inward supernatural change he makes the love of God the supreme affection of his soul and gives him power to refrain from sinning and to obey God. He also gives him a filial relation to himself, graciously adopting him as a child. The sinner thus becomes a Christian, and to continue a Christian he must continue what God has made him—forgiven, renewed, and his child.
>
> A Christian, then, is one who takes Christ as his Saviour to save him and his Lord to rule him, who loves God more than all else, and his neighbor as himself; who, as to himself, subdues the evil within him; as to God, obeys his laws as given in the Scriptures; and as to his fellows, walks honestly, justly, unselfishly, kindly, helpfully, as Jesus would do in his place.

Compare this with Dr. Bowne's contribution to the symposium:

> "To be a Christian is to live in loving submission and active obedience to the will of God, trusting in his mercy in Jesus Christ." (*Philosophy of Christian Experience*, Appendix.)

Starting from this acceptance of the Lord Jesus as guide, Bowne laid stress on the righteous will as the center of Christian experience. If, out of that obedience, unusual emotional uplifts come, let them come, provided they lead to larger and better life. Now, this, obvious and commonplace as it sounds, was regarded when it was first uttered as dangerous, and is so regarded to-day in many circles that speak of the mystic experience on its own account. Let me remind my readers that Bowne was not ruling out mystic experiences. He himself had quite a mystical temper, and, on at least two occasions of which I am aware, conceded the spiritual worth and virtually the objective validity of experiences which definitely took the form of vision. In each instance the subject was a person of complete devotion to righteousness and the vision came out of prolonged searching for a right course. Bowne called these experiences supernormal. Such experiences, however, were not the essential. That essential was the will firmly set to do the purpose of God, and to find that purpose if it had to be sought for.

Here I may mention a position taken in the *Ethics,* the teaching that there is a double reference in the moral life. There is the central purpose to do right, and there is the search for light on what the right is. Bowne would not hear of a genuine purpose to do right unless that purpose showed itself in the most strenuous effort to find what the right called for. It is for the purpose of finding the truth that the Lord has given us our faculties. He has placed us in a world where we must in chief part find our own way. Any easy, lazy substitutes for earnest search for the right path Bowne dismissed as revealing the irreligious spirit.

To get back to "experiences." The organ for the discovery of the will of God is the whole life, founded in the devoted will. The mind plays its part and the emotions play their part, but the result is a conviction for which formal reasons cannot always be given. As the outcome of doing the will of God, as that will is progressively seized, the soul attains to the conviction of "being on the Lord's side," or of anything else that means identity of purpose with the divine. Separate aspects of experience, like emotional uplifts, or flashes of insight, or unusual coincidences of one description or another, are to be tested out by their strengthening or weakening the will to do right. Much of what used to pass as "finding peace" in religion Bowne attributed merely to psychological rhythm, or the swing of nervous periodicity. After a season of emotional uproar the life might settle into quiet, and the person might "feel better" without having undergone any moral change or re-enforcement, the experience being wholly psychological, or even almost purely physical.

The Methodist Episcopal Church used to suffer intensely from the religious arrogance—I might almost say bulldozing—of those who, on the basis of "experiences," claimed spiritual authority to tell others how to live, or gave themselves to courses annoying to others, expecting those others to acquiesce without complaint. Sometimes these enlightened souls were church officials, sometimes ministers, sometimes laymen, and at all times Bowne considered them nuisances. A bishop justifying a wretched piece of administration on the ground that he had spent much prayer over the problem, or a committeeman seeking to make an expression of consecration take the place of a showing of reasons—to all such Bowne was a scourge. One lay brother, who in the name of extreme devotion had exacted humiliating sacrifices of his family, and had made himself a pest to his acquaintances, after a while surmised that maybe something was wrong with himself and sought Bowne's counsel. "Wrong with you! I should say there is," was the comforting reply. "You are a sinner, lost in spiritual selfishness. You have baptized general ugliness and meanness into sanctity. Go home first of all and apologize to your wife and children. Then try henceforth to live a decent life." Abstractly, this sounds severe; concretely it was entirely justifiable.

I once was pastor of a woman—whom Bowne knew—a good woman after a fashion, who nevertheless had tendencies to what in other people would have been called worldliness, for she was fond of display and of luxury. Inasmuch, however, as she was a "professor" of the higher life of holiness the patient people of her church put up with a deal that was annoying, as a "peculiarity." At one time this woman took offense because I would not do something she wanted done, and informed me that she could not understand why the Lord was not answering her prayers by changing my mind. "Tell her," said Bowne, who knew the whole circumstances, "that if we regard iniquity in our hearts, He will not hear us. She should go through her soul, as it were, with a lighted candle to see if there be not some hidden iniquity—*perchance a wedge of gold or a Babylonish garment*."

A devoted young preacher came to Bowne in much bewilderment and announced that he was going to the foreign field as a missionary. Bowne offered his congratulations, but soon discovered that the youth was not going out of his own conviction but out of reliance on the counsel of a bishop, who had told him that it was the Lord's will for him to accept the appointment. It further appeared that the bishop had the appointment on his hands to fill speedily, that he had tried in many quarters for a missionary without success, that he had taken the young minister's willingness to accept the guidance of the bishop as of the Lord. There was no doubt that the bishop was acting in good enough faith, but he had asked nothing as to the young man's fitness to plunge without preparation into such a task. Bowne felt called on to say just how far short such a total situation fell of being a divine call, and how lacking in seriousness it was to ask a man to take a responsible appointment chiefly to get the weight off the mind of the appointing authority. Bowne did not conceive of mystic experience as being vouchsafed to men for the sake of relieving them of the exercise of their minds, which should be set with a flintlike determination to find out the truth. The quick flashes of insight which come as the climax of determined effort belong, of course, in another category.

This must not be taken to mean that he whose life we are studying believed in unnecessary struggle to find light as the mark of the divine discipline. Out of the unworldliness and unnaturalness of the Puritanism that condemned so much of the normal human existence there has descended to the Protestant churches the notion of the necessity of a willingness to renounce this or that in order to find spiritual understanding. This, in many quarters in Bowne's day—and in this later day, for that matter—led, and leads, some to the conclusion that a "call" from God must be a call to the disagreeable—a notion which heads straight toward fanaticism. A man with this misunderstanding, remarked Bowne, can ask himself so long, and so often, whether he has "all on the altar" that he can reduce himself to a state where it does not make much difference whether what is left is on the altar or not. Another question of like deadly import is that as to whether the seeker for the Kingdom is willing to give up all that he holds dear, and that he ought to hold dear. Against this false ascetism Bowne held that our spiritual duty is to redeem the ordinary activities of life, our relations in families, in neighborhoods and in states. The ordinary contacts of ordinary people are above all sacred as giving the opportunity for bringing in the kingdom of God. The kingdom of God does not consist necessarily in giving up this or that, but in carrying into whatever we do the Spirit of the Father.

In this connection I must mention Bowne's protest against the needless burden-bearing in this world. He used to say that the willingness of men and women day after day to take up a load of drudgery and carry it far into the night is an immense item to be set down to the credit of humanity. He said also that the fairest fruit in character which this world has to show is a mother who has come to age, having patiently reared a brood of children of her own—and often a brood of grandchildren—and done so with cheerful unselfishness. All this comes in the natural order, but there are other burdens which are needless, such as struggling for causes and institutions, and in some instances persons, that might better be left to themselves. He was never more wrathful than when he found men willing to sacrifice the care and training of their children to any cause whatsoever. "Such men may get into the Kingdom," he said, "but they ought to be chastened for a while with whips of scorpions." Simply because, in his thought, the field of the daily life is the sacred realm in which we are to show forth the Spirit of the Father in heaven, and by revealing the Spirit bring that kingdom to earth. All through this runs obviously the theme of the value of persons as ends-in-themselves.

Keeping this aim before us it is easy to see how Bowne's mind followed the trail through utterances that now and again seemed at odds with one another. He would not have a soft or smooth religion, and yet religion must strive after making the normal human life more human and normal. He abhorred all quick solutions of the intellectual difficulties of religion. If religion has to be belief anyhow, let us believe something worth believing. Though he did not feel called on to enter the fields of the more specifically theological debates, and though when he did enter such fields it was to strip the questions down to the bare essentials, yet when he reached those essentials he sought to make them a veritable challenge to all the life. We have seen how far he would go in his belief in Jesus Christ, putting a profoundly significant construction upon the conception of divine Sonship. If Jesus was only a man, like the rest of us, we have in his death just another instance of tragic devotion to truth. If he was the Son of God, we are dealing with a problem of quite a different order. We have a revelation to be followed with the last ounce of our consecration, inasmuch as the righteousness there revealed holds good in the constitution of the universe.

Still, nothing was farther from the Bowne spirit than the rule much talked about in his day, that we are to settle all private and public duties by asking, "What would Jesus do?" At the very time when this advice was most freely given, he wrote against it in the columns of *Zion's Herald*. He showed that the inquiry as to what Jesus would do may well arouse any mind to the need of personal sincerity, but beyond that it throws little light on specific duties. Jesus in our place would do whatever we ought to do, and what we ought to do we have to find out by the putting forth of all our powers. The raising of the question as to what Jesus would do is likely to give the questioner a shock, by bringing a sacred object of thought close to the workaday affairs of daily life. The shock may lead the devoted followers of Jesus to conclude forthwith that the situation which causes the shock is therefore evil. It might give one considerable of a start to think of Jesus, said Bowne, dressed like a man of our own time, but that does not mean that high hats and frock coats, or dress suits, for that matter, are necessarily wrong.

These more private matters will settle themselves. We soon find that the question as to what Jesus would do will not help us much. In the realms of social discussion, however, Bowne felt that while the raising of the Christian principle is vital, the asking of the question as to what Jesus would do was likely to cause harm as leading to unreal simplification. Jesus lived in a concrete environment different from ours. The social questions which concern us—I mean as regards detailed setting—had not arisen in his day. It is hardly to be expected, therefore, said Bowne, that any specific rules of conduct can be found in the teaching of Jesus. Jesus did more than all other forces put together to deepen the sense of obligation and to set on high the human ideal. He could not have given a code without imperiling the moral virtue which comes of one's thinking one's own way through. To attempt to deal with modern property-holding, industry, and international relationships by appeal to the teaching of Jesus is, according to Bowne, futile.

This leads us to say that Bowne stressed continually the dangers of moral codes. He could not have been the sound mind that he was and have denied the importance of law in society, but I am thinking now of the inner moral spirit. For that spirit the code of conduct must be progressive. The inner morality must be kept up to date, just as the will-to-do-right must be continually deepened and the ideal of human values continually expanded. The moral code of an age expresses a current conventional morality. Bowne considered it appalling for a Christian to shape his thought of duty merely by what was conventional at a given time. The soul must find higher laws for itself. Here in this inner realm the mighty spiritual destinies are determined.

Especially is one to hold to this need of increasing moral power in the presence of ecclesiastical requirements, or specific exercises whose avowed purpose is a spiritual result. Bowne taught that the evil of Pharisaism is mainly that it is easy. It is less strenuous to tithe mint, anise, and cummin than to give heed to mercy and truth. Suppose there are a thousand regulations governing the right use of the Sabbath. It would have been easier, in the days of the Pharisees, to learn them all and keep them all than to use the Sabbath, or any other day, with the loftiest spiritual purpose. If there is any strength left after observing the Commandments, the one whose life thus moves by the rule is likely to think that he can do what he pleases. Whereas, in a genuine Christian spirit, the moral requirement rules everywhere and always. Only, it is an affair of spirit and not of code. Bowne enjoyed quoting Hazlitt about the desire of occasionally going out for an airing beyond the strict precincts of one's conscience. He also used to tell of a worthy ministerial friend who made lofty pretensions to religious attainment but who used to long for what he called "such an extension of Christian privilege" as would allow him to kick some fools he knew around the block. Probably Bowne himself thought the fools needed the kicking, as did also the "conscienceless and voluble persons of the yahoo type" who declaimed against the failure of marriage, for example. I have referred to the revival of mysticism at the present time. Recently a distinguished student has told us that in true mysticism we go above the realm of right and wrong, and enter into the divine experience to enjoy it for what it is in itself. I mention this because it is so exact a summary of what Bowne did not teach. The only mysticism he would recognize as having a significance for Christianity is that which has a moral basis, and rises out of the will-to-do-right. To the life set toward righteousness all manner of illuminations may come, but they must rise out of moral doing, and they must lead on to moral strength. Every aid should be sought to make the religion of Jesus attractive. "Storied windows richly dight," said Bowne, are indeed artistic glories, but the mood begotten by gazing at them is not to be taken as necessarily ethical. It may be nothing of the sort; it may be indifferent, or even opposed to the ethical.

It may be asked—indeed, often was asked in Bowne's day—why, if these human values are so essential, Bowne did not go over to humanism outright, with emphasis on the human values on their own account, without bringing in any religious conceptions whatever. If human values are supreme on their own account, why not serve men on their own account? It is true that the precise accents of our current humanism were not being sounded in Bowne's day, but the essentials of the doctrine were present and he dealt with them. Schiller, of Oxford, had for himself at least replaced the term "pragmatism" with "humanism"; and the pluralist made the human selves exist from all eternity, the only creators there are. A concession was made for God in this pluralistic scheme by conceiving him as a finite factor, indescribably mightier than the other finites indeed, but finite nevertheless. It is not necessary to retrace our steps into philosophy to indicate how foreign this was to Bowne's thinking.

The humanism of to-day is akin to positivism in science. It recognizes definite services that can be rendered to men and seeks to render them. It does not ask as to the desert of men before it seeks to help them. It takes them as they are and asks no philosophical questions, just as the investigating scientist studies physical events without adventuring into metaphysics at all. So the practical helper of men advances to his deeds of helpfulness without any reflections on man's place in the universe. He finds men in need of help and gives the help, and that is all there is to it.

No, Bowne said, this is not all there is to it. He conceded, indeed, that just as positivistic principles are all that are needed for immediately practical scientific investigations, so a human willingness to help is often all that is needed for emergencies in human affairs. I remember the expression on his face when a letter came from a student in India telling why a thesis on a philosophic theme had not yet been completed. The student was in a famine district and reported that the first spectacle that greeted his eyes in the morning was scores of starving babies brought to his house for a few mouthfuls of food. Under such conditions reflections on underlying philosophical problems had to be postponed. There is more or less emergency in all our life, in India and elsewhere.

Still, Bowne insisted that, after all, it makes a deal of difference as to how we approach the problem even of feeding starving babies. Oriental officials have been known to approach it with the cool reflection that lands like India and China are overcrowded anyhow, and famine is one way of restoring a balance. Other Orientals have looked upon famine fatalistically. In other words, while it is well enough to say that formal theories concerning the place of human life in the universe are not necessary in a Christian land where Christian assumptions are inescapably in the air we breathe, it would be another matter to deny the importance of such theories if the proposition were to rule them and their assumptions out altogether.

Moreover, in dealing with the masses of mankind we have to recognize that, inspected at close range, most of them are not likely themselves to supply the strongest motive for works of relief. Men looked at in the mass, just as they appear to be, show their "seamy" side. Effort for them commonly must be sustained by laboring toward ideal humanity as our inspiration, and when we raise considerations as to ideals we are on the path toward a philosophy.

The humanist—or the humanitarian, to use the term more commonly employed in Bowne's day—asks if a man loves his mother on her own account, or on account of her theoretical place in a philosophy of the universe. To all questions like this the Bowne reply was that the chief value of finite souls is to God, and that if a man seriously loves a person, the path to still deeper affection can come through increasing realization of the value of the beloved person to God. One would hardly feel like saying that one would not care to see a truer estimate of the virtues of one's mother, or to enter into the noblest possible estimate of her. Bowne held that the value of men is ultimately to God the Father, though he was careful to make clear, as he did in a reply to an attack made by Dr. Daniel Steele on his exposition of the divine Fatherhood, that when he said fatherhood he meant fatherhood, and not grandfatherhood. Nor did he mean paternalism.

This professed unwillingness to look beyond the immediately human has its parallelism in a positivism which declares there is nothing binding in its findings anywhere beyond particular experiments. In his shrinking at the idea of universal law Mill said that two and two might make five on some other planet. That is to say, remarked Bowne, not exactly four. The normal mind rejects such a deliverance at once. If the scientist genuinely becomes convinced that truth is nothing more than a limited insight, or succession of insights good only in limited localities, the nerve of the truth-seeking mind has been cut. The only force that will long hold the thinker to his work is the conviction that at bottom skepticism is not real, even when it is most loudly affirmed. So with the spirit which would serve men. The effort itself to save them, no matter how small their personal deserts, is a sign of an assumption that they are more than the bare facts about them would indicate. As Bowne said, if giving a cup of water or a crust of bread is only the prolonging of a wretched existence by a few days, such a work of alleviation is of slight consequence at best. The words: "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these ye have done it unto me" lift the act of mercy into quite a higher plane of significance.

After what I have said about mysticism it is only just to say also that Bowne felt that the human self is not likely to go far toward its noblest development without feeling the need of companionship with the Infinite Self. He did not undertake to suggest the form of such companionship, except that it more and more becomes the felt need of the total life as the life becomes practiced into doing the will of God. For himself he made use of all the so-called "means of grace," of meditation and prayer and worship. He was a regular attendant at the prayer meeting service of the Saint Mark's Methodist Church, of Brookline, when he could have availed himself legitimately of a score of excuses if he had not earnestly desired to attend.

Personal immortality he took as a matter-of-course implication following from his thought of God. The customary arguments for immortality he dismissed. It was not to be expected that one who insisted so positively that there is no conclusive argument for the existence of God would hold to formal argument for immortality. That does not mean that he allowed that there was any important argument against it. Believing as he did that there is no way of accounting for thinking itself except by an agent which cannot be described in physical terms, he was not at all disturbed at the dependence of that agent on earthly conditions, though these conditions are not inherently indispensable. He never subscribed to the efforts of some intelligent thinkers in the direction of psychical research. William James at one time seems to have hoped for much from such research, but Bowne never shared the hope. Dr. Minot J. Savage once came to Bowne telling him of a wonderful message he had received on a slate, in a darkened room, with the slate held behind his back. All Bowne said was that he had no interest in messages thus received. If the slate could be held out where he could see it, and the light turned on, he might be interested. All alleged spiritistic communications he pronounced depressing.

On the other hand Bowne had not a trace of patience with the theologians who deftly and certainly inform us as to the conditions of the other life. All that must be left in the hands of God. He held somewhat grimly to the conviction that the escape from consequences of sin could be achieved, not by any word of forgiveness, but by the actual working of the will toward righteousness. The personal attitude of the Infinite Person might be one thing, the consequences of wrongdoing quite another. Forgiveness might readily be granted, but the universe, if it is to be moral at all, must be so made as to bring different consequences to transgression from the consequences of obedience. Notions like conditional immortality, with immortality a prize grasped by an exceptionally spiritual few, he rejected. He once quoted with approval a remark attributed to Abraham Lincoln, though there is no evidence, according to Dr. W. E. Barton, the foremost authority on such matters, that Lincoln ever uttered the remark. Speaking of immortality, Lincoln is alleged to have said, "It must be for all or none." Bowne saw in immortality the only adequate opportunity for the expansion of that human life which he made so important in his system. In fact, he held that up to date, taking the world over, humanity has not had a chance.

Belonging to the Methodist Episcopal Church Bowne was now and again set upon for supposed lack of interest in what

Methodists call evangelism. It was because of a supposed chilling influence of his teaching on the evangelical temper that, as he said, "faithful editorial watchdogs of Methodism would bark through column after column" at him. For evangelistic methods as ordinarily practiced he had little sympathy, but for the bringing in of the Kingdom through persuading men to yield their wills to the divine will he had every regard. For evangelistic effort carried on by pastors who knew how to shepherd souls he had sincere respect, but most professional evangelists, with their shoddy and claptrap theology, their artificial tests, their overworked emotionalism, were an abomination to him. For winning the outsider he thought the church should rely on personal effort; in caring for converts he felt also that the best service would be rendered by wise personal guidance. He used to declare that no better means of spiritual guidance had been contrived than the classmeeting as conceived by John Wesley, and he thought it still had possibilities in spite of all the changes since Wesley's day.

The main stress, however, was to be on religious education. Here again he stood for the Wesley doctrine that the child is born into the kingdom of God, or, adapting Amiel's expression, born as a candidate for the kingdom. It is the duty of parents and teachers to make the election sure. Times have changed for the better since Bowne began to speak of religious education, but his words were sadly needed when he began; and they are needed still, especially in their caution that the child must be treated as a human being. The use of the questionnaire method was just becoming general as Bowne passed off the scene. The questionnaire is only an attempt to ask questions on an extensive scale, but Bowne thought we all ought to pray for deliverance from fool questions. He did not know which was worse, an exhortation which he had heard a Sunday-school teacher giving a class of little tots always to "look up to Jesus" where it manifestly suggested something like looking up a tree, or the wooden mechanicalism of some modern religious pedagogy. Yet he insisted that religious education was the only way, provided the nature of the child's mind be held always in plain view. Bowne had quite an exalted idea of the ordinary child mind just as we find it, and protested against its being abused. I knew him once to speak of a small boy's defense of a singed cat, at which bystanders were throwing stones, as a manifestation of genuine moral spirit. In moral equipment and in capacity for insight he thought the child "further along," so to speak, than is ordinarily understood, an outspokenness of the child often being taken as a mark of inferiority, when it is just naïveté. For example, he declared that the child finds the church service irksome and says so. The man feels likewise, but keeps still. A cynic might remind us, as we think of Bowne's exalted opinion of childhood, that Bowne himself had no children.

All the present-day methods of pedagogy, religious and secular, that keep in mind the human character of the pupils Bowne would have welcomed, but he would have fought against fussy infringements upon the child's liberty, or too close inquisitiveness into the child's own affairs. To indicate how far we have come in the past quarter century I will say that when the proposal was first made to have oculists go through the schools examining the eyes of school children Bowne commented, "I suppose the next step will be to send dentists around looking into their mouths." Well, the dentists are doing just that to-day, and if Bowne were here he would approve. What he always feared in such matters was paternalism, which outside of childhood he called bad, and which even with children is likely to violate the child's own self-respect or interfere with his growing independence. It was the precious human possibilities which he sought and which he fought to guard. These were the sacred goods, standing in their own right.

It must be clear by this time that the subject of this study was intensely religious. There were intimate passages in his life, of which it is not permissible to speak at length—griefs which went to the inner depths, as of the loss of a friend of whom he said that he would walk through the whole earth for another glimpse of the departed face. Without any trace of melancholy he lived much in the memory of those who had gone. In passing familiar spots in Brooklyn, and New York, and Boston he would stop for a moment and say: "Here is where I last saw Dr. Duryea," or whoever it might have been. From an outward view his life must have seemed singularly happy, and for the most part it was so; but the loss of friends through death became more painful to him as the years went by, as did also the increasing realization of the distresses of the world. He once applied to himself a remark of Charlotte Corday that she was too sensitive to the wrongs in the world ever to be completely happy. He never doubted as to the essentials, and yet he worried a good deal over details near at hand. He said that in the long range his faith always stood by him, but that at short range he had many anxieties. Toward the close of his life two or three heavy blows fell unexpectedly upon him, and thereafter he gave the impression of one in apprehension of something dreadful that might suddenly happen.

As a revelation of the best in Bowne's religious mood I add here a prayer uttered at the funeral of his long-time friend, Bishop Randolph S. Foster:

> O God, thou art the Lord of life and death! Life and death are alike thy ministers, and in both life and death thy children are safe and secure in the Everlasting Arms.
>
> Our Father, we gather here in the sorrow of our human bereavement. Our hearts ache and the tears start before the awful void and silence left by this vanished life.
>
> But we gather, also, in the solemn joy and triumph of our Christian faith. For thou hast brought life and immortality to light, and we sorrow not as those who have no hope. We are not left to the sad and sinister suggestions of the visible senses. We are not left to stand by these precious relics, soon to be hidden forever from our sight, and think that this is all and this the end. To sense, indeed, this is the

end, but to faith it is the beginning. The mortal life has ended, and the life immortal begun. By faith we see our father, our brother, our friend, freed from the weakness and frailty of the earthly life and putting on the strength of the eternal years. We follow him into the glad reunions and divine revealings of the better land. We see him join "the great intelligences fair, who range above our mortal state," to whom he always belonged in aim and sympathy, and to whom he was bound by every spiritual affinity. We see him "where loyal hearts and true stand ever in the light, all rapture through and through in God's most holy sight." But, above all, we see him face to face with his Lord, whose he was and whom he served, and whose love was his supreme delight. He knows no longer in part, but knows even as he is known. Earth's sorrows have vanished, the mysteries are made clear, and now the eternal living, and the eternal loving, and the tireless activities, and the divine fellowships of the skies, are his. We bless thee, our Father, for the exceeding grace and wonder and comfort of the hope of the gospel. By a light above the brightness of the sun, shining from the upper sky, thou dost transform the gates of death and darkness into the gates of life and light. Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost!

We thank thee, our Father, for the holy dead, for the great multitude which no man can number who have been gathering home out of every age and kindred and tongue and clime. They served thee in their day and generation, and passed into the heavens, where they are forever with thee, faithful over a few things and now made rulers over many. For all of these holy souls we give thee thanks, and especially we thank thee for those that we have known who have faithfully lived and peacefully and bravely died. They vanished from our side and from our arms, but they are ours forevermore. Death has separated but for a little while, and we are one family still. In Christ we and the holy dead are united. They belong to us and we to them, one in the service of our common Lord, and one in his eternal plan.

"One family we dwell in Him,
One Church, above, beneath,
Though now divided by the stream,
The narrow stream, of death."

Especially do we thank thee for this our friend, whom thou hast taken to thyself. We bless thee for all that thou didst for him and through him; for his great talents and his greater faithfulness and devotion; for the great work he did in guiding the thought of the church and the world, and for the great example of a noble life whereby he became an abiding inspiration to the best things to all who knew him. And now he rests from his labors, and his works follow him in ever-growing harvests of blessing.

And now we pray that thou wilt bless to all of us this solemn scene and hour. Bring home to every heart the sense of our mortality. Help us to realize that the things that are seen are temporal, and that only the things unseen are eternal. Free us from undue bondage to temporal things. Make us mindful of the end, and help us to estimate life's values aright. And seeing that the night cometh and life hastens so swiftly to be gone, whatsoever our hands findeth to do may we do it with our might. May we pattern after thy servant, and in our place and measure imitate him in the unselfishness of his life and the greatness of his devotion, so that his life, which was the life of Christ, may reappear in us.

And now, our Father, we especially pray for the hearts that are especially sore and smitten. Thou only canst help. Thou only canst bind up the broken heart. O God, who knowest our frame, who rememberest that we are dust, have mercy upon us! O Christ, who hast borne our griefs and carried our sorrows, have mercy upon us! O Holy Spirit, who art the Comforter, have mercy upon us! Help us to see that thou wast never nearer, never more kind and loving, than now in the hour of sorrow. Help us to cast ourselves upon thy love, and wait for thy peace and thy salvation.

And in thy mercy grant us thy grace for the life that now is, and bring us all to the inheritance of the saints in light; there to take up again the interrupted friendship, and go on forevermore in unbroken communion in thy presence! Amen, and Amen!

I close this chapter with an excerpt from a letter from Dr. Lucius H. Bugbee, of Hennepin Avenue Methodist Church of Minneapolis, Minnesota, who was Bowne's pastor at Saint Mark's, Brookline, for the two years preceding his death. Of the men who had ministered to Bowne in the pastoral relation, the two whom he mentioned most often were Dr. Dillon Bronson and Doctor Bugbee; Doctor Bronson for marked capacity for helpful personal friendship, and Doctor Bugbee for effective expression of acute religious insight. Doctor Bugbee writes under date of June 20, 1927:

He was always at prayer-meeting, as you probably know, and seldom failed to express some very pertinent and helpful thought. A favorite quotation of his, given with the utmost sympathy and understanding, was two or three stanzas from Richard Baxter's hymn, number 470, in our hymnal:

"Lord, it belongs not to my care
Whether I die or live;
To love and serve thee is my share,
And this thy grace must give,"

especially the third stanza:

"Christ leads me through no darker rooms
Than he went through before;
He that into God's kingdom comes
Must enter by this door."

My attention had never been called before to that hymn, and his use of it made a deep impression on my mind. It stands out in my memory as a most striking expression of his own religious experience.

## CHAPTER XIII

## THE FOE OF OFFICIALISM

WE come now to an aspect of Bowne's contribution to the religious organization to which he belonged. About this some might raise question, but those who knew well the Methodism of his day rank the value of the services as high. I refer to his persistent criticism of officialism, especially of the ecclesiastical type. Methodism is a highly centralized organization. A large part of its practical efficiency is due to that centralization, but Methodism has suffered in the past and always is in danger of suffering from the tendency of officialism to take itself too seriously. Bowne indeed knew and said that any good cause has to work through practical machinery, but he declared that the only safety in dealing with organizations is frankly to face their faults. The danger of organizations, he said, could only be averted as somebody now and then would be willing—I am using his phrase—to "run amuck" among them, crying aloud and sparing not. Surely, Bowne did his share of the running amuck. If some of his statements seem extreme, we must remember the exceeding slowness of the official mind. Bowne thought of ecclesiastical bureaucrats as he thought of French courts in the Dreyfus case—in which he took immense interest—as so jealous of their own prerogatives, as so sensitive to the consequences to themselves of "losing face," that they are likely to go to frightful lengths for expediency as against justice. In sixteen years of experience among the kind of officials, namely, Methodist bishops—whom Bowne lashed most vigorously—I do not know that I have ever met just the officialism that seemed most offensive to Doctor Bowne, but I am confident that without such criticism as his, ecclesiastical officials are sources of genuine peril. The officials themselves seldom can see this; they resent the criticism. Every official position as important as the bishopric of the Methodist Episcopal Church is inevitably privileged. In spite of all that can be said about democratizing the episcopacy, even by the most radical changes, the man actually holding the bishop's power, even for a brief period, is in a post of privilege. Among the privileges should not be that of exemption from criticism. Criticism of authorities is not ideal, but episcopacy itself is not ideal. There are original sins characteristic of organization and officialism, original as being inherent, and against such Bowne fought.

The case which called forth his most scathing comment was the Mitchell trouble, to which I have already referred. It was through the failure of the bishops to confirm that Professor Mitchell lost his chair in Boston University. The argument of the bishops was vulnerable from many angles. The most of the Episcopal Board were not qualified to deal with the critical and doctrinal issues involved. They had not been elected with such qualifications in mind. Competent administrators no doubt many of them were, but the curse of administrative ability is that it so often looks to immediate practical results. If there was uproar in the church, that was enough for the true-to-type official leader. The presence of the uproar was *prima facie* evidence of Mitchell's lack of pedagogical skill; and some bishops who measurably agreed with Mitchell voted against him on the ground that he was doing harm to the church by being a persistent storm-center.

Bowne felt positively that there had been bad faith on the part of some of the bishops, though I do not think that such a judgment was warranted. His ground for this belief was that some of the men on the committee to examine Mitchell's *World Before Abraham,* which was the main object of attack, had admitted that they had not read the book. Bowne said that if in a civil court a jury failed to examine evidence it would be jailed for contempt of court. Jurymen, however, would not be treated as severely as that if they failed to examine evidence they could not understand.

The case distressed Bowne beyond words—and that is saying a good deal, considering the words he did and could use. His faith in the episcopacy as such, especially in the members who had acquiesced in the decision against Mitchell when they should have stood stiffly for him, was so shaken that it never fully recovered. He was for the elimination of the episcopacy root-and-branch, until the action of the General Conference of 1908 in taking doctrinal decisions out of the hands of bishops somewhat mollified him. It must be said too that he never wavered in his admiration for Bishop Andrews, who though the oldest member of the Board at the time stood with complete determination for Mitchell to the end.

In all this badly bungled matter Bowne's central contention was sound. The settlement of a doctrinal controversy, when an unfamiliar aspect of teaching is under fire, should never be left to a group of ecclesiastical administrators; for, with the best of intentions, those administrators give too much weight to immediately visible factors. In the main, too, Bowne was right on the whole episcopal system. His judgment that it should be abolished outright manifestly came out of disgust over the Mitchell result and later underwent change, but his essential claim that such an institution is safe only under the light of publicity and the fire of criticism cannot be gainsaid. If it is necessary for Methodism to have an episcopacy—and no one believes in it as an effective working instrument, and as a basis for eventual ecclesiastical union of denominations, more heartily than the present writer—it should be regarded as forever on trial, with the retirement of bishops and the modification of the office held fast as means of guarding vital religious interests. Admittedly, we run the risk of having disgruntled soreheads and half-baked tinkers doing the modifying, but that risk is inevitable. I include here excerpts from two letters to an eminent Methodist minister, which are valuable for light on his attitude toward Methodist authorities:

> With regard to your ecclesiastical relations, I hope you will not be hasty in reaching a decision. I gather from your letter that financially you are fairly well treated, as such matters go in our church, and I infer that your difficulty is rather one of lack of sympathy with some of the authorities and some of the men and methods in the church. I have no doubt that your feeling in this matter is quite correct, but this thing seems to be a part of the present situation and has to be endured as one of the things that go to make up the life of to-day. I feel the same myself, and on a great many accounts would find it more congenial in other communions, but I do not feel free to go on my own accord without some better reason than I have. Our church has in it a large body of ignorant people, and there is somewhat of ignorance in high places, but, after all, it is a great body of much real efficiency and more potential efficiency, and I have never felt justified in leaving it to flounder in ignorance in order to be more comfortably or congenially located myself. The leaven that is to leaven the lump must be in the lump. If it be removed from contact with the lump, it will have no leavening power, and it seems to me that the lump is big enough and important enough to give every bit of leaven a worthy task in the way of leavening; and I have no doubt that when you come to be mustered out you will be better satisfied if you can look back upon such leavening work, even in uncongenial circumstances, than to look back upon a life of more peace and quiet under pleasanter conditions but with less real effectiveness. Not to go through life quietly and comfortably, but to execute a high commission is our real task.
>
> "They climbed the steep ascent of heaven
> Through peril, toil, and pain:
> O God, to us may grace be given
> To follow in their train."
>
> With respect to the General Conference, I am not discouraged. I hardly think the ultraconservative elements will accomplish much in their own line. It appears to me that the light is breaking in.
>
> One good sign is that they [the bishops] put the better sort of bishops on the Committee to revise the Conference Course of Study, and I think many of them are really anxious to please and even to propitiate the more progressive element. In any case, we are much better off than we were not many years ago. Then most of our leaders "had

not so much as heard" of many of the newer views, whereas now all of them have heard of them and some of them are embracing them. My own feeling about the bishops is that they are in the main well meaning, but weak and timid. Had they been men who commanded respect by their scholarship and character, they could have guided the church by simply saying that these questions are subordinate in any case and do not concern the standing or falling of the faith, and by inciting the church to greater activity along the fundamental lines of faith in God the Father Almighty and in his Son and in the Holy Spirit and the forgiveness of sins and building up the kingdom of God. These things constitute the real faith of the church and work for these things is a great source of faith. No church working on these lines will ever go far into unfaith, and a church that does not work on these lines is of little value anyhow, but the good men did not know the day of their visitation, and they had not the authority that comes from scholarship and character. They could not read the signs of the times [in the Mitchell case], and by consequence they became blind leaders of the blind with the usual result of that condition of things.

Hughes has the real stuff in him. To look at him one would not take him for anything like his real worth, but he has done a great work there [in California] and elsewhere. I heard recently a little story about him which is at once to his credit and to another's discredit. It was at the time of one of the bishops' meetings when one of the bishops proceeded to denounce Professor Sheldon's *Systematic Theology* and declared that it was a crying shame that such a heretical book should be published by the Methodist House. Here Hughes interrupted to ask if he had ever read the book, and the poor creature said, "Not all of it." Hughes continued, "Have you read any of it?" and he had to admit that he had not. Then the other said, "Have you read the book?" "Yes," Hughes replied, "I have read it all three times and I accept every word of it." And there was a great calm.

I was once sitting beside Doctor Bowne at an Annual Conference session when the bishop was about to read the appointments. The bishop was one of the very old school with an exalted notion of his own importance. The Conference had to listen to a dissertation on the wisdom of leaving appointments in the hands of bishops without any interference or suggestion by ministers whatever. The good man went on to tell us that once in a session of an Annual Conference he was confronted with the responsibility of making twelve most difficult assignments. Preachers and ministers swarmed around to give advice, but the bishop turned it all over to the Lord, seeking for no earthly help whatever. He blandly remarked in conclusion that of the twelve appointments only three proved to have been at all mistaken. Whereupon Bowne remarked to me that only three mistakes out of twelve possibilities was a very good record for the Lord when he was working unhindered.

I am well aware that there may be some question as to the propriety of my repeating the Bowne criticisms on the episcopacy, but the criticisms were all essentially sound. Moreover, every Methodist preacher knows that in the voicing of the criticisms, Doctor Bowne was expressing a judgment, or at least a mood, which at times mentally takes possession of Methodist minds. It is well for everybody, bishops included, to let the criticism come out into utterance.

In the Mitchell case itself the question of religious freedom was up, and, in Bowne's thought, freedom was not to be interfered with. Let it not be imagined for one moment that Bowne held the creed of academic freedom which would guarantee a professor's position to him after he had developed eccentricity, or was neglecting the fields for which he was selected, or was aiming at sensationalism, or was making a fool of himself, or had become lazy. In such circumstances he would let the ax fall summarily. When, however, a scholar like Hinckley G. Mitchell, thoroughly loyal to the church, was teaching what needed to be taught, even though it was not familiar, the loss to the church and the truth through removal he considered irremediable. Bowne knew too much to subscribe to the doctrine that martyrdom makes for helpful publicity. The claim that the man dies and his work goes on he never subscribed to, except in the obvious and commonplace sense; that is to say, he did not believe that first-class minds could be easily replaced. He would have admitted that the philosopher whom he considered probably foremost of all, Immanuel Kant, started philosophical tendencies which would never cease to affect the world of thinking, but he taught that we must make the most of the Kants while they are here, that after they are gone they never can be replaced. At the time Mitchell was removed there was not his superior as an Old Testament scholar in the United States, and not his superior in devotion to the kingdom of God through reverent study of the Scriptures. His methods were not lively, or especially enlivening, but he was a scholar and a saint. Bowne thought the interference with such leaders a direct attack upon the very foundation of an educated ministry. He used to say that as he looked upon theological students and saw the vastness of the responsibility to which they were called, their manifest inadequacy, and the need of their getting the best available training, he "felt like screaming." He saw in Methodism in particular the potentialities of enormous conquests for the Kingdom if zeal could be joined with disciplined knowledge. The size of Methodism as a denomination had prevented it from doing the qualitative work which is essential if we are to have a kingdom of Christ. The wisdom of the horsemen's proverb, "Mettle is bad in a blind horse," seemed to Bowne so applicable to half-trained but zealous preachers that he advised them to bind that motto as a frontlet between their eyebrows. None of this is to be taken, however, as supercilious disparagement of Methodism. After all the faults of the denomination had been dwelt upon, he would remind the critics that Methodism had at least the advantage of being alive. When a distinguished leader in another denomination sought to dissuade a bright student from accepting a Methodist pulpit because the congregation was composed of tradespeople led by a fishdealer, Bowne calmly remarked that the publicans and the harlots would get into the kingdom of heaven before the distinguished ecclesiastic in question.

To some it seemed that the Bowne attacks on officialism came of an excessively critical spirit and of a fondness for criticism itself. I do not think this is just. It is quite possible that Bowne, with his interests in the intellectual, was not qualified to take due account of the difficulties of officialdom; but, even so, the soundness of his essential contentions must not be forgotten. Bowne desired that first things be kept first. He had little interest in General Conference elections; in his book on the *Immanence of God* he refers to General Conferences, and General Assemblies, and Church Conventions, and "all such unprofitable works of darkness." When, therefore, he went with Bishop John H. Vincent to a series of Ohio Annual Conferences in 1895—a General Conference election year—and found the brethren so taken up with lobbying that they could not find time to listen to addresses on the essentials of Christian thought and experience, the vials of his wrath were opened for a wider sprinkling than that on bishops alone.

If Bowne had lived till to-day, he would have probably been extremely suspicious of the growth of all varieties of ecclesiastical mechanisms which thwart or stunt the search for an adequate Christian interpretation of the universe. He was to a degree an administrator himself as dean of the Graduate School of Boston University, and performed his duties with effectiveness; but he would not allow himself to be entangled in details or caught in machinery. The bewildering multiplicities of the administration of a church to-day would have called forth his protest, as would also the handing down of plans from official superiors. If he had been told—what is undoubtedly true—that there are in every ministry scores of men who will do nothing beyond the barest necessities unless somebody gets after them, he would have replied that all such should be forthwith "cashiered." The difficulties in such wholesale cashiering he did not stop to reckon. Here, again, however, he was on the right track. One has only to glance at the frightful numerousness of ecclesiastical mechanisms to-day to see how in number and complexity they are a hindrance to religious prophecy and to the insight of trained religious discernment. Doing the will of God has often come to mean a bustling about on ecclesiastical trivialities not worth a straw. The distraction of mind and the nervous waste interfere, as Bowne said, with the further "revelation of the Revelation."

We sometimes assume that profound philosophic reflection unfits the brooder for practical affairs, as if philosophers could not be administrators. Hegel's wandering into Jena on the morning of Napoleon's battle and asking why so many soldiers were there seems always typical. Bowne, indeed, sometimes passed judgment on administrative concerns in phrases that sounded cruel, but he was never wide of the mark. He saw the tendencies, in American education especially, to become paternalistic in interference with students, and stood against this as unsound pedagogy and bad administration. He would not countenance overmuch educational apparatus with its modern intricacy and complexity, and "stripped" all his own machinery down to the absolutely indispensables. A student accustomed to elaborate directions as to just how to prepare and preserve the results of lectures in notebooks once went to Bowne to ask about rules as to how the notes on the lectures should be put together, having in mind the requirements of some professors that notebooks be handed in for professorial inspection. The only answer was, "The supreme requisite is an understanding mind."

Upon the resignation of Doctor Warren from the presidency of Boston University in 1902, quite a number of Bowne's students thought their philosophic leader should be Doctor Warren's successor. The tone given the institution by the educational policies of Doctor Warren seemed to them to call for the election of a successor who would stand for the same ideals. Other friends felt that Doctor Bowne should at all costs be kept at his teaching post, and this wiser counsel prevailed. I have always thought, nevertheless, that Bowne would have made a good university president. He would not have done much soliciting for money but he would have maintained his institution on the soundest educational basis. He would have kept the standards high; he would have stood for the best traditions of academic freedom in accordance with the policy adopted by Doctor Warren, and he would have used the utmost care in selecting professors; but having selected them, he would have stood by them most loyally. In 1894 a professorship in preaching became vacant in the School of Theology and Bowne went to the trustees and suggested that they call the Rev. E. H. Hughes, of Newton Center, then about twenty-seven years of age. "What is the use of bothering with small fry?" was his appeal. There were before the trustees the names of some men then regarded as the best masters of preaching in the country. By the way, Bowne wrote to the author of this book as follows, January 28, 1905:

> It appears to me there should be a way of studying sermonic literature and the sources of sermon material which should be fruitful beyond anything yet attempted. Comparative studies of preachers, studies of biography, studies of literature with reference to its homiletic value, studies of living men at work. All these might be used so as to make the dry bones of homiletics live and move and have their effective being. I sometimes wish I had a relay of heads, a set of about four, so that I could work continually by screwing on a fresh one at will. In that case I would like to try the chair of practical theology to see if something could not be made out of it.

Bowne could in committee meetings sweep away the ordinary conventional speech of recommendation about as neatly and completely as the mind of man could conceive. A good layman of financial importance once urged on Bowne the desirability of supporting a particular candidate for an eminent educational position. Much praise might justly have been spoken of the candidate, but what the layman actually said was: "I favor this man because he is an excellent judge of men. He has moved around in the world a great deal, and is socially attractive—especially a wonderful story-teller." Bowne instantly replied: "All those recommendations could be put forth in favor of the devil. He is a good judge of men. He could not do what he does if he were not. We have it on high authority that he has moved around in the world a great deal; and, no doubt, if he were put to it, he could tell a number of capital stories."

There was not much sense in talking of the subordination of a faculty to the policies of trustees with Bowne in the faculty. The Boston University trustees in his day were singularly intelligent, and for the most part never thought of interfering with professors. On one or two occasions, however, Bowne felt it necessary to oppose trustee policy. Whereupon a trustee who had followed the sea until he had become himself a captain—a fine character, who nevertheless supposed a college trusteeship was a quarter-deck—rushed into print in protest against what he called "having the ship run by the bullies on the main deck." That "tickled" Bowne. He said that it "smacked of the sea and of the rope's end." Only once or twice, however, did Bowne oppose trustees, and then solely for the sake of educational standards. It may be that the realization that any trustees would be slow to attempt to discipline him made him feel a responsibility for speaking out where others would have deemed it discreet to keep silent.

The following is an extract from an address on "Educational Fiatism," published in the *Personalist* nine years after Doctor Bowne's death:

> Questions of educational policy are not to be settled by popular clamor nor by the wishes of the students themselves. Scholars must decide them in the light of social needs and obligations, and they as little need to concern themselves respecting the opinions of the ignorant as physicians and legislators need concern themselves respecting the vote of dwellers of the slums against sanitary laws. It is the duty of the university to counteract popular errors and to set up a standard against them and not to yield to them. It is the duty of the college to lead, not to follow. It should express the opinion of the educated

world as to what constitutes a liberal education, and for the sake of guidance it is desirable that there should be some standard degree which should have a fairly definite meaning other than a quantitative one. Let the persons who do the work leading to this degree receive it and let all others be free to do what they please, on condition that they shall show proper industry in the work they choose. Such a rule would tend to clearness and would do no one any injustice. If this be thought a counsel of perfection, then another course is possible. Let every diploma state the work for which the degree is given. If it were given chiefly for a course in Italian novels or something else of the same sort let it appear in the diploma. There certainly would be no hardship in having the diploma state precisely what the student has done. In this way we might unite the extremest freedom of choice and get all the benefit of the youthful student's self-knowledge together with the little wisdom which might be added by the wise counsel of friends, and we should also not be doing business under false pretenses.

# CHAPTER XIV

## THE TEACHER AND HIS METHODS

TO those who have had the patience to read thus far, some qualities of Bowne in the classroom are probably manifest, but it may be worth while to look a little more closely at some of his methods. Especially is this in order because of the tendency of teachers to-day to criticize the Bowne pedagogy sharply as being of the propaganda order, not allowing pupils to take time to make up their own minds. In other words, Bowne's attitude is characterized as of the "take-it-or-leave-it" variety, but with the probability that one who left it would not likely hold the favor of the teacher.

What measure of pertinence there is in this criticism is due to the fact that Bowne's aim was professedly to introduce students to his own system. The judgment that he was not inclined to have patience with those who did not accept his theory is not fair. He expected of pupils who came into his classes that they would master his teaching to the extent of understanding it, but he enjoyed meeting those who disagreed with him, provided that their disagreement was based on evident intellectual competence. The stories that have gone out about his severity on those who dared differ with him have no basis, except in the case of bumptious ignoramuses who took rebukes which they brought on themselves as indication of their own superior intellectual equipment.

Again, Bowne had none of the present-day superstition that it makes no difference what one studies as to content, provided one follows a right method. The first factor in right method, according to his thought, is a perspective which has some power to distinguish what is worth while from what is not. His conviction was that the student should become absorbed in a worth-while theme. Pedagogical mechanics as such he disliked, and yet he was one of the most successful teachers of his day. His method was to lecture and to judge the progress of the student by frequent written quizzes. The student could take notes or not, he could attend class or not, just as he pleased, but there was small chance of his getting through if he had not been present through all the course. No records were kept, but unbroken attendance was necessary to get the subject matter. The examination tests were problems in which the principles discussed in the lectures were involved, but which likely had never themselves been mentioned in the class. The pupil would often read through the list of questions with a sinking heart, for they would seem at first to deal with themes of which he had never heard. There was no possibility of dishonest answer in examination. If the pupil had all his lecture notes spread out before him, they would have availed little or nothing if he had not mastered the principles. The quiz papers were read carefully, and usually by Bowne himself.

It was objected by some that Bowne did not give his pupils an all-around introduction to the philosophies of the ages. Bowne once remarked that not to hit a mark at which one does not aim is in itself no great hardship, but to be blamed therefor calls for vast patience. Bowne did not aim at giving students an all-around introduction to the problems of philosophy, but at establishing a definite point from which the students could do their own viewing. Whatever justice there is in the criticism that he did not give his students an all-around introduction to philosophy lies not against him, but against the University, and it must be remembered that the University in those days was limited for funds. The same criticism can be urged against any first-rate thinker. He gives his own conceptions. Precisely that same fault could have been found with William James or Josiah Royce. Some used to say that at Boston you got not philosophy but Bowne. There is just as much aptness in this as to say that in James' day at Harvard men got from James not philosophy but James. The Bowne approach was distinctive; but, admitting that it was distinctive, it did introduce the student to philosophies other than Bowne's own, for it showed a line of development which brought long periods of philosophy into at least a semblance of order. Bowne had planned at the time of his death to write a short sketch of his history of philosophy showing the historical movement toward personalism. The trend through Locke, to Berkeley, to Hume, to Kant, to Hegel, to Lotze and on to the personalistic theories is definitely traceable. Personalism is not the only vantage-ground from which these thinkers can be surveyed, by any means, but it has immense advantages. Pedagogically the Bowne method is sounder than that of taking up period after period, and trying to tell all about it in catalogue fashion. Kant, for example, rendered yeoman service for the cause of world peace, but I do not believe Bowne ever mentioned Kant's peace-crusading. For his purpose it was irrelevant. The classroom discussions were never allowed to diverge a hair's breadth from the purpose in hand. In exposition Bowne professedly followed the method of Herbart, which Professor Knudson in a personal letter describes as follows:

> Herbart would start with the "concepts" given to us in our common-sense experience. On examination these concepts were seen to contain contradictions. To remove these contradictions by working over the concepts of common sense became then the task of philosophy and particularly of metaphysics. Herbart called this method "the method of relations." Philosophy itself he defined as "the working over of concepts." This was, of course, also Bowne's method, and is no doubt what he had in mind when he said that "Herbart supplies the method." The particular contradictions that Herbart found in common-sense philosophy were these especially: the concept of a thing with a number of *qualities*, of *change*, of the self, etc. The first two of these are essentially the same as Bowne's problems of unity and plu-

rality, and identity and change. The kinship of Bowne to Herbart at this point is closer than I supposed.

The Bowne "technique" was to lecture and to quiz, through the use of problems which tested a pupil's command of the principles and his originality. The lectures in class were markedly different from the printed discussions. The lectures abounded in illustrations drawn from a wide range of information, all the way from boyhood memories of the farm to recent investigations in physics. In the written treatments Bowne used illustrations sparingly, avowing that a reader with a book before him could hold his attention fast to the text till he had mastered the principles, after which illustrations could be found by the student himself. For the classroom he found the illustrations—and they illustrated. In an earlier chapter I said that Bowne did not often seek out his students on his own initiative, but allowed them to make the first move toward personal acquaintance. Perhaps this is an overstatement. The situation at Boston University itself back in those days did not encourage much personal contact between professors and students, or even between professors and professors. The professors lived in the suburbs, and after the last classes were over made frantic dashes for the next trains. Bowne lived at Longwood and walked home. He never was in a desperate hurry, and if a student sought him out for counsel, he would suggest a walk toward Longwood. Once a friendship was established, Bowne would go to lengths beyond all reason of giving his time and strength to the student. Those favored by this extravagantly generous friendship came to behold at close range that emphasis on the fullness and fineness of human life, which the Bowne philosophy formally taught, made concrete and lavish in the personal character of the philosopher. Bowne was the best commentary on his own system.

He worked prodigiously. He wrote almost incessantly. Composition was a slow process with him, at least so he said; but his slowness would have been speed to most others. He never seemed to know mental fatigue, never went stale, and would write as long as the pen-wagging muscles would stand it. In the last five years of his life, because he had physically wearied of constant writing, he dictated most of his composition. Dictated English is a problem by itself. It is likely to be loose, and diffuse, and flabbily organized, with the proportions all askew. Not so with Bowne. His dictated English is, if anything, too tightly compressed. The last book, *Kant and Spencer,* was dictated throughout. Mrs. Bowne, with the help of Professor Knudson, went through the manuscript of this book to prepare it for the press. The bracketed passages show where slight changes had to be made when the stenographer had not quite seized the meaning. The corrections are astonishingly few.

In those last years Bowne accepted invitations to write and speak before the wider Methodist public. Once present at a meeting of the Wesleyan Association where Dr. Charles Parkhurst was reading his yearly report as editor of *Zion's Herald,* he felt moved to admiration by the fine results in religious journalism which Doctor Parkhurst was achieving with appallingly meager material resources; out of his expression of that admiration came a close relationship between the professor and the editor which meant the frequent opening of the columns of the *Herald* to Bowne. Through this opportunity came the articles which afterward made up the booklets on Christian life and thought, and which were gathered together a second time in *Studies in Christianity.* Bowne enjoyed the chance thus given him to reach a different audience from that of his classroom, and his contributions were much simpler statements of the fundamentals of religion than were his more formal teachings. As was to be expected, some of the articles made considerable stir. The expositions of such themes as miracle, incarnation, atonement, prayer to the readers of a religious paper were quite different from lecturing to a class or writing for a magazine. Some readers were powerfully disturbed, but others saw the outlines of hitherto obscure theological landscapes take on precision before their eyes. Doctor Parkhurst was a man of marked individuality, not to say peculiarity, of strong likes and of some dislikes which he was never able to overcome. Nevertheless, he was a great editor, one of the ablest Methodism has ever known. He saw the value to the *Herald* and to the church of the Bowne material, and always printed it and put up with the uproar which it caused. He remarked, when someone protested, that he had always noticed from the letters which came in after the objectors had quieted down that Doctor Bowne had cleared the air. Indeed, Doctor Bowne revealed a singular facility for striking out sparks of light on old themes, and making them more than sparks; they were steady fires which burned unforgettably. In this service he had the advantage of being more orthodox than the orthodox on some fundamentals, while he seemed to go to full lengths in the advocacy of new interpretations of religious truth. We have already seen how determinedly he held to the gospel of the Son of God, while he fought just as determinedly for the newer phrasings. On the incarnation Bowne could make a genuinely sincere statement much more orthodox than even in those days could often be found. During the bishops' discussion of the Mitchell case Bowne avowed that, after listening to the utterances of most of the bishops, he could convict all of them whom he had heard of heresy before any church tribunal which understood theology at all. For example, one orthodox bishop stated in a prayer meeting which Bowne attended that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit was simple enough: it meant merely the everywhereness of God—a statement which, Bowne pointed out, any Unitarian could accept. When all this became known the genuinely orthodox found comfort in Bowne. Again, Bowne was fair in pointing out in his *Herald* articles that while it is distressing to have conservatives applying epithets to progressives, it is just as bad to have the progressives putting on airs because of supposed superior honesty. Let the progressive please remember, said he in an article already quoted, that he has not long been out of what he calls Egyptian darkness himself; and as he feels that he himself was not a hypocrite while he sojourned in Egypt, perhaps he may as well admit that not all those who still dwell there are hypocrites. Still, he would mercilessly castigate the conservative who he had reason to believe was an "Old Betty," or whom he suspected of cherishing a low smothering envy at the heart of his professed devotion to the old standards.

The same justification for allowing Bowne to speak in this open fashion is at hand for Doctor Parkhurst's editorial attitude as for the attitude of the Boston University trustees. Both in the classroom instruction and in teaching the wide groups of newspaper readers Doctor Bowne's effect was in the long run conservative. Most of the more pronounced radicalism in Methodist circles is that of men who have rabidly reacted against old-time Methodist stiffness, or of those who have tried to find their way through to light alone, or of those who have attended schools where the questions have not been frankly faced. I know of very few instances in which a Bowne student went off into such radicalism that he could no longer work comfortably in an evangelical church. I do not know of many who left Methodism because of the progressiveness of their theology. Other factors than the theological often enter into change of denominational relationship, though Bowne did not like to see strong men leave the Methodist ministry. In fact, he was at Boston one of the effective forces in holding men to our ministry.

There was, indeed, one Methodist preacher, a student of Bowne, who became so intoxicated by the intellectual heights which he attained under the professor that he announced that he could no longer in self-respect remain in a denomination as ignorant as the Methodist. Bowne was a Methodist, indeed, but he was an exception. It gave the Methodists some carnal joy when this same brother soon after approached Bowne in a little group with the leading remark, "Doctor Bowne, I don't really feel that I am much of a philosopher," and received the smiling answer, "I am not disposed to quarrel with you on that point."

Concerning the presentation of religious truth Bowne used to say that with an idea once mastered all that was necessary for its exposition was an ability to speak English, and all that was necessary for its comprehension was a knowledge of English—and possibly the possession of a dictionary. This brief summary Bowne very nearly made effective, however, in his own more popular addresses. For many years he went in the summer to the Grove City Bible School at Grove City, Pennsylvania, where he addressed ministers who were taking two weeks out of their regular parish work to get a better grip on fundamentals, and laymen, many of them farmers, who stepped aside from their ordinary labors to listen to addresses on the profounder themes. He always came back from Grove City refreshed by the experience, delighting especially in the manifest responsiveness of the farmers to his straightforward and solid lectures on theology and ethics.

In spite of Bowne's dictum, that anybody who could speak English could present the truth, there were some styles of formal public speech which he especially enjoyed. I mention a few orators just as types. He never ceased to be stirred at the recollection of the eloquence of the three lectures of Bishop Foster entitled "Beyond the Grave," delivered at Chautauqua, New York, in the late seventies. He spoke repeatedly in admiration of the effectiveness of the preaching of his pastor, at Saint Mark's, Brookline, Dr. Lucius H. Bugbee. He used to tell of his delight in listening to Dr. William F. Warren, especially at Doctor Warren's deliberateness because of the wealth of intellectual material before him from which he was finding it difficult to make selection. "It makes for good listening," he remarked of the tingling vitality in the rush of the eloquence of Dr. S. Parkes Cadman. An address at the funeral of Mr. Alden Speare, of Newton Center, by the Rev. E. H. Hughes, of Malden, Massachusetts, afterward bishop, he pronounced "perfect." A missionary sermon by Dr. Charles Brown, of the Baptist Church in England, he remembered as one of the most compelling public utterances to which he had ever listened. I have mentioned six speakers, all of different type. I have said that he was always charmed by the intellectual wealth which evidently lay back of the utterances of Doctor Warren. He used to say that Doctor Warren had as fine a mind, considered as an instrument, as it had ever been his fortune to meet. The hesitancy suggestive of fullness of knowledge characteristic of Doctor Warren showed peculiarly in Bowne himself, not so much when he was speaking as when he was reading. I remember once watching him read a *Methodist Review* article by Dr. Milton S. Terry on Bishop Foster. The article was not long, and I wondered why it took so much time to read it. The reason was that every line called up memories with which Bowne's mind went forthwith to work. So with publications of all sorts. If an article were of poor quality, Bowne cast it aside after a few paragraphs, but if it were worth while, it required time for reading. He called his reading "working through," because of the suggestions the reading started.

Much of my material in this chapter may seem to have little to do with the title of the chapter, but in considering the teacher it has seemed appropriate to deal with the qualities that Bowne revealed chiefly to his students. I have said that to students who proved at all capable Bowne opened himself without reserve. Many of my readers will recall the name of Byron Palmer, a minister in Ohio, a devoted Bowne follower, who in the midst of his ministry was beset by a strange physical blight, a disease that the physicians had never before met. It was like a progressive paralysis attended with excruciating pain. The doctors did soon see that there was no hope, and told Palmer so. At first Palmer was stunned and bewildered by the blow. Under the kindly administration of Doctor Bowne he was able to take an attitude toward the mystery which brought his mind into peace, and which even quickened him to deeper insights. In the midst of the distress Palmer wrote a book entitled *God's White Throne,* which had a circulation of nearly ten thousand copies—an extraordinary circulation for such a work in those days. Bowne said that he would not be surprised if the book became a classic. He looked with more satisfaction at the production of Palmer than at almost everything else any of his pupils had done.

A most fascinating treatment of Bowne's literary style appeared in the 1911 volume of the *Methodist Review,* from the pen of Dr. William W. Guth, now president of Goucher College.

In a letter to Dr. William S. Bovard, under date of October 14, 1909, Bowne spoke of his own estimate of the importance of the teacher's task:

> The teacher's life is rarely a showy one, and to many it is a root out of dry ground, but for real and permanent influence no one has more of it than the effective teacher. "Our echoes roll from soul to soul and grow forever and forever."
>
> I conducted the other day the funeral exercises of Mr. Henry Blackwell, who was the husband of Lucy Stone, and who had devoted a great deal of his life to securing equal rights to women. At the same time the body of Mr. Harriman lay waiting for burial, and I could not help in my own thought contrasting the life of the two men. Mr. Harriman had been prominent before the public and had won great financial victories, and, for all I know, was a good man. Mr. Blackwell's life, on the other hand, had nothing spectacular in it. He had loved justice and hated iniquity. He had been the friend of the oppressed everywhere, in Europe, Asia, and America, and they knew and loved him from one end of the earth to the other. And the works of the two men follow them. But when it comes to computing the value of the works at the compound interest that applies to such things Mr. Blackwell was certainly whole worlds beyond Mr. Harriman. He had worked in another field. He had worked on men for the improvement of human conditions, the raising of human ideals, the establishment of justice, making it easier to live the human life.

# CHAPTER XV

# THE TRIP AROUND THE WORLD

DOCTOR BOWNE had visited Europe only once between his student days and 1906. One letter survives from that trip, made in 1883, as follows:

Norrkoping, Sweden,
May 25, 1883.

My Dear J.:

As you see by the heading I am up here in Sweden. I found a good place to leave Kate in Paris and came here to look after the Bishop. Bishop Foster was very anxious to have someone with him, and as he was coming alone I was not unwilling to come along.

Our trip thither lay over Cologne, Hamburg, and Copenhagen. At Cologne we stopped to see the Cathedral. It is the most beautiful Gothic building I have ever seen. The plan is clear and harmonious and is not lost in the richness and mass of detail as is the case with Milan Cathedral. The work too is very fine in execution. It is, however, not as large as that in Milan and to me not as impressive internally. The greater length, breadth, and height of the latter produce vistas of aisle and arch which are very superior to anything in the former. But still it is a thing of marvelous beauty, of beauty perhaps rather than of grandeur or sublimity. Of the two Cathedrals Cologne is nearer the ideally beautiful; Milan is nearer the ideally sublime.

In Copenhagen we went to the Thorwaldsen Museum and to the Church of Our Lady, where his famous group of Christ and the Apostles is found. No other Christ compares with this. Christ seems so majestic yet so tender, so regal yet so winning, removed by such infinite heights yet so condescending as to be infinitely near. Thorwaldsen seems to have aimed to unite both the invitation and the benediction. When I first glanced at it, I said, "That is the way Christ must have looked when he said, 'Come unto me,' " and underneath is written "Come unto me." Again I thought that the attitude was one of blessing, and underneath I found the words, "Lo, I am with you always." The pierced hands and side show that the moment is that of the ascension and of his final benediction on the disciples. But the other text shows that the other moment was in his thought also. I looked at the marble for a long time without noticing the text; and when I was filled and almost overwhelmed with its presence, I read below, "Lo, I am with you always." It almost seemed to me that he spoke himself to me. I could not keep back the tears and could scarce refrain from sobbing aloud. I wanted to kneel down and pray; it would have been a joy and relief. But there were others in the church, so I entered into the closet of my own heart and, having shut the door, I prayed to Him who seeth in secret.

I suppose that Kate has abundantly described our stay in Switzerland. We were in Lucerne for several days and Kate was in an exalted state of mind all the time. There were various signs of an attack of fine writing; and I doubt not that the eruption took place. But it was grand. Our ride over St. Gotthard Pass was magnificent and the position of Lucerne and its lakes is sublime. It was finer in repetition than in the first experience of years ago. I think I have a more sympathetic eye now than then—owing possibly to the fuller exchequer which leaves me freer to enjoy.

We are now in the land of short nights. To be sure, we do not see the sun at midnight, but on clear days it is almost broad daylight at 2:00 A. M. We reached here at 3:10 A. M. I said beforehand, "We shall get there in the night." I awoke at two o'clock and the east was all aflame as if the sun were just going to rise. In the clear, cool air the effect was beautiful. Some clouds above caught the light and turned crimson. These in turn looked down on the small lakes with which the landscape abounded and were reflected as from mirrors. Besides, the east and upper air were full of all rich tints of amber and rose, of purple, and delicate pale green. We were not at all troubled with darkness on alighting at our destination at 3:10. The sun was already above the horizon, not moving at right angles to it, but sailing along it and giving all the light necessary for exactest vision. Well, as it was day, we supposed that night was done but, on reaching our stopping place, the good friends proposed that we go to bed. They said they were going to do so, and to make them comfortable we had to go to bed. After I was alone and had lain down, I could not refrain from laughing at the absurdity; but my nerves and muscles did not think it absurd, for I had scarcely finished my laugh before I was sound asleep—so sound, indeed, that I took no notice of the maid who came in and carried off every stitch of loose clothing to brush it.

And speaking of that reminds me that there is a certain simplicity in Swedish manners which is rather embarrassing to a stranger. In the morning the maid always comes in before you are up to brush the clothes, etc., or, if you choose, to bring your coffee, and she is never embarrassed at finding you are not entirely presentable according to our notions. In a thoughtless moment I proceeded to adjust my garments without first locking the door. I was visited by a young woman without warning of any kind on some errand, and I assure you, I was the only one embarrassed. However, my experience is not equal to that of a ministerial acquaintance here. He ordered a bath and proceeded to disrobe. I don't know how it was he failed to fasten the door, I judge they don't fasten; but when he was entirely undressed, a good, grave, and very worthy woman came in to adjust the temperature and *wash his back.* He was utterly horror-stricken and besought her to retire, but she, in the most simple-minded way, persisted it was her business to wash his back; and he could only get clear of her by letting her wipe his back with a towel. After that, he was very careful to give notice beforehand that he must be left alone. This makes credible Bayard Taylor's statement that in Russia the attendants at the baths are women. Some lands have some customs that other lands don't have.

Well, I am not tired of sight-seeing. I should like to go back over my trip, but still I think with pleasure of getting home. I shall get back to Paris about the last of June and then I can't tell what I shall do. We may go over to Strasburg and down the Rhine and we may go direct to London. But I must hurry, as dinner is waiting.

Yours affectionately,
B. P. B.

About the year 1900 Bowne began to express a desire to go "around the planet." The plans were worked out and the trip was begun in the early fall of 1905, and was not completed till about eleven months later. The route was to the west across the Pacific, through Japan, China, India, and thence to Europe.

Trips around the world are common enough, so that ordinarily there would not be much justification for extended remarks on such a journey. The tour, however, was among the important experiences of Doctor Bowne's life as supplying the occasion of a spiritual pilgrimage of profound significance, the widening of his view and the deepening of his appreciation of those human values which always had stood at the heart of his philosophy. It gave the last touch to all that he had been thinking.

Readers of the *Ethics* will recall that the attitude of the book, published in 1892, was rather severe toward the non-Christian systems. Bowne had not in 1892, and for ten years later, any surplus of patience toward what we used to call "heathen" peoples. He was genuinely interested in the missionary cause, but not over-sympathetic toward "heathen." In the *Ethics* he said of the non-Christian peoples that they must be either transformed or perish. At the time of the conquest of the Philippines by the United States in 1899, he wrote an editorial for the *Independent,* in New York, on "Humanity's Eminent Domain," in which he spoke as bluntly as any imperialist of the necessity of ruling peoples who cannot rule themselves—all this in the name of humanity's own best good. The difference between Bowne's utterance and that of many others who spoke likewise was that Bowne meant in entire sincerity what he said about humanity's right-of-way. He was not concerned with sources of raw material or with labor supplies. He was thinking perhaps too exclusively of a situation as in Africa, where the intervention of European powers had done away with much inter-tribal slaughter. The consideration was not altogether pertinent, for African conditions were not paralleled in the Orient. Still, he was right in maintaining that England had done something for humanity in Egypt and India. When the Boxer uprising occurred in China, Bowne would have stood for any measure calculated to bring order, whether the Chinese liked it or not. He had said in the *Ethics* that if at any time China took to slaughtering Chinese Christians, the Christian powers might not be clear as to the international principles on which to proceed, but they would proceed nevertheless.

The argument by which Bowne justified all this was that taking political sovereignty from a people is not necessarily reducing that people to slavery. Men are deprived of freedom in some directions, only to be given a chance to realize more freedom in others. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness would be more worth while if people were relieved of tasks for which they had shown themselves incapable.

If such benefits could result from depriving a people of political freedom, much might be said of it. The ideal is that of the mandatory system since the Great War, and the ideal was distinctly in Bowne's mind. The immense financial interests back of imperialism, however, make of the ideal a sorry mess when they are allowed to have too much their own way; and it requires only a glance backward to see how completely the magnates of finance and commerce were having their way a quarter century ago. Furthermore, it is hardly permissible for one nation to assume to judge when it should interfere in the affairs of another people for that other people's good. In the days of our Civil War as genuine a liberal as Cobden wrote to John Stuart Mill inclining to the opinion that outside nations ought to step in to stop the "unscientific butchery" going on in the United States. If such a man as Cobden, of such a country as England, could propose such a measure toward such a people as the United States, it does not require much imagination to see what is likely to happen when selfishly interested representatives of the so-called favored nations take in hand the uplift of the so-called backward nations.

Bowne fell in with the movement toward American imperialism which came with the Spanish-American War. He thought that McKinley had covered himself with honor in striving for peace in the negotiations with Spain just before the outbreak of hostilities, but with the war once on he believed with the mass of Americans that it could be used to the advantage of mankind. It is to be remembered that Bowne was here looking out from the abstractly ideal on a concrete policy which, for America, was altogether new.

To come to the phase of the subject immediately at hand, the trip around the world gave Bowne an altogether fresh angle from which to look at the questions we have been discussing. Though he never formally recorded any change of opinion, the different spirit is manifest in everything that he wrote about the Oriental nations. He had admired the heroism with which Japan had stood against Russia. Still, he thought that good would come to Russia when he discovered the extent to which anti-Czaristic literature was being distributed by men like George Kennan among Russian prisoners in Japanese camps. Doctor and Mrs. Bowne, and Miss Morrison, Mrs. Bowne's sister, arrived in Japan in September and remained there over two months, visiting from Sendai in the north to Nagasaki in the south, the professor making forty-one addresses in all. They were in Tokyo from September 29 to October 16. A lawn party with two hundred and fifty guests was given on the grounds of Aoyama Gakuin on September 30. On October 7 Bowne spoke at Count Okuma's school, now Waseda University, where the count showed the professor the very highest honors.

Doctor Bowne was enthusiastically received in university circles from the first. His *Personalism* had already been translated into Japanese and widely spread. The Japanese are excessively polite to scholars, and they strove enthusiastically to show Doctor Bowne every attention. At first the visitor was inclined to be a little suspicious, fearing that the welcome might be largely formal for the purpose of furthering international friendship. He had for a while in the back of his mind the experience of another American lecturing in Japan. This lecturer kept noticing that the interpreter took much less time with the interpretation than the original delivery had required, and that the interpretation always ended in the same phrase. A Japanese, pushed for an explanation, reluctantly revealed that the constantly recurring formula was: "I have given you the substance of what this man is saying. The rest of it is nothing but words." Bowne's lectures were fully interpreted and did not end with a damaging formula. The Japanese liked the metaphysics, but could not make much of the Bowne wit, and they also asked that the lecturer take more time. Before Doctor Bowne left Japan a most beautiful gold medal was presented to him by the Imperial Education Society, in honor of his services to education.

In addition to the applause given the lectures Professor and Mrs. Bowne were fairly weighted down with the social attentions of the Japanese, yet it was not the public welcome or the private hospitality which began to mark Bowne with an impression which deepened throughout the journey and remained with him after he returned to America. It was the vast possibilities of the masses of the people, their meaning to themselves, and to the world and to the God over all. A friend in whose home he stopped in Japan found him sitting one morning with bowed head lost in a meditation from which he slowly roused himself. "I have never before had such a vision as this," he said.

"What vision?"

"Just the vision of these masses of mankind, their possibilities in themselves and in their possible relation to the welfare of the whole world."

The experience recurred, was deepened in China, where the Bownes were from early November to December 12. There he was touched by the evident genuineness of the religious devotion, especially of those in distress. He saw a poor Chinese mother come one morning to a heathen shrine with a sick baby and make some offering there, evidently in hope of the child's recovery. He used the incident afterward before a group of Christians in China as indicating the spontaneous turning of souls in trouble to religion the world over. By the way, when the address was afterward published, without Bowne's knowledge a reference to the Christian God as One who could not fail to note the human appeal even in heathen rites was cut out.

Actual contact with China, with the worthiness of the people, and with their resentment at the grievances they had suffered at the hands of the outside nations, evidently modified the tone with which he had declared himself in *Ethics.* He wrote in *Zion's Herald* of November 21, 1906, that the recollection that the Englishman who negotiated the treaty which fastened opium on China was the author of "In the Cross of Christ I Glory" caused one actually to shiver. Instead of boasting of Anglo-Saxonism, after an experience in the East, he returned very humble, declaring that, compared with the Oriental peoples, the Anglo-Saxon was only a pioneer in the world-movement toward civilization—"a rough instrument to clear the way." "God has vast reservoirs of humanity in the peoples of color which he will one day tap for the civilization and Christianization of the race." Then he made two other remarks calculated to cause his friends to catch their breath. Asked what he imagined the effect on Christianity would be if by any unforeseen catastrophe the yellow peoples should overrun the Christian world as did the barbarians the Roman Empire, he replied that he did not foresee any danger of such an overrunning, but that he was not sure but that it might be a good thing, inasmuch as he believed there was enough vitality in Christianity to Christianize even such an overwhelming flood. The other remark was that if he were beginning his professional career in 1906, he felt confident he could accomplish most by teaching in China. In the article in *Zion's Herald* referred to he said: "The dealing of foreign nations with China has been one sad, dreadful, atrocious, abominable history. The things the Chinese have done will not compare in inhumanity and diabolism with the things that the Western nations have done to them."

One of the cherished memories which Doctor Bowne carried with him from China was the recollection of a call on

Bishop Samuel I. J. Schereschewsky, missionary bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church. In late October of 1905 Doctor Bowne had an interview with the bishop at his home near Saint John's College in Shanghai. In the issue of the *Youth's Companion* of January 3, 1907, Doctor Bowne wrote an unsigned article about this bishop under the title of "One of the World's Heroes." The sketch told of eight years which the bishop had given to translating the Scriptures into the Mandarin dialect. A large part of the translation was done after Bishop Schereschewsky had something resembling paralysis following sunstroke. The translator used the Roman alphabet to spell out Chinese sounds. Because of his physical infirmity, he was compelled to tie a stick to his middle finger, and with his finger thus stiffened, "poked out" twenty-five thousand pages of manuscript. Doctor Bowne's article rightly remarks that the bishop "by his courage and energy did humanity imperishable honor."

He was not so favorably impressed with the India mind as with China and Japan. It did not seem to him that the Indian audiences possessed much power of sustained attention. As one after another of the Bengalese, especially, would get up and leave during his lectures, he was heard to repeat to himself one of his favorite adages—"A pint pot is soon full." Moreover, the connection between a thoroughly heathen belief and a wretched social condition became more evident to him in India than anywhere else. He once went to a multitudinously attended religious festival at Kaligat and was literally sickened by the reek of the goat's blood and the stench of the sweating crowds. After the experience he remarked that he could well understand the mood of the Old Testament writer who spoke as if it had repented God that he had made man, and that God had felt an impulse to wipe the race off the earth. The degradation seemed beyond relief and beyond hope. This mood soon passed, however, and he came to a most appreciative attitude toward the work of men like Fred B. Fisher, Titus

Lowe, and Chester C. McCown. He began to preach, whenever he could get a hearing, that Christianity rightly presented was the only avenue through which the vast possibilities of India could be realized. He gloried in the finer sights of India. The vision of the Taj Mahal by moonlight seemed to him far beyond the mind of man to conceive, but the total impression which he carried away from India was of the vast mass of sheer human distress, and the duty of redemption through Christianity worked out into expression by the Indians themselves. As a first step he used to declare that foreigners in India would have to get over their notion that the Indian peoples are to be treated as anything other than human. He had a carrier, or porter, accompany him out of the hot land into the mountains, where at night the air is bitingly cold. The porter was barelegged. As night came on Bowne inquired of the keeper of the home where he was to be entertained, what arrangements were to be made for the shivering servant. The indifferent answer was that the servant could sleep under a porch, almost wholly exposed to the night air. It came near making a scandal and rocking the foundations of the British empire, in the judgment of the host, when Bowne insisted that some quarters be provided inside the house. Bowne could not adjust himself to the contemptuous attitude of foreigners toward natives in India. I once aroused the ire of an American, long resident in India, by telling him of Bowne's fury at the treatment of Indian servants by Americans, and other foreigners. "You are uttering slander," he said to me. "We never really hurt our servants. *I myself have never done anything worse than switch them a little.*" The italics are, of course, my own. All this was in that past which, we trust, is gone forever. It was the kind of attitude which later made possible Dyer at Amritsa and the "crawling order."

Bowne remained in India from the latter part of December, 1905, to March 17, 1906, when he sailed from Bombay to

Europe. A personal letter to me from the Rev. A. W. Mell, of San Francisco, is interesting:

> When Doctor Bowne was in Calcutta delivering lectures, I wrote to him from Bombay and asked whether I could arrange for a series of lectures for him at the Bombay University.
>
> He wrote me a letter which greatly surprised me. He said, "I will deliver no more lectures in India which require consecutive thought."
>
> He refused to have arrangements made. However, when he came to Bombay I took him down to the Bombay University and introduced him to Doctor MacKichan, the Chancellor of Bombay University, who for over thirty years had been the leading educator of western India. During an hour's delightful visit, the two educators found out that they attended, though at different times, the same universities in Germany. Doctor MacKichan then asked Doctor Bowne to deliver a lecture before the Bombay University, saying that he would dismiss all classes and that they would have a great occasion.
>
> Doctor Bowne again refused and stated his disappointment with his lectures at Calcutta.
>
> He told how he had stopped at Japan delivering lectures at the Imperial University, and with what cordiality and interest these were received, but he said that at Calcutta his lectures fell flat. The students did not seem interested, and even the professors manifested but little interest. And on the whole, he felt that his audience had not carefully and closely followed his discussions.
>
> Doctor MacKichan, on discovering that the lectures were largely philosophical lectures on Theism, Personality, etc., said to Doctor Bowne, "I don't wonder that you were disappointed in dealing with these subjects in a learned, philosophical way with the students of Calcutta. Of course, some may have followed you, but I am not surprised that many did not.
>
> "I would not want you to come and deliver a learned, philosophical lecture on one of those subjects, but come and give us an address on religion in a simple discourse."
>
> Doctor Bowne consented. Arrangements were made for such an address on the following Monday. Classes were dismissed and a great assembly of students and professors gathered: Parsees, Mohammedans, Christians, Anglo-Indians, Eurasians, Hindus of all castes. Doctor Bowne gave an address on "The Religion of the Future." (I quote from memory.)

"The religion of the future will have:

"1. One God—Modern thought in all science and in all philosophy is recognizing the unity of all force; physical, mental and moral. 'In him we live, move and have our being.' *The many gods must go!*

"2. An Intelligent God—The illiterate, dumb, and unintelligent gods must go. The modern mind can worship only a God that can be worshiped with all the mind.

"3. A Holy God—The immoral, thieving, lying and licentious gods must go. Only a moral God—a *holy* God—can appeal to the soul of modern man.

"4. A Beneficent God—The cruel, jealous, revengeful gods must go. The God for the modern mind must be a giving God—a benevolent God, one who seeks to give for the good of all.

"5. A God of Love—The gods of hate are doomed. Love is the end—the goal—of man's aspirations and worship.

"6. A Universal God—The gods of classes, races, and nations must go. As there can be but one God, the modern mind must think of him as *the* God of all nations and peoples—the God of the universe.

"7. A God of Brotherhood—One who will seek the unity and the peace of all men.

"CONCLUSION—For me, gentlemen, the God that I have described to you as the God of the religion of the future—though I do not ask you to accept my judgment, for it is only a statement of my belief—I repeat again, as for me, I find such a God revealed in the face of Jesus Christ, in his character, his life of good deeds, and in his teachings. It satisfies my mind and my heart, and I believe that this God as revealed in Jesus Christ will ultimately receive the homage of all nations. In his life the nations will find their life, and life more abundant."

It was enthusiastically and delightfully received. The students cheered heartily its main points, and at the close the cheering developed into a great ovation. For five minutes Doctor Bowne had to stand and receive the applause of the great crowd. Students and professors thronged to the front to greet this prophet of the future.

Doctor Bowne was fairly overwhelmed with the nature of the reception given his address, but he was tremendously pleased, and thanked Doctor MacKichan for his suggestion that he should deal with the subject of religion rather than that of philosophy.

As we drove home, after this Bombay University experience, he told me how delighted he was with the way in which these addresses had been received. He said, "When I got through with the Calcutta addresses I felt that I was through lecturing in India, but now I feel quite differently about it and would like to come back to India, and if arrangements could be made for me to deliver in India the Barrows Lectures, I would be pleased to do so."

On Doctor Bowne's return to America, I received several letters from him which plainly indicated his loss of faith in the use of philosophy in reaching India. In substance he declared, "India will not be saved by the *mere* intellectual approach to Christ, but by faith in Christ and in the following of his teachings."

It is relevant here to mention the interest in Turkey aroused in Bowne through his appointment to the Presidency of the Board of Trustees of the American School for Girls near Constantinople. Once interested in this school he threw himself into its problems with whole-hearted devotion, though he never was able to carry out his plan to visit it. In the days of the early Armenian slaughters he used to say that he wished he could harness up an earthquake and "rock around in Turkey for a while." He was disgusted with the impotence of the European Powers in the face of the butchery of Armenian Christians, and cried out in a discussion of the problem in the class in Ethics: "Avenge, O Lord, thy slaughtered saints!" The peace movements, or anti-war movements, had not then taken on strength, and at times like those of the Armenian outrages Bowne was decidedly pro-war. He considered a war to set the Turks in order likely to be of benefit to mankind. When he visited the Mohammedan university at Cairo in the spring of 1906 and listened to the droning of those committing the Koran to memory he pronounced the school a devastating waste of human energy.

Still, when the Young Turk Revolution came, Bowne cherished large hopes. His experience with the American College for Girls had made him feel that the propagation of Christian truth by Christian education would save the day. Anything more radical than the change of attitude from that when he desired an earthquake with which he might rock around in Turkey, to that when he enthusiastically recounted instances of transformed mental attitude on the part of Turks, it would be hard to conceive. He showed positive gusto in telling of the transformation of a Mohammedan Turk religionist, who, after the Revolution had made it inevitable that some measure of modern knowledge would be taught Turkish youth, came out openly for the teaching of geography. "Of course we must have geography," said the Mohammedan, "and that for religious purposes. How can a man rightly place his prayer-mat unless he knows the exact direction of Mecca?" Bowne used to say that this was a perfect illustration of the power of religion to adjust itself to a positive and established change.

In 1910 Doctor Bowne was looking forward to a trip to England. He said that he hoped to get his "fill" of London by walking about fifteen miles a day through its streets for a month or two. The dream was never realized.

## CHAPTER XVI

## THE CLOSING DAYS

BOWNE returned from his around-the-world tour in the late summer of 1906 in time to take up the tasks of the opening academic year. The trip through the Orient had been strenuous, but he had rested long enough in Switzerland and in England to put himself in what appeared to be excellent physical condition. Two or three years before he had had serious attacks of grippe, and he confessed to his intimate friends that he felt some apprehension concerning his heart, or, in his own words, his "pump." The "pump" finally collapsed, though it had ceased to give warnings of its doing so for many weeks before the end.

The closing months were probably as happy as any of Bowne's life. He looked forward to arrangements which might make it possible for him to retire at about sixty-five. He would be "grieved," he said, if he had to work on till seventy. He used to complain that he had never had time adequately to gaze upon the glories of nature. One March day as he and I walked in Longwood a drop of sap fell from a tree and splashed upon his hand. I shall not forget the eagerness with which he hailed this token of coming spring.

"What do you want to see?" I once asked as he spoke of his desire for a few years of leisure.

"Oh," he replied, "just the coming and going of the seasons, dawn and the sunset, night and the stars. I shall be disappointed if I have to leave this world without a chance for a good long look at all these."

This, of course, suggests a tinge of sadness, but the sadness is of the normal human yearning of those who find themselves getting into the sixties and viewing the lessening of the opportunities to carry out personal desires long dreamed of. Again, Bowne once admitted to a friend that he would like to see a wider recognition of his achievements as a philosopher before the hour came for him to depart, but he found increasing reason for rejoicing in the acceptance of the main principles for which he had fought, acceptance even by those who approached philosophy along paths other than those trodden by himself. In fact, Doctor Bowne's outlook for the future in the last two or three years of his life was too optimistic. He fancied that the general theistic position was finally established, and that the task of the future would be merely to carry theism out into its implications.

On the whole, then, the closing years were happy. He had lived long enough at 380 Longwood to have set the stamp of his personal life there, so that the house and grounds, and especially the wonderful rose garden, were almost a part of himself. Here is how he wrote of his flowers to Professor Coe:

"You ought to take to gardening," he said. "I raise roses galore. I cut every summer about three thousand choice blooms, and I find the work its own exceeding great reward." "My hyacinths are beginning to bloom, so are the narcissi; the violets are about done, but I've picked as many as twenty dozen a day from my little frame. Of all the odors, according to my nose, there is none other so gracious and refined and refining as the violet. What manner of man ought I to be with 12 x 20 violets in the house?"

Mrs. Bowne was of surpassing æsthetic discernment and taste in the choice of pictures and rugs and chairs and china in which her husband delighted. He had a rare appreciation of beauty, which was increasingly gratified. He found joy also in work, though it was evident that he was taking on too heavy a schedule. He lectured from eight to twelve hours a week, corrected quiz papers by the hundred, dictated on this or that book three or four afternoons a week, responded to appeals for special addresses without number.

He was never too weary to greet the theologues from 72 Mount Vernon Street who came with their perplexities. His attitude toward the theological students was always that of desire to help, though he found one of his chief sports in making sarcastic sallies at them. There was a purpose back of all the chaff and ridicule, for Bowne saw the danger in having swarms of preachers rushing out into the world, and taking, not their cause, but themselves too seriously. His stock exclamation, every fall when droves of theologues came in to register for his courses, was that the Philistines were upon him; but there was never a Philistine whom he did not at heart welcome. He knew that his influence was best exerted through those who were to go forth into the ministry of the church. Much of what he said to shock the young preachers aimed at begetting in them a sense of perspective as to what was worth while. The word "piffle" had not been invented in his time, but he abhorred piffle. A distinguished woman who gave her time to advising girls, through the columns of a woman's journal, on all manner of silly religious nothings was once ridiculed in *Life,* which suggested that she deal with the question as to whether one should say grace before eating a sack of peanuts. The answer of *Life* was that, while it is not necessary always to say grace before opening a sack of peanuts, yet even here all depends on the spirit in which the peanut is approached. Bowne immensely enjoyed *Life's* thrust, and considered it applicable to many ecclesiastical stupidities which split churches into rival sections. When he would remind the young students, calling on him at Longwood, that religion is a dangerous drug unless it is wisely administered, they were somewhat disturbed till they had thought it over. He even advised against overmuch study in philosophy as tending to sharpen the intellectual tools down into nothingness.

What delights for the theologues those calls at Longwood were! What rapt moments of vision as Bowne "let himself go"! Who of us ever knew a finer, purer soul? He never said anything coarse; even minor vulgarities of speech disgusted him. It caused him almost physical distress, for example, to hear sung that popular hymn which makes "Jesus" rime with "diseases." He never said anything mean, or, at bottom, cynical. His personal religious life was intense. He felt free to ask students whom he knew closely the most searching questions as to inner religious attitudes. He wrote to friends who might be in grief letters which could be called classics of consolation; such as that to Dr. Frank W. Collier, of Washington—the letter published on page 14 of the *Personalist,* January, 1921, in which he said: "Meanwhile let grief have its way. It is natural and human and Christian to do so. But do not try to explain or understand or be reconciled. Leave all that and fall back on God." He used to pray for his friends, including those long gone from earth, with such wistfulness as to reveal his immense capacity for friendship. He resented Holmes' lines in "The Last Leaf," "Let them laugh at the poor forsaken bough where I cling." The fleeting years had made all human meanings richer and fuller. He used to revel in what the sailors of his boyhood called "gams"—conversations when the outgoing sailing ships lay "hove-to" to talk to the other ships homeward bound after a long cruise. Who of us that enjoyed the "gams" in that library on the third story of the Longwood home does not feel a catch of the breath at remembering them?

By the way, Bowne's working library contained between fifteen hundred and sixteen hundred volumes. Of those about one hundred volumes were in German. These were largely the works of the German philosophers. About one hundred and twenty volumes were in French. This includes a ninety-two-volume set of Voltaire. Besides these there were ten in Latin, ten in Greek, eight in Spanish, and four in Italian. And there were grammars and foreign-English dictionaries of all varieties. Added to the six languages mentioned above, were Danish, Norwegian, Dutch, and Portuguese—about forty books in all, on the study of languages. Among the volumes was a well-worn handbook of chess-playing. It was crammed with clippings, all yellowed, of chess games. Some were marked "good" and one was marked "A magnificent game."

The early days of 1910 slipped by, no one suspecting that the last summons was at hand. He was full of labors, contemplating a sketch of the history of philosophy to show the trend toward personalism, preparing to discuss Berkeley in an important English lectureship for which arrangements were under way, getting ready for a visit to Constantinople to inspect the American School for Girls. He had never been of unusual muscular strength, had never weighed much more than 160 pounds. He had, however, ruled his body like a Spartan till it was the completely flexible servant of his will; never sick, never unresponsive to the exacting demands for endurance that he laid upon it; but the end came suddenly on Friday, April 1, 1910. He was seized with a heart attack as he met his class, was able to reach home, but passed away in the afternoon of the same day. Except that the end had come prematurely, he could have desired no better lot than to fall thus at his post in the midst of the daily task.

I deeply regret that I am stopped by Mrs. Bowne's own wishes from making anything except the barest mention of the part she played in her husband's career. Mrs. Bowne belonged to a New York family named Morrison, a family for which Doctor Bowne had deepest and sincerest respect. Mrs. Bowne brought into her husband's life a delicate appreciation of the finer beauties which found their expression in artistic decoration of the home, and in the ordering of the affairs of the household. Doctor Bowne himself was highly gifted in a certain exquisiteness of æsthetic discernment, and Mrs. Bowne ministered to him by making for him an environment of genuine and satisfying beauty. In every other respect also that made for strength, Mrs. Bowne re-enforced Doctor Bowne. It is sometimes said of wives that they serve their husbands by supplementing their characters in emphasizing qualities which the men themselves lack. I think no higher praise can be given Mrs. Bowne than to say that she saw unerringly the strong qualities in her husband's nature and effectively sought to increase their strength. I know that Bowne depended in the inner springs of his life upon the never-failing and freshening of vigor which came from his companionship with Mrs. Bowne.

The first copy of each of Bowne's books was presented to his wife, who was his amanuensis, with a written inscription on the fly-leaf. I quote the inscription from the revised edition of *Theism:*

> My dear Kate: Considering the number of my books which present themselves for your approval, I am reminded of Leah's remark when a son was born. And she said, "A troop cometh—And she called his name Gad."
>
> J'aimai, J'aime,
> J'aimerai, te toujours.
>
> Yours ever,
>
> Borden.

# CHAPTER XVII

# POSTSCRIPT

MORE than eighteen years have passed since Borden Parker Bowne left us. Every year since that time has seen the deepening of his influence in the Methodist Episcopal Church. Those who sat under his teaching have come to such positions of influence in the denomination that it is fair to say that his system has had more influence on Methodism than that of any other philosopher in her history. At the Boston University School of Theology the Bowne system receives adequate interpretation by Professor Albert C. Knudson, and in the College and Postgraduate Departments by Professor Edgar S. Brightman. Each of these teachers is peculiarly qualified to supplement the service wrought by Bowne. Professor Knudson has read practically everything available in any language bearing at all directly on personalistic philosophy and possesses an amazingly discerning skill in selection in philosophic interpretation. Professor Brightman has by a brilliant gift of exposition won for personalism a wide hearing among philosophers and laymen alike. Honor for spreading the Bowne teaching should be given to Dr. Ralph T. Flewelling for yeoman service rendered in his own books and in the *Personalist;* to Dr. George C. Cell, of Boston; Dr. George A. Wilson, of Syracuse; Dr. Herbert A. Youtz, of Oberlin; Dr. T. G. Duvall, of Ohio Wesleyan, and to Dr. H. C. Sanborn, of Vanderbilt, for like distinguished service.

The question is often raised as to why the Bowne influence has been so limited to one denomination, especially on the philosophic side. The answer has to take account of a good many factors. Professor Bowne cared nothing for advertising. He once referred to publicity experts in the exploitation of religious thought as "advertising harpies." He did not esteem highly membership in Philosophic Societies. His range of acquaintance with other teachers of philosophy was somewhat narrow. He did not wish to leave Boston University for a post which itself might have filled a bigger place in the public eye. All these considerations count for something in the answer.

There are other reasons which perhaps throw additional light upon his character, and because they thus throw light I will devote a word to them as I draw this study to a close. First, Bowne was a theist, so devoted to the preaching of theism that he kept his place in the ministry of an aggressively evangelistic denomination. I do not suppose it is necessary to do more than remark that an avowed and militant theist in America is not likely to get much of a standing among the professional philosophers. Theism is not popular in philosophic circles, and is not likely to be. The theist is tolerated, but that is about all. One reason for this is, of course, the realization that the existence of God cannot be proved, and the philosophers are tempted to treat the theist as if he thought he could demonstrate the fact of God. Bowne never tried to do this. The other reason is that a good many essentially theistic philosophers are concerned about their standing with their fellow craftsmen; and if theism is not popular, they will not noticeably emphasize their theistic notions. This aggravates a bad situation. For some time the school of Dewey has been a dominant factor in American philosophy, and the Dewey system has a blind spot whenever religion appears above the horizon, enormously useful as that system has been otherwise.

Bowne was not only a theist but a Methodist—and Methodism always has come in for considerable good-humored, not overintelligent patronizing by the professedly intellectual. This is not so true now as formerly, but even to-day there appears surprise in some intellectual quarters when a Methodist achieves any feat requiring first-rate mental ability. The situation is not relieved much by the fact that some Methodists suffer from an inferiority complex, and cannot themselves believe that a Methodist can do thinking worth while until somebody outside the denomination tells them so. The delight in some Methodist quarters when men like Rudolf Eucken of Jena, and William James of Harvard and John Cook Wilson of Oxford, pronounced Bowne entitled to rank among the great in philosophy was pathetic to contemplate.

Again, Bowne was not a voice of his day. Some men unwittingly gather up into their consciousness the demands of a time, and voice those demands, and often satisfy the demands. This is altogether creditable and even indispensable, or at least inevitable. It was inevitable that Herbert Spencer, or someone like him, should propound an evolutionary theory of all creation just when he did, and quite as inevitable that the theory should be just about the jumble that it was. For men were feeling after some big comprehensive phrasing which would gratify their yearning for unity in the new ways of looking at things. They were ripe for Spencer and were not disposed to be overcritical. Spencer was a genuine voice of his age, the self-contradictions of the age being manifest in the contradictions of the voice.

With Bowne it was not so. He was not fitted to be a voice of his time. It is hard to imagine that a demand of the time, so called, would have made the slightest difference to him. We need the two types of thinker, but I think the Bowne type is more original and forceful. Bowne declared that as we read the Spencer philosophy we cannot help noticing that, though the same principles are formally avowed in the latter volumes as in the first, a pressure, as of a current flowing across the main stream, carried it far to one side of the goal at which it seemed to be pointing at the outset. Nobody could imagine that Spencer was deliberately yielding to such a cross-current.

He was probably fighting against it, but he was at its mercy nevertheless.

I do not think we get any such impression in reading Bowne. There is in him enlargement of view as life goes on, and a finer discernment progressively reveals itself, but the same sturdy independence is evident throughout. A writer of this stamp will not win as wide a circle of readers as the other. Bowne never received very large royalties from his books in philosophy, except possibly from the first edition of *Metaphysics,* which sold about six thousand copies.

Again, there is the explanation suggested by style of writing. If Bowne's classroom lectures could have been taken down by a stenographer, they would have made popular reading, for they abounded in illustrations and in flashes of wit which he seems not to have been willing to publish in printed form. He assumed too much about the reading public when he said that, with the principle stated on a printed page which a reader could hold before his gaze till he understood, there was little need of illustration. This, let it be remembered, from a master of illustration. The human fact is that the ordinary reader needs an immense amount of repetition and amplification and intellectual "roughage" if he is to assimilate philosophy.

I have already referred to the power of William James as a popular expositor of philosophy. Some of the expressions of James sink at once into the memory, never to be dislodged. The "stream of consciousness," the "mother-sea" of an Other-consciousness, the "saddle-back of memory" will hint at what I mean. Bowne always enjoyed the raciness of the figures of James, though he insisted that they often raised more questions than they solved. Still, they were, by his admission, powerful agents in propagation. For their own characteristic charm as well as for their tributes—both expressed and implied—to Bowne we may well ponder the following letters from James:

CAMBRIDGE, 95 Irving St.,
May 21, 1895.

MY DEAR BOWNE:

The gods have spoken, and alas! They have said no. The President and Fellows, at their meeting yesterday, decided that they could not appropriate any more money for philosophy next year, and that it was therefore impossible for them to ask you to give us a course. I am *exceedingly* sorry, for I feel the great value it would have been to us to be able to add your name, to say nothing of adding *you*, to our philosophy department, even for a single year, as we are now adding Ladd's by having him give the Ethical Seminar. I believe, and I know the President does, in the policy of communion and interchange between the different universities, and this would have been a splendid instance of it.

I don't suppose you will personally feel very much disappointed at having this temptation to overwork removed, and you will, I hope, see in the episode a proof of the admiration of your talents which the Harvard philosophers are all filled with, and of the good will with which I in particular am always truly yours,

WM. JAMES.

Post card addressed to Bowne:

ROME, Feb. 15, 1901.—I am here for my precious health, recovering from a variety of troubles, of wh. "nervous prostration" is the most serious. I am trying to write at the rate of a page and a quarter a day some "Gifford" lectures on the "Varieties of religious experience," to be delivered in Edinb. in May and June. A couple of years ago you pubd. (in Zion's Herald, if I recall rightly) a number of articles on that subject, which I read but did not keep; and now I hear of a book by you of which I suppose those articles were the basis. They seemed to me important; and *I need the book* for my work. But I know neither title nor publisher, so I go to headquarters and frankly beg you to *give* me a copy, sending it to the care of Brown, Shipley and Co., London, S. W., and trusting (under Providence) to be repaid by a copy of my Gifford lectures when they come out! The subject is one of absorbing interest, but it is not easy to prove (as I seek to do) that religion is man's most important function, when most of the particular manifestations are patently absurd. I have been abroad a year and a half now, and am very impatient to get home again and never wander more.

WILLIAM JAMES.

GENEVA, March 31, 1901.

DEAR BROTHER BOWNE:

I thank you sincerely both for your most friendly letter and for "The Christian Life," which came duly several weeks ago.

The book seems to me an admirable piece of clearness, compactness and good practical sense. In point of form, there being not a waste sentence in it, and the arrangement being so perfect, it is perhaps the best thing you have written—and that is high enough praise. From the theological point of view, it makes an outsider like myself wonder at the relaxing of ancient doctrines, to see such a document emanating from the Methodist body—the body that used to speak of the Universalists as they did! It seems to me that all our sects are doctrinally coming together on the basis of theism much like that of earlier Unitarianism. I am sure that, as you intimate, there have been cries enough of protest against you, and I myself have enough of old Lutheran sentiment in my bones to believe that you are too unsympathetic with the mystical needs of man in making as light as you do of the theological symbols in which they have clothed themselves. It seems to me that extravagance of some sort is essential to the *direct* religious life. For the mass, who live at second-hand anywhere, I have no doubt that such sobriety as you defend is a better model to imitate than the morbidnesses of the more original theologians. Yet is it as readily *imitable?* I have found this book so very useful to my own thought that since you write of having published "two others of the same sort" (happy fecundity!) I am going to ask you to send them to me also! This is shameless; but necessity knows no law. So secluded have I been as not to have heard of their existence. Pray be good to yours always truly,

WM. JAMES.

Care Brown, Shipley & Co., London, S. W.

(Gr. Brit. & Ireland post card)

RYE, May 9, 1901. The two other booklets have arrived, and I thank you for them heartily. I find them perfect masterpieces of pithiness—of expression without waste of words; and I should think that they would have a tremendous effect within the Methodist body, as well as in the other orthodox denominations. But how poorly they seem to have been advertised. Surely each should contain the announcement of the others.

WM. JAMES.

95 Irving St., CAMBRIDGE, Dec. 29, '03.

MY DEAR BOWNE:

Your letter finds me in my 19th day of immersement, with grippe, still weak as a "cat," both cerebrally and muscularly, but a better Methodist than you, I still believe, in spite of your efforts to persuade me to the contrary. If the ass and the blatherskite succeed in their attempt to weed you out of the body, I hope that they will have the wisdom to get me voted in to fill the vacuum. Seriously speaking, I regret that my use of the word "rationalistic" should in any way have added to your annoyances.

I shall be at home all the time every day this week, and am much pleased at the prospect of seeing you. My house is a little off the car-track, but only 10 or 12 minutes' walk from the corner of Mass. Avenue and of Quincy St. Take any Harvard Square car, get out at Quincy St., walk through it to its end at Kirkland St., which turn into to your right (towards Boston), and follow till you come to Irving. Turn into Irving St. to your left (northwards)—my house is the first on the left.

Can't you come at 12, Friday or Saturday—I name these later days, thinking that my head will be stronger—and stay to our 1 o'clock lunch? Or if the afternoon hours are better for you, come any time after 3:30 on the same days.

Truly yours,

WM. JAMES.

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HAARLEM, August 17, 1908.

MY DEAR BOWNE:

Owing to various distractions, duties, and impossibilities, I have only just "got 'round" to the reading of your *Personalism*, and I must immediately send you a word of "reaction" on its contents. It seems to me a very weighty pronouncement, and form and matter taken together a splendid addition to American philosophy. Your youthful tendency to a certain snappishness of statement has toned itself down into patience, but you have clung to your old directness and simplicity and to your avoidance of overtechnicality in language. The book represents very obviously a process of mature evolution, with the phases gone through remaining in the result, some of them (in my own opinion) rather in the form of cicatricial than in that of living tissue. The shortness of the book is wonderful, considering the great amount of vigorous thought-operation embodied in it—that is what makes it so weighty. After one reading one gets only the generalized impression, and I shall not pretend to go into any detail. It seems to me that you and I are now aiming at exactly the same end, though, owing to our different past, from which each retains special verbal habits, we often express ourselves so differently. It seemed to me over and over again that you were planting your feet identically in footprints which my feet were accustomed to—quite independently, of course, of my example, which was what made the coincidences so gratifying. The common foe of both of us is the dogmatist-rationalist-abstractionist. Our common desire is to redeem the concrete personal life which wells up in us from moment to moment, from fastidious (and really preposterous) dialectic contradictions, impossibilities, and vetoes. But whereas your "transcendental empiricism" assumes that the essential discontinuity of the sensible flux has to be overcome by high intellectual operations on it, quite *à la* Kant, Green, Caird, etc.; my "radical" empiricism denies the flux's discontinuity, making conjunctive relations essential members of it as given, and charging the conceptual function with being the creator of factitious incoherencies. You don't stop with the abstract syntheses of the intellect, however; you restore concreteness by the "will," etc.; whereas I *keep* the full personal concreteness which I find in time and the immediate particulars that fill it. I have been tremendously confirmed in my radical empiricism, and emancipated, by Bergson's writings. He treats (as you probably know) the whole intellectual function as being primarily practical. By it we jump or fly over the surface of experience and perch on distant spots conceptually, for our advantage here and now, instead of wading through the intervening concrete particulars, as animals without intellect have to do. New values, indeed, arise by the use of the intellectual function, but it gives no insight into forces or activities, which must be lived directly or represented sympathetically, not *conceived*. All this is entirely congruent with your scheme; so I think we fight in exactly the same cause, the reinstatement of the fullness of practical life, after the treatment of it by so much past philosophy as spectral. I personally prefer my own directer method; but so far has the thinking (at any rate the "academic") mind been warped away from directness by school traditions, that I have no doubt your more complex treatment will prove by far the more effective in the philosophy market. By the school traditions I, of course, mean the contempt of sensation, the insistence on an intellectual synthesis, the spewing out of "time," the appeal of infinite regress as fatal, and the like. I prefer simply to short-circuit all this as so much artificiality. But the essential thing is not these differences, it is that our emphatic footsteps fall on the *same spot*. You, starting near the rationalist pole, and boxing the compass, and I traversing the diameter from the empiricist pole, reach practically very similar positions and attitudes. It seems to me that this is full of promise for the future of philosophy.

My wife awaits me to go to the church to hear the organ. We sail for home on September 22nd, in good health, as I hope the whole Bowne family is. Don't think of answering this—at any rate, not by writing!

Yours fraternally and sincerely,
(Signed) WILLIAM JAMES.

In this connection it is interesting to note also the following from J. Cook Wilson, professor at Oxford. While Bowne and Wilson held the same philosophic fundamentals, Bowne was far more generous to James than was Wilson. It is difficult to sympathize with Wilson's sharpness.

LONDON W., 5 Granville Place,
December 26, 1908.

MY DEAR BOWNE:

It was a great pleasure to see your handwriting again, for in spite of type, as long as you address your letter with a pen and sign your name you may be said to have a handwriting; but perhaps in the future a man who has a handwriting will be as rare as a man who has a horse. I met Professor James and his wife when they were in Oxford, and found them very delightful people. About the value of his philosophical speculation, I suspect all the philosophers in Oxford are of the same mind as yours. I find it very difficult to attend any lectures during term, and I didn't really feel I could afford the time for James, knowing he had no message for me. However, I went to one of them (it happened to be the one in which he talked of Bergson) and I heard him discuss the puzzle of Zeno. It was a puzzle to me how a man so entirely unqualified to deal with a question of the mind, so slippery to any but the really trained metaphysician, could venture to discuss it at all, not to speak of addressing an audience in a University town. It was extraordinary naïveté, because, as we well know, such questions are decisive tests, and fatal traps to the uninitiated. The philosophers present—it was a very mixed audience with a large proportion of ladies—listened with wonder as he tumbled into the ordinary and elementary fallacies. Among other things he fell into the familiar snare of making one time elapse in another time. This he did in an amazingly confident attempt to overthrow the satisfactory solution which Aristotle gives in the *Physics*. It seemed quite clear, by the way, that he imagined the solution a modern one and had no idea it was from Aristotle.

He seemed to think the difficulty couldn't be met in theory, the true (pragmatical) answer being that we are not in *practice* troubled with continuity; e. g., he said gravely, that in practice the liquid came out of a bottle in drops—a drop at a time. Not to speak of the fact that water appears to come in a continuous stream out of a tap before it leaks out drops and that in hydrodynamics the equation of the tapering shape is determined by the equation of continuity. He never seems to have made the elementary reflection that a drop does not come out of the bottle *all at once*, but the first half before the second half, the first half of the first half before the second half of the first half, and so on *ad infinitum*, reproducing all the elements of the Zeno puzzle. I am glad I had wasted no more time on the lectures. Indeed, I do not think the speculation of James worthy the valuable time or serious attention of anyone who knows even a moderate amount of philosophy. I dare say, by the way, you have have seen an article by Albert Schurz in the *Revue Philosophique* for October, 1908, which ends thus: "Le Pragmatisme l'emportera non parce que n'est juste—car quoique soit d'ailleurs le vrai, le pragmatisme certainement *est* faux—mais parce qu'il est desirable—Le besoin crée, etc., etc."

From all this talk of mine about James and his lecture you may probably realize—what is indeed true—that if you had a "call" to Oxford you would find yourself in a very congenial atmosphere. That reminds me that when you published your Lotzian book in metaphysics I promptly, being librarian, put it in the undergraduates' library of my college, and also that I have not read your recent work on Personality, of which I first heard from the good James himself. When I asked him whether he knew you, he told me of the recent publication. I haven't read it yet because, I shall presently explain, I haven't had time. I have not read Bergson partly for the same reason, but also because I don't consider him at all a "first claim" on my time, even if I had any for him. What I am struck by is what you say about him and am the more anxious to have a look at him. What you say strikes me as very, very true about some of these modern "reformers" (viz., that what is newly true in them "has been fairly obvious to a good many of us a long while," e. g., as regards a merely "conceptual intelligence"), and they produce it as their own remarkable discovery. Then the "Pragmatists" affect to look down on the people they call "intellectualists," and suppose they don't know the things which they have themselves so imperfectly apprehended. If they did apprehend them better, they would see they were fully realized and had long been so by the "intellectualists."

In the last year of his life Bowne characterized himself as follows:

"It is hard to classify me with accuracy. I am a theistic idealist, a personalist, a transcendental empiricist, an idealistic realist, and realistic idealist; but all these phrases need to be interpreted. They cannot well be made out from the dictionary. Neither can I well be called a disciple of any one. I largely agree with Lotze, but I transcend him. I hold half of Kant's system, but sharply dissent from the rest. There is a strong smack of Berkeley's philosophy, with a complete rejection of his theory of knowledge. I am a Personalist, the first of the clan in any thoroughgoing sense." (Borden P. Bowne, in a letter dated May 31, 1909, and printed in *The Personalist,* 1921, p. 10.)

Of course at the date this sketch of mine is written we are set upon by the demand that everything be "snappy." The so-called demand for the popularization of knowledge has let loose on us a flood of banalities and sillinesses without parallel since the printing press was invented. It is remarked as a sign of the progress of our age that books on philosophy now take rank as best-sellers side by side with some of the most popular novels of the hour. The reason is not far to seek. Some of the philosophical works and some of the novels could interchange titles—and no one would know the difference. It would not be possible to popularize Bowne in the current significance of the much-used term any more than it would be possible to popularize the binomial theorem, or the Copernican theory, or Kant on the regulative principles of thinking, or any thoroughgoing treatise on law.

Nevertheless, it is a comfort to turn from the flashy garments with which many professed philosophers seek to clothe their nakedness to-day to the firm and fine texture of Bowne's Metaphysics and Theism and Ethics. I close by citing a characteristically Bownian passage of noble prose taken from "The Modern Conception of God's Kingdom," page 325, of *Studies in Christianity:*

> I dream of a time when humanity shall come to its own, when physical nature shall be subdued to human service beyond all present conceptions, when want and disease shall have disappeared, when the social order shall be an expression of perfect justice, when the race shall be rich enough to afford all its members the opportunity of a truly human existence, when the bondage of physical drudgery shall have been taken off from human shoulders, when the treasures of knowledge shall be a universal possession, and when over against these external conditions there shall be a moral spirit wise enough to use them and strong enough to control them. Then the kingdom of God and of man will have come. And to turn this dream into a reality is the Christian program, the true meaning of the prayer, so often uttered and so seldom understood, Thy kingdom come; thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven.

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# INDEX

A

Abbott, W. T., 21
"Abolitionists," The, 175
Adams, Benjamin, 40
Agnosticism, 65, 66, 67, 68, 97
Allen's biography of Brooks, 179
American School for Girls, 262
Amiel, H. F., 167, 222
Amusement question, 202
Andrews, E. G., 188, 230
Anthropological research, 46, 48
*Appearance and Reality*, 84
Armenia, 262
Asbury, Francis, 13, 14
*Ascent of Man, The*, 126
Associationalism, 80
Atheism, 43, 73, 75, 76, 84, 120, 121, 122, 130
Atkinson, Edward, 171

B

Bacon, L. W., 175
Bagehot, Walter, 36
Bain, Alexander, 77
Balfour, A. J., 85
Barton, W. E., 221
Baxter, Richard, quoted, 227
Beecher case, the, 88
Bergson, H. L., 159
Berkeley, 107, 109, 112, 187, 268
Beyond the grave, 247
Bible, 186, 187
Biblical research, 42, 179–227
Bibliography, 282–286
Bishops, 228–232
Blackwell, Henry, 249
Boston Preachers' Meeting, 186
Boston University, 24; appointment of professors in, 180; Bowne system at, 270; Mitchell's removal from, 181; Trustees of, 238.
Boswell, James, 107; quoted, 173
Bovard, W. S., 249
Bowen, H. C., 87, 88
Bowne, Borden Parker, ancestry, 9; appointment to Boston University, 91; and pragmatism, 149–162; articles quoted, 177, 204, 205, 224, 225, 226, 231, 238; as critic, 51–86; as disciplinarian, 20; associates of at Boston University, 94; attitude of toward suffrage, 170; attitude of regarding a miracle, 184; belief in God, 134; boyhood, 10, 11, 18, 19, 23; character of, 271, 272; characterization of self, 280; college record, 28; courses at Boston University, 91; criticism of Spencer, 58–70; criticism of officialism, 228–239; defender of biblical research, 179–206; definition of a Christian, 209; degrees, 29, 37; education of, 19–50; first sermon of, 22; first pastoral charge, 32; garden of, 265; heresy charges against, 191–202; home of, 9; idealist, 106–110; influence of European study on, 40; influence on Methodism, 270; impressions of India, 258–262; journalistic work, 87; last days, 264–269; letter to Powell, quoted, 146; letter to Knudson, quoted, 149; letters of, 32, 33, 34, 231, 237, 249, 250, 251, 252, 280; library, 267; local preacher's license, 21; on amusement question, 202; offers of professorships, 91; ordination, 32; personalist, 131–148; prayer at funeral of Bishop Foster, quoted, 224–226; prizes and honors, 28; reception in Japan, 255, 256; religion of, 40, 41; reply to the physicist, 81; smile, 24; students of, 24, 39; study abroad, 34–41; style of writing, 273; teaching methods, 240–244; the realist, 86–105; theist, 120–130; trip around the world, 250–263; transcendental empiricist, 111–119; trial of, 189–202; virgin birth, 184, 185; visit to China, 256, 257; works of, 27, 30, 31, 37, 69, 101, 103, 116, 131, 157, 184, 235, 253, 282–286
Bowne, Mrs. Borden Parker, 268
Bowne, Letitia, 14, 21, 32
Bowne, Margaret P., 9, 13
Bowne, Joseph, 9, 13, 21
Bowne, Joseph, Jr., 21
Bowne, William P., 23
Bradley, 84, 85, 149
Brightman, E. S., 270
Bronson, Dillon, 226
Brooks, Phillips, 179
Brown, Charles, 248
Brown, C. R., 180
Bryan, W. J., 171
Buckley, J. M., 202, 203
Bugbee, L. H., quoted, 226; 247
"Buxton's Entire," 175

C

Cadman, S. Parkes, 247
Calvinism, 92, 161
*Candid Examination of Theism, A*, 75
Cartwright, Peter, 15

Categories, 123
Causes, final, 120
Cell, G. C., 270
Child, religion of, 89; religious education of the, 222, 223
China, 256, 257
Christ, divinity of, 214
Christian, experience, 207–227; perfection, 13, 14; standards of living, 17
*Christian Advocate, The,* 11, 14, 87
Christian Science, 101
Christianity, 44, 45, 178; secularism and, 177; studies in, 184, 207, 244; quoted, 281
Church, the, 177, 178; attack on liberal views of, 204–206
Cobden, Richard, 254
Coe, George A., 204
Coleridge, S. T., 183
College record, 28
Collier, F. W., 267
Columbia University, 27
Conference Course of Study, 180, 231
Cooper Union, 29, 30
Corday, Charlotte, 224
*Cosmic Philosophy,* 17, 71, 73, 74
"Cosmic Theism," 72, 73
Creation, understanding of, 128
Creative, ability, 124; will, 127
Crimean War, 36
Criminality, 174
*Critique of Practical Reason, The,* 151
*Critique of Pure Reason, The,* 113, 151
Czar, 36

D

Darwin, Charles, 26, 52, 53, 70, 73, 100
*Defense of Philosophic Doubt,* 85
Degrees, 29, 37
Depotentiation of the Son of God, 183
Dewey, John, 149, 150, 271
*Discipline,* the, 17, 21, 22, 203
Discipline, 203; schoolroom, 19
Discovery of America, 74
Doctrine of sensations, 59, 72, 77
*Don Quixote,* 19
Dooley, Mr., 149
Dram-drinking, 16
Draper, J. W., 26, 89
Dreyfus case, the, 228
Drummond, Henry, 126
Duvall, T. G., 270

E

Eddy, Mary Baker, 101
Education, 19, 23
"Educational Fiatism," 238
Educational values, 38
Educated ministry, 234
Einstein, Albert, 79, 104, 107
Eliot, C. W., 13
Elliott, George, 189
English, unresponsiveness of, 36
Episcopacy, 228, 229, 230, 232
Ethical theory, 163–178
*Ethics,* 14, 30, 166, 170, 210, 253, 257
Eucken, Rudolf, 272
Euclidean geometry, 104
European, method of dealing with students, 39; study, 34–41
Evangelism, 222
Evolution, 26, 46, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62, 70, 72, 73, 125, 126, 128, 182; agnostic, 97; definition of, 61, 63; scientific, 86; theory of, 120; worth of, 127
*Examination,* 60

F

Fallacy of the Universal, doctrine of, 143
Faraday, Michael, 100
Fatalism, 161
Fatherhood, divine, 219
Faust, 38
Fear, 46, 47
Fénelon, 13
Fictionalism, 156, 157, 158
*Final Causes,* 120
*First Principles,* 51, 56, 65
Fisher, F. B., 258
Fiske, John, 65, 71, 72, 73, 74, 136, 142
Flewelling, R. T., 270
Foreknowledge, divine, 161
Forgiveness, 221
Foster, R. S., 88, 92, 93, 208, quoted, 209; prayer at funeral of, 224–226; 247, 248
*Foundations of Belief,* 85
France, 36, 38
Freedom, 142, 143
French system of thought, 36

G

Garrison, W. L., 175
General Conference elections, 235
Gessler, cap of, 86
Germany, 37, 38, 39, 52, 87
*Gil Blas,* 19
Gladden, Washington, 168, 169, 170
God, Belief in, 120, 134; Immanence of, 235; knowledge of, 65, 66, 67, 69, 73, 123, 128, 147; of reason, 129; of the living, 150; personality as applied to, 85; presence of, 121
*God's White Throne,* 249
Gods, finite, 125
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 38
Gold standard, 171
Golden Rule, 165
Good will, 167, 168
*Gott und die Natur,* 37, 89
Göttingen, Germany, 34

Gray, Asa, quoted, 126
Green, T. H., 60, 61
Grove City Bible School, 247
*Guide to Holiness*, 13
*Gulliver's Travels*, 31, 118
Guth, William W., 249
Guyon, Jeanne M. B. de la M., 13

H

Haldane, R. B., 105
Halle, Prussia, 34
Hamilton, William, 54
Handley, John, 21
Harper, W. R., 91
Harriman, E. H., 249
Harris, N. W., Foundation, 131
Hartshorne, 11
Harvard University, 26, 163
Hegel, G. W. F., 60, 61, 100, 114, 150, 236
Herbart, J. F., 242
Heresy, 188–202
Hocking, W. E., 131
Hodgkins, Louise M., 25
Holmes, O. W., 267
Hughes, E. H., quoted, 232; 237, 248]
Human race, origin of, 47
Humanism, 149, 217, 218, 219
"Humanity's Eminent Domain," 253
Hume, David, 59, 60, 61, 80, 85, 112, 113
Huntington, W. E., 94
Huxley, T. H., 75

I

Idealism, 98, 106, 107, 109, 110, 114, 134; objective, 18
Immanence of God, 235
Immortality, 220, 221
Impersonalism, failure of, 132, 140
*Independent*, the, 87, 88, 90, 253
India, 258–262
Infinite, 58, 150; activity of the, 158; Person, 176
Institutions, improvement of, 173
*Introduction to Psychological Theory*, *116*
*Irenics and Polemics*, 175

J

James, William, 40, 55, 76, 77, 78, 117, 118, 124, 132, 138, 143, 146, 149, 150, 155, 221, 241, 242, 272; letters of to Bowne, 274–278
Janet's *Final Causes*, 120
Japan, 255
Jefferson, Charles E., 180
Jesus, 42; character of, 153; resurrection of, 154
Johnson, Samuel, 18, 107, 109, 112, 173
Jonah, 185
Judas, 42

K

*Kant and Spencer*, 69, 70, 113, 186, 244
Kant, Immanuel, 38, 51, 53, 68, 83, 113, 114, 115, 129, 131, 147, 149, 151, 186, 234
Kelley, William V., 24
Kennan, George, 255
Kenoticism, 183, 184
Knudson, A. C., 118, 131, 149, 182, 270; letter of, 242
Kropotkin, Peter, 126

L

Laplace, P. S., 64
Larkin, F. M., 189
Law, 142, 143, Reign of, 144
Layard, Sir Austin H., 48
Leibnitz, G. W., 113
*Life*, 266
Light, measure of, 136
Lincoln, Abraham, 221
Locke's, doctrine of the mind, 111
"Logic of Religious Belief, The," 128
*Logical Theory*, 149, 153
Lotze, Professor, 37, 115
Lowe, Titus, 259
Lowell, J. R., 160
Lufburrow, 17

M

Mackichan, D., 260
McCabe, L. D., 161
McCown, C. C., 259
McKinley, William, 171, 254
Man, 48; resuscitation of, 154
*Man and Nature*, 124
Marsh, G. P., 124
Martin, Benjamin N., 27
Martineau, James, 89
Massachusetts, 176
Materialism, 56, 80, 88, 89, 142
Mayer, J. R., 96
Mell, A. W., letter quoted, 260
*Metaphysics*, 12, 24, 30, 31, 37, 104, 115, 144, 273
Methodism, 13, 207, 208, 228, 230, 234
Methodist, bishops, 228–233; mode of dress, 17
Methodist Book Concern, The, 21, 51, 91
Methodist Conference at Wilmington, Delaware, 87
Methodist Episcopal Church, 15, 18, 179, 189, 229
*Methodist Review*, 41, 71, 128, 131, 151, 163, 189–202, 203, 204, 248, 249
*Methodist Quarterly Review*, 41, 163, 176
Mill, J. S., 77, 98, 219, 254
Mind, activity of, 115, 153; doctrine of the, 111; impressions in the, 112; mathematical, 147; moral nature of, 123
Minister, educated, 234; ordination of, 17
Miracles, 42, 184, 185
Mitchell, H. G., case of, 179, 180, 181;

removal of from Boston University, 181; 94, 182, 229, 230, 233, 234
"Modern Conception of God's Kingdom," The, quoted, 281
Moral, codes, 215, 216; Life, 165, 166
"Moralization of Life and the Vitalization of Morals," 163
Moses, 186
Mysticism, 14, 207, 208, 217

N

Napoleon, 35, 36, 52
Nebular theory, 99
Negro, 93; equality of, 88
*New Englander*, the, 51
*New Philosophy*, 55
*New Republic*, 150
New Testament, 42, 44, 154
New York, east side life, 21; University, 23, 25, 31, 87
New York East Conference, 31, 40, 189
New York Tribune, criticism in, 31
New York University, 25, 31, 87
Newark, New Jersey, 154
Newcomb, Simon, 98
Newman's *Grammer of Assent*, 162
Newton, Sir Isaac, 24, 64, 138
Nichols, W. H., 27
*North American Review*, 145, quoted, 170
Northwestern University, 131

O

Officialism, criticism of, 228–239
Ohio Annual Conferences, 235
*Old Faith and the New*, 42, 44
Old Testament, 179, 180
"One of the World's Heroes," 258
Oratory, 29
Ordination, 17
*Origin of Species*, 26, 52
*Outlook, The*, 30

P

Paley, William, 120, 128
Palmer, Byron, 248, 249
Pantheism, 146, 183
Paris, 34, 35
Parker, Theodore, 140, 176
Parkhurst, Charles, 244, 245, 246
Pedagogy, 39
Pennington Seminary, 19, 23, 24, 25
Pentateuch, 186; documentary hypothesis of the, 180
Person, Supreme, 182
Personalism, 77, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 140, 148, 152, 161, 163, 176, 255; objection to, 134, 135, 141
*Personalist*, the, extract from, 238; 267, 270, 280
Personality, 141; development of, 139; sincerity of, 215; dignity of, 139; Divine, 85, 137
Philistinism, 55
Phillips, Wendell, 175
Philosophic criticism, 131; principles, 62
Philosophy, 42; evolutionary, 74; history of, 111; idealistic, 19; of As If, 157; Synthetic, 67, 74
*Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, 27, 100
Physicus, 75
Pierce, C. S., 119
Pluralism, 124
*Popular Science Monthly*, 54
Porter, Noah, 91
Positivist, The, 86
Powell, G. L., 146
Pragmatism, 55, 149–162
Preacher, local, 31
Preachers, Methodist, 14–16; pioneer, 15
*Primacy of the Practical Reason*, 149
*Principles of Ethics*, 30, 163
Prizes, 28
Psychologists, experimental, 117, 118
Psychology, scientific investigation of, 118

R

Rationalism, 40, 42
Realism, 94, 101
Relativity, meaning of, 68
Religion, 27, 177; of childhood, 89, 90; of the future, 260, 261; thoughts on, 76
"Religion and Secularism," 163
"Religion as Affected by Modern Materialism," 89
*Religion and Science*, 89
"Religion of Childhood," quoted, 89, 90
Religious, arrogance, 211; education, 222, 223; ethics, 17; experience, 18; freedom, 233; revelation, 186
Resurrection of Jesus, 154
Resuscitation of a man, 154
Romanes, G. J., 75, 76
Roosevelt, Theodore, 169
Ross, E. A., 49
Royce, Josiah, 132, 150, 241
Russell, Bertrand, 59, 78, 79, 119, 132
Russia, 36, 255

S

Saint Paul, 154
Sanborn, H. C., 270
Savage, M. J., 221
Schereschewsky, S. I. J., 258
Schiller's *Humanism*, 149, 217, 219
Schools, denominational, 166; intuitional and utilitarian, 164; public, 44
Schurman, J. G., 126
Science, 27
Scriptures, 187; translating the into Mandarin dialect, 258

Secularism and Christianity, quoted, 176, 177
Self, 115, 116; doctrine of, 124; fiction of, 157; Infinite, 145, 159, 160; Supreme, 140
Selfishness, 46, 47, 85, 86
Sensationalism, 59, 72, 77
Shakespeare, William, 31
Shedd, W. G. T., 153
Sheldon, H. C., 94, 184, 232
Simpson, Matthew, 29, 32
*Siris*, 187
Skepticism, 45, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 92, 156, 158
Slavery, 175, 176
Smith, George A., 126
Smith, Goldwin, 43
Social problems, 168, 169
Socialism, 165, 172
Solipsism, 95, 96, 101
Space, 101, 107, 108, 117
Spain, 254
Spanish-American War, 254
Speare, Alden, 248
Spencer, Herbert, 41, 51–57, 62, 70, 71, 73, 77, 85, 136, 141, 179, 272; and agnosticism, 66, 68; and democratic movements, 49; inconsistencies of, 58–62; Kant and, 69, 70, 113, 244; philosophy, 51–57, 69, 100
Spencerian doctrine of the Unknowable, 65, 67
Spiritualism, 221
Standard Oil Company, 168, 169
Steele, Daniel, 14, 219
Stevenson, Eugene, 27
Stevenson, quoted, 160
Stokes, E. H., 21, 22
Strauss, D. F., 41–49; reference of to Butler, 44
*Studies in Christianity*, 184, 207, 244; quoted, 281
*Studies in Theism*, 37, 91, 92, 98, 100, 103, 115, 157, 269
Success, worship of, 150
Suffrage, 170, 171
Supernatural, 183
Sweden, 250
Swift, Jonathan, 31, 118, 175
*Systematic Theology*, 232

T

Talmage, T. DeWitt, 30
*Tale of a Tub*, 31
Tarbell, Ida, 168
Terry, M. S., 248
Theater, 172
Theism, 57, 67, 76, 120, 122, 128, 129, 136, 151, 160, 265, 271; argument for, 123, 125; candid examination of, 75
Theistic conviction, 160
Theology, conventional, 48
*Thoughts on Religion*, 76
*Through Nature to God*, 72, 74
Tobacco, 16
Transcendental empiricism, 111–119
Truth, as Bowne defined it, 157; heart of, 159; test of, 83
Tübingen, Germany, 42, 182
Turkey, 262
Tyndall, John, 75, 89, 179
Tyrrell, George, 161

U

Ueberweg, Friedrich, 113
Ulrici, Professor, 37, 87, 89, 115
United States, 52
Unknowable, doctrine of the, 65–73
Universe, in terms of personalism, 131–148; intelligibility of, 122–129; nature of physical, 158
Universities, appropriations to State, 166
University of Chicago, 91
Uriah, 187

V

Vaihynger, 157
*Varieties of Religious Experience, The*, 40, 146
Vincent, J. H., 235
Virgin birth, 184, 185

W

Warren, W. F., 91, 94, 203, 204, 247, 248; resignation of, 236
Wesley, John, 13, 17, 207, 222
Whately, Richard, 121
Whitestone, L. I., 32
Will, 108, 109; to Believe, 149
Wilson, G. A., 270
Wilson, J. C., 272; letter of, 278–280
Wing, C. S., 188
"Woman and Democracy," 170
*World and the Individual, The*, 132
*World Before Abraham*, 229
World-Idea, 135, 140, 144, 148
Worldiness, 17

Y

Yale University, 91
Youmans, E. L., 54; quoted, 100
*Youth's Companion, The*, 258
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